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Abstract 
 
The 1980s marked the beginning of market driven reforms in the electricity sector based 
on the standard textbook model. More than half of the economies around the world have 
initiated power sector reforms since late 1980s irrespective of the sector size, resource 
endowments, institutional capacity and economic development. Hence, this thesis 
qualitatively and quantitatively assesses the process and outcomes of market-based 
reforms evolving the electricity sector across the developing, transition and developed 
economies where reforms are on-going at various stages. Deriving relevant and feasible 
reform options and policy for the electricity sector based on the lessons learnt after 
considering more than two decades of reforms remains the major contribution of this 
thesis. 
 
Chapter one is the introductory chapter and provides an outline of the motivation and 
context of the thesis. Chapter two is a literature review of the experiences to date with 
the performance of electricity reforms across the reforming countries. The chapter 
identifies the knowledge gaps in the literature and sets the scene for the three substantial 
chapters of the thesis to follow.   
 
The third chapter assesses the issues and options in reforming small electricity sectors 
considering the twin complicating factors of political instability and increasing 
electricity demand. The reform in the small electricity sector of Nepal is cited as a 
specific case. Chapter four empirically investigates the often poorly explored link 
between power sector reforms and wider institutional reforms in the economy across 
different groups of transition countries. The transition countries include the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Chapter five examines the 
degree of market integration between the relatively small all-island Irish electricity 
market and other wholesale electricity markets in Europe. The chapter focuses on the 
role of interconnections and increased cross-border trade of electricity in the creation of 
an integrated market for electricity in Europe.  
 
Chapter six concludes the thesis by highlighting the policy implications and areas for 
future research. The chapter establishes that electricity sector reform is prone to chronic 
political, market and regulatory failures in many reforming countries.        
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the experiences to date with the process and 
outcomes of market-oriented reforms in the electricity sector across the developing, 
transition and developed economies. The major contribution of the current work 
remains in deriving relevant reform options and policy recommendations for the 
electricity sector based on the lessons learnt after more than two decades of reforms in 
the global electricity industries. 
 
1.1. The Standard Textbook Model for Reforms 
 
 Market driven electricity sector reforms have been initiated in more than half of the 
economies around the world since the early 1980s. The importance of the electricity 
industry in domestic production and economic development implied that reforms in the 
sector were crucial. The power sector is the growth engine of modern industrial and 
developing economies. The centralised and natural monopolistic characteristics of the 
power systems often conceptually make them a public utility. Hence, the results from 
reforms in the power sector matter and can serve as important economic and political 
tests for any government undertaking power sector reforms. 
 
The early 1980s gave birth to the ‘standard textbook model’ for organising and 
restructuring the electricity sector across countries. The model was based on market-
oriented liberal policies and typically constituted of three fundamental components 
(Joskow, 2008). The first element involved the vertical separation or unbundling of the 
potentially competitive segments (generation, marketing and retail supply) from the 
natural monopoly segments (the transmission and distribution networks). The model 
assumed that not all aspects of the electricity supply industry are monopolistic and 
electricity can also be generated and supplied by private and competitive firms apart 
from the state. Preventing cross-subsidization of competitive businesses from regulated 
businesses and promoting competition by guarding against any discriminatory network 
access policies were the principal drivers behind separating the competitive segments of 
the electricity supply industry (ESI) from the monopoly segments.   
 
The second component of the model underscored the need and role of private ownership 
of the competitive segments of the ESI on the notion that private entities could better 
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allocate the scarce capital resources and ensure efficient management of the system. It 
was perceived that privatisation of state-owned electricity monopolies will create hard 
budget constraints and high-powered incentives for efficiency improvements and make 
it more difficult for the state to use these industries in order to meet costly political 
agendas such as patronage employment, unfavourable macroeconomic and 
redistributive policies and national revenue diversion to government budgets outside of 
the tax system (Joskow, 2006).   
 
The third component of the standard model stressed the need to create powerful and 
effective new institutions in the form of independent regulators and regulatory agencies.  
An independent regulator would act as the custodian of public interests (Armstrong et 
al., 1994). It was expected that an independent regulatory authority with adequate staff, 
powers, duties and information about the costs, service quality and performance of the 
ESI will ensure proper conduct in the industry by effectively implementing the 
incentive regulation of the monopoly segments in terms of market entry, network 
charges and network access. Hence, it was assumed that incentive regulation of 
monopoly electricity networks will mimic the outcomes of a competitive market 
(Littlechild, 1992).  
 
Other components of the textbook model included the horizontal restructuring of the 
generation segment to create  adequate number of competing generators and suppliers,  
designation of an independent system operator to maintain network stability and 
facilitate competition,  creation of voluntary public wholesale spot energy and ancillary 
services markets and trading arrangements, application of regulatory rules to promote 
access to the transmission networks, unbundling of retail tariffs and rules to enable 
access to distribution networks and provision of transition mechanisms that can 
anticipate and respond to problems and facilitate the transition process (Joskow, 2000; 
Hunt, 2002).   
 
1.2. Factors Driving the Reforms 
 
Chile became the first developing country in the world to apply the 'standard textbook 
model' in 1982 and was soon followed by UK (1989) and Norway (1990). The Chilean 
reform sequence involved the following steps: i) establishment of the electricity market 
regulator at the start, ii) corporatization of state-owned enterprise, iii) law for electricity 
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sector liberalisation, iv) unbundling (or vertical separation) of the main segments, v) 
incentive regulation of electricity networks, vii) establishment of a wholesale electricity 
market, viii) introduction of privatisation and ix) introduction of private independent 
power producers (IPPs). 
  
The success of the model in Chile, UK and Norway demonstrated the great potential of 
introducing market-based reforms and incentive regulation in other countries around the 
world signalling the advent of modern electricity reforms. The remarkable pace and 
extent of the reforms meant that many advanced economies and around 70 developing 
and transition countries had adopted some market driven reform steps in their electricity 
sectors by the end of 1990s (Bacon, 1999; Steiner, 2001). The reform measures 
implemented across these countries varied from partial to complete adoption of the 
'standard textbook model'. For example, a developing country like Nepal has only 
pursued minimal structural changes in the electricity sector although IPPs have been 
introduced while a developed economy like Ireland has already reached the advanced 
stage of the standard reform model with the creation of an organised wholesale spot 
market for electricity.   
   
However, the demonstration effect from early success stories was just one of the major 
drivers of electricity sector reforms around the world. A combination of political, 
economic and technological factors enabled a remarkable world-wide experiment of 
introducing market-based reforms and restructuring of the electricity sector starting the 
early 1980s across the developed, transition and developing economies.   
 
1.2.1. Developed economies 
 
The advanced economies such as those belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) experienced a lack of electricity demand growth 
after the oil crisis of the 1970s. The adverse incentives of over-capitalisation under rate-
of-return regulation were also criticized (Averch and Johnson, 1962). Hence, the 
electricity industry in the developed countries were characterised by excess capacity 
coupled with the use of expensive generation technologies and productive inefficiency 
(Jamasb et al., 2005). Improving financial and economic performance of the ESI 
remained the major aim of pursuing reforms in developed economies. Ideological 
reasons also provided reasoning for reforms in these economies as exhibited by the 
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privatisation of the state-owned electricity utilities in the United Kingdom (UK) which 
reinforced the ideology of the Thatcher government. The development of gas-fired 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) and improvements in information and 
communication technology reduced the significance of economies of scale and 
facilitated the separation between generation and transmission segments of the ESI.   
 
In advanced economies such as the European Union (EU), the motive for reforms also 
came as an initiative from the European Commission through two electricity directives 
during 1996 and 2003 in the pursuit of a common integrated market for electricity 
(Newbery, 2002a). The EU directive 96/92/EC laid down the foundations concerning 
common rules towards creating an internal market for electricity. The 2003 directive 
established several key objectives to be achieved by 1 July, 2007 such as creating an 
independent regulator, 100% market opening to all customers including households, 
legal unbundling of the network segments from generation and supply and free entry in 
generation via a non-discriminatory network access to third-parties. In addition, the EU 
Directive 2009/72/EC underscored the need to mitigate barriers to cross-border trade 
and expand interconnections for creating an integrated market for electricity in Europe.  
 
However, the European reform model excludes some aspects of the standard model that 
are present in some of the leading reforming nations such as the UK. It is not mandatory 
to completely privatise the state-owned assets although there is a requirement to 
increase private sector participation in the market as demonstrated by successful 
electricity liberalisation in Norway and Sweden. The ownership unbundling of 
transmission system operation or transmission assets is also not required in the EU 
directives though independent system operation exists in many of pioneer reforming 
countries. Nonetheless, the integration of small economies and island states such as 
Ireland in the wider EU market currently remains an interesting political and economic 
challenge for Europe in the creation of an integrated and common electricity market. 
The challenge of establishing an integrated market for electricity becomes bigger when 
market integration goals have to be pursued along with the climate change and security 
of supply targets.  
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1.2.2. Developing and transition economies  
 
In developing and transition countries, reforms were particularly driven by the 
operational and economic inefficiency of the state-led vertically integrated utilities, the 
inability of the state sector to raise adequate capital, the lack of electricity access across 
the population, deteriorating facilities and equipment, serious problem of theft and non-
payment, the need to remove state subsidies for better allocation of resources and the 
desire to raise immediate revenue for the state through sale of state assets (Joskow, 
1998; Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001; Kessides, 2004). The macroeconomic crisis of the 
1980s also created a regime of fiscal responsibility in developing and transition 
countries. High inflation levels, increasing debt burden and deterioration of the quality 
of public services garnered political support towards liberalisation of the electricity 
industries.      
 
The shift from a vertically integrated public monopoly to a more competitive power 
sector by undertaking the structural, regulatory and ownership reforms was also 
strongly encouraged by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other 
international financial institutions in developing and transition countries. The World 
Bank officially changed its lending policy in 1992 for power sector development from 
traditional project lending to policy lending implying that any borrowing country should 
adopt the market-based standard reform model. This background explains the appeal of 
privatisation and market-oriented reform in developing and transition economies which, 
at times, preceded other necessary reform measures (Jamasb, 2006). 
 
The allure of utility privatisation was particularly strong among the transition countries 
(the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) and the 
Latin American countries (LACs). The transition countries experienced massive market-
oriented systemic changes in all sectors of their economy from the early 1990s. The 
structural change included aspects like macro stabilisation, price liberalisation, 
eliminating institutions of the communist systems and openness to international trade.  
These reforms were termed as Type I reforms while Type II reforms included the design 
and enforcement of laws, regulation and proper institutions to support and nurture the 
functioning of the market driven reforms (Svejnar, 2002). Large-scale economic 
privatisation combined with the establishment of legal institutions in establishing well-
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defined property rights and contracts and anti-corruption agencies were the major 
hallmarks of the Type II reforms.  
 
In the Latin American context, the first electricity privatisation took place in Chile in 
1982, followed by Argentina in 1992 and some privatisations in Brazil. The appeal of 
utility privatisation grew following these early experiences in other LACs such as Peru, 
Colombia and Bolivia. Privatisation coupled with wholesale market competition and 
independent regulation were the major elements of reform among the developing 
countries of Latin America.   
 
1.3. Context of Reforms 
 
The initial context of reforms varied across the reforming countries that underwent the 
wave of market-based electricity reforms. Resource characteristic and sector 
endowment, initial sector structure and institutional strength evolving the electricity 
sector differed across the reforming countries at the start of the reform process.  
 
1.3.1. Size of the sector 
 
The size of the electricity sector is a crucial but often ignored concept in electricity 
sector reforms. The size of the electricity system can generate substantial influence on 
the reform capabilities and reform options of individual reforming countries. Hence, not 
all reform elements prescribed by the standard textbook model are appropriate across all 
reforming countries. For example, it is not clear if small electricity systems also require 
or benefit from vertical separation and third-party access. The scope for competition 
may be limited. This suggests that the benefits of adopting a full reform package may be 
small in relation to the costs in small electricity systems. However, the importance of 
sector size on the determinants and performance of reforms has not received adequate 
attention in electricity reform literature implying a considerable knowledge gap. Bacon 
(1999) provided important information on the extent of reforms possible in small 
electricity systems which clearly motivates studying the impacts of different stages of 
reform on performance among reforming countries with varying sector endowments.   
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1.3.2. Sector structure       
 
The initial sector structure at the time of reform is a function of the sector’s history, 
resource endowment and past policies. The initial structure defines the starting point of 
the reform process and is a given factor (Jamasb et al., 2004). For example, the 
transition countries inherited the features of the command economy in the power sector 
which led to politically determined power prices, excess capacity and high levels of 
electrification at the start of economic liberalisation.   
 
However, the reform measures adopted have a direct impact on the performance of the 
sector. Reforms take time to implement and produce the desired effects. Hence, it is 
important that the appropriate structure is envisaged from the start of the reform process 
(Jamasb et al., 2005). For example, the transition countries adopted market-oriented 
reforms in the electricity sector but did not effectively create suitable institutions to 
support the market driven reforms. Whether the reform in the electricity sector worked 
or not is a matter of empirical investigation and is clearly missing in the past literature 
studying electricity sector reforms. 
 
1.3.3. Institutional factors 
 
Institutional factors refer to the sector and economy level legal and regulatory 
frameworks that influence and support the continuity of the electricity sector reform 
process.  According to North (1991), institutions are humanly devised constraints that 
structure human interaction at the political, economic and social levels, provide an 
incentive structure of an economy, create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. 
From an institutional economics perspective, institutions constitute two essential 
components: the institutional environment and institutional arrangement (Williamson, 
1995). The institutional environment is concerned with macro-level 'rules of the game' 
which can be formal or informal while institutional arrangements focus on micro-level 
governance mechanisms. The institutional endowment of a country influences the 
institutional environment and includes five elements: legislative and executive system, 
judicial system, administrative system, informal rules and social and ideological 
character of the nation (Levy and Spiller, 1994). 
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The reforms and regulation of the electricity sector in developing countries tend to 
suffer from low levels of institutional environment in terms of limited regulatory 
capacity, limited accountability, limited commitment and limited fiscal efficiency 
(Laffont, 2005). The weak institutional environment implies that reforms and regulation 
of the electricity sector can be ineffective. Regulation becomes prone to political 
capture becoming a tool of self-interest within the government or ruling elite (Stiglitz, 
1998). In contrast, developed countries have robust institutional frameworks and 
arrangements in place as they have a high institutional endowment. Hence, 
implementing reforms and regulation of the sector is easy and feasible in developed 
economies. Whether reforms and regulation of the electricity sector in developed 
economies is effective or not requires exact empirical testing. This is because many 
developed countries have already exhausted the reform steps under the standard model 
implying that current reforms are driven by the need to meet different national and 
regional objectives. For example, an isolated small island developed economy like 
Ireland with robust institutions in place faces major challenges to increase market 
integration with other wholesale electricity markets in Europe by expanding 
interconnections.  
 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Reforms are on-going in many countries while the reform process in the electricity 
sector is regarded as not only possible, but also inevitable. Ample amounts of financial 
resource and effort have already been spent in reforming the electricity sector across all 
developing, transition and developed economies since the 1980s. What reform lessons 
can be learnt, in general, from these electricity reform experiences for an economy that 
is willing to undertake reforms? In particular, what lessons can be learnt from the 
theoretical and empirical analysis of electricity reform experiences across countries 
where electricity reforms were separately initiated due to pressures from external 
lending policy, as a consequence of overall transition towards market-driven economic 
reforms and as a consequence of successful reform experience in the UK with the need 
to comply to the EU directives? These are the questions this thesis aims to answer. 
 
Chapter 2 of the thesis provides a literature review on the theoretical and empirical 
evidence of reform performance in developing, transition and developed economies.  
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The literature review also identifies the caveats in existing literature on electricity sector 
reforms.  
 
Chapter 3 of the thesis assesses the issues and options in reforming small electricity 
systems citing Nepal as a specific case. Nepal is a developing country in South Asia 
where reforms seem to have stalled after undertaking minimal structural changes and 
introducing IPPs. The Nepalese electricity sector also initiated reforms in the electricity 
sector since the early 1990s, often due to direct lending pressures from international 
financial institutions. However, increasing electricity demand and political instability 
remain the complicating factors obstructing the implementation of reforms in the state-
owned electricity sector among less-developed countries like Nepal which this chapter 
attempts to account for.    
 
Chapter 4 of the thesis quantitatively examines the impact of market-oriented reforms in 
the economy including the power sector and their effect on the power sector outcomes 
and economic growth in the transition countries using panel-data econometrics. The 
transition countries represent a remarkable electricity reform experiment in the  world as 
many of these countries have a clear reform model to follow from the EU with access to 
substantial amount of resources or technical assistance and reform is on-going in the 
context of associated macroeconomic and governance reforms (Pollitt, 2009). The 
emergence of transition economies also coincided with the world-wide trend in power 
sector reforms. Hence, market-oriented electricity reforms started after the collapse of 
communism in the context of overall macroeconomic transformation in transition 
countries. Furthermore, the transition countries are of special interest in the context of 
analysing electricity sector reform because they include a diverse mix of countries 
belonging to different stages of economic development and different stages of the 
reform process. 
 
Chapter 5 of the thesis quantitatively studies the restructuring and reform of a small and 
isolated Irish wholesale electricity market located in an island economy. The Single 
Electricity Market (SEM) is a relatively new wholesale market in Europe and started its 
operation in November of 2007 in line with the EU policy guidance. However, lack of 
sustained competition and market power concerns imply that expanding 
interconnections can be a feasible solution to improve competition and market 
integration in SEM as per the EU policy of creating an integrated market of electricity 
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in Europe. This chapter estimates the degree of market integration between SEM against 
other large, mature and well-established electricity wholesale markets in Europe 
including Great Britain (GB) using advanced time-series econometrics.   
 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by outlining the findings from the three empirical 
chapters, and attempts to combine the results and interpret them in the context of global 
electricity reforms. This chapter also highlights the contributions of the research and 
suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2. Review of the Literature  
 
Economic principle suggests that a reform should be undertaken if the reform adopted 
will engender a net positive economic welfare impact. This implies that a social-cost 
benefit analysis (SCBA) prior to reform is a pre-requisite to assess the effectiveness of 
reforms. A SCBA considers reforms and restructuring as an investment and compares 
the costs of investment with the benefit which is the change in actual and projected 
performance relative to a defined counterfactual of what would have happened in the 
absence of reform and restructuring (Jones et al., 1990). Hence, a SCBA estimates the 
overall welfare impact of reforms and distribution of welfare among government, 
consumers and private investors. However, governments do not necessarily perform 
social-cost benefit analysis prior to reform and tend to rely on less formal types of 
assessment (Jamasb et al., 2004). A limited number of notable studies assess the 
efficacy of electricity reforms and restructuring using SCBA, mostly in the Latin 
American and European context.   
 
Galal et al. (1994) estimated that the privatisation of the Chilean distribution and 
generation companies led to a permanent gain in social welfare equivalent to 2.1% of 
1986 sales although two-thirds of the aggregate gains go to foreign shareholders. Mota 
(2003) found out that the privatisation of distribution companies in Brazil created a one-
off gain equal to 2.5% of national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while producers gain 
around two-thirds of the benefits. Anaya (2010) calculated the welfare impacts of 
privatisation of two retailing and distribution companies in Peru. The study estimated a 
permanent gain of 27% of costs. Toba (2002) concluded that the privatisation of 
Meralco, a distribution company in Philippines, contributed to a permanent gain 
equalling 6.5% of 1999 sales. Another study by Toba (2007) estimated that the 
introduction of independent power producers by incumbent generator created a one off 
gain amounting to 13% of national GDP of Philippines.      
   
In the UK context, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) estimated that the privatisation and 
separation of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) into generation and 
transmission led to a permanent gain in welfare equivalent to 6% of 1995 turnover even 
though consumers lose initially. Pollitt (1999) applied a social cost-benefit analysis 
methodology, similar to that by Newbery and Pollitt (1997), to the Scottish electricity 
systems. The study estimated that efficiency gains from privatisation in the Scottish 
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system, under the more probable counterfactual scenario, were relatively small at about 
10% of turnover as compared to 50% in England and Wales. Green and McDaniel 
(1998) applied SCBA to examine the economic merits of full market opening in the ESI 
of England and Wales. The results showed that full market opening result in lower 
prices but with additional transactions costs exceeding £100 million a year for the first 
five years. Domah and Pollitt (2001) found out that the privatisation of 12 regional 
electricity distribution companies in the UK lead to a permanent gain equivalent to 9% 
of 1995 turnover. The study showed that consumers begin to gain only from 2000 while 
the government gains £5 billion in sale proceeds and net taxes. The latter study by 
Domah and Pollitt (2001) confirms the finding of the previous study by Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997) in asserting that consumers lose initially in the privatisation process. 
Barmack et al. (2007) estimated the net benefits of wholesale electricity market 
restructuring and competition in New England to be about 2% of wholesale costs. The 
SCBA methodology used in this study was based on Newbery and Pollitt (1997).    
 
Likewise, Brunekreeft (2008) estimated the welfare impacts of ownership unbundling of 
the electricity transmission system operators in Germany using discounted SCBA. The 
results suggested marginal gain in terms of net weighted discounted benefits. De Nooij 
(2011) economically analysed the decisions to build the NorNed and the East-West 
interconnectors in Europe using a SCBA. The main conclusion from the analysis 
indicated that the current interconnector and transmission investment decisions in 
Europe are unlikely to maximize the social welfare. Malaguzzi Valeri (2009) analysed 
the effects of additional interconnection on welfare and competition in the Irish 
electricity market. The study found that the amount of interconnection with the Great 
Britain market would have to be large for the two markets to benefit from market 
integration. The study concluded that as the amount of interconnection increases, there 
are also positive effects on competition in Ireland, the less competitive of the two 
markets.         
 
However, assessing the effectiveness of electricity reforms experience can be complex 
as it includes different interrelated steps. These can occur in different forms or models 
in a dynamic process (Pollitt, 2009). Electricity sector reforms are multi-dimensional 
activities with many interacting factors and a variety of impacts that a SCBA may 
inadequately capture. Hence, there exist other important applicable approaches to 
analyse electricity sector reforms and can be classified into four major categories: 
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econometric studies, efficiency and productivity analysis, macro studies and individual 
and comparative case studies. Econometric studies can suitably analyse well-defined 
issues and hypothesis tests through statistical analysis of reform determinants and 
performance while efficiency and productivity analyses are desirable for assessing the 
effectiveness with which inputs are transformed into outputs, relative to best practice. 
Macro studies of reforms estimate their impacts using general equilibrium models of the 
economy. Likewise, single or multi-country case studies are desirable when in-depth 
investigation or qualitative analysis is needed. 
 
2.1. Econometric Studies 
 
Econometric studies are used to examine the drivers of electricity reform and to 
quantify the effect of various reforms on the electricity performance indicators. 
Performance metric regressions based on cross-section and panel data econometrics are 
applied for this purpose. Statistical tests to assess the significant differences in the 
performance metrics before and after reforms are also applicable by conducting a t-test. 
However, a t-test for significant performance differences cannot control for the effects 
of other variables as in a multi-variate regression analysis. Several econometric studies 
have examined the effect of reforms on performance indicators in developing and 
developed countries based on regression analysis.  
 
Ruffin (2003) conducted an econometric study of  institutional determinants of 
competition, ownership and extent of reform as dependent variables in electricity sector 
restructuring using cross-section regression analysis for 75 developed and developing 
economies around the world. Different measures of judicial independence, distributional 
conflict and economic ideology were used as explanatory variables. The study found an 
ambiguous relationship between judicial independence and competition and ownership. 
However, greater distributional conflict is significantly correlated with a higher degree 
of monopoly while there was a positive but not always significant relationship between 
judicial independence and extent of reforms. Nagayama (2009) studied whether the 
effects of electric power sector reforms should be different either across regions or 
between developed and developing countries using panel data for 78 countries from four 
separate regions involving the developed, developing Asian, Latin American and 
selected transition countries around the world for the period 1985 to 2003. The results 
suggested that higher electricity prices was one of the driving forces for government to 
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adopt liberalisation models while the development of liberalisation models in  power 
sector did not necessarily reduce prices.   
 
Similarly, Erdogdu (2011a) empirically analysed the impact of power market reforms 
on residential and industrial price-cost margins and their effect on cross-subsidy levels 
between different consumer groups using panel data for 63 developed and developing 
countries covering the period 1982-2009. The research findings suggested that there is 
no uniform pattern for the impact of the reform process as a whole on price-cost 
margins and cross-subsidy levels. Hence, each individual reform step has a different 
impact on price-cost margins and cross-subsidy levels for each consumer and country 
group. This also implies that reform prescription of a specific country cannot easily and 
successfully be transferred to another country. Another study by Erdogdu (2011b) 
analysed the impact of power market reforms and their effects on power sector 
efficiency using panel data from 92 developing and developed countries covering the 
period 1982-2008. The findings showed that income level and other country specific 
features are more important determinants of industry efficiency than reforms. The study 
concluded that introducing a decentralised market model with competition in the 
electricity sector has a limited increasing effect on electricity industry performance.  
 
A number of studies have also examined the effects of various aspects of reforms on 
industry performance among the OECD countries. Steiner (2001) tested whether 
regulatory environment, degree of vertical integration and degree of private ownership 
have an impact on efficiency and on prices for a panel dataset of 19 OECD countries for 
the period 1987-1996. The study found that utilisation rate is positively and 
significantly correlated with both private ownership and unbundling of generation and 
transmission. The results also showed that private ownership is not necessarily 
correlated with increased competition while the establishment of a spot market was 
found to lead to lower prices. Hattori and Tsutsui (2003) replicated Steiner's model for 
the same sample of countries but for a different time period covering from 1987-1999 
slightly changing the definitions of the regulatory reform indicators. The study found 
that the existence of a wholesale market is statistically significant and positive for prices 
while third party access is statistically significant negatively in contrast to Steiner 
(2001). This implies that precise definitions of reform indicators are critical to the 
empirical work undertaken. Meanwhile, Chang and Berdiev (2011) examined the effect 
of government ideology, political factors and globalisation on energy regulation in 
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electricity and gas industries using a panel dataset for 23 OECD countries over the 
period 1975-2007. The study found that left-wing governments promote regulation in 
gas and electricity sectors while less politically fragmented institutions contribute to 
deregulation of gas and electricity industries. The findings from this study indicate that 
political economy factors are also important determinants of electricity sector reform 
and regulation in the advanced economies. 
 
While the previous studies examined the impact of reforms on OECD countries, Bacon 
and Besant-Jones (2001) tested hypotheses on the determinants of reform for a sample 
of 115 developing countries using cross-section regression analysis for the year 1998. 
The results suggested that reforms are positively associated with country-level policy 
and institutions while reforms tend to occur with high probability in countries with 
lower political and economic risk. Zhang et al. (2005) studied the effect of sequencing 
of privatisation, competition and regulation reforms in electricity generation using panel 
data for 25 developing countries covering the period 1985-2001. The results from the 
study concluded that establishing an independent regulatory authority and introducing 
competition before privatisation is correlated with higher electricity generation and 
higher generation capacity while sequencing competition before privatisation 
significantly improves capital utilisation.  
  
Another study by Zhang et al. (2005) provided an econometric assessment on the effects 
of privatisation, competition and regulation in electricity generation industry using 
panel data for 36 developing and transitional countries over the period 1985–2003. The 
study identified the impact of these reforms on generating capacity, electricity 
generation, and labour productivity in electricity generation and capacity utilisation. The 
results suggested that privatisation and regulation, on their own, do not lead to obvious 
gains in economic performance though there are some positive interaction effects. In 
contrast, introducing competition does seem to be effective in stimulating performance 
improvements. Sen and Jamasb (2012) also conducted an econometric analysis of the 
determinants and impact of electricity reform in India giving special regard to its 
political economy and regional diversity using panel data for 19 states spanning 1991-
2007. The results showed that individual reform measures have affected key economic 
variables implying that the nature of reform in individual states would determine these 
economic outcomes. The findings suggest that outcomes have tended to be adverse in 
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the initial stages of reform as previously hidden distortions become apparent in the 
reform process due to political economy factors in developing countries. 
 
2.2. Efficiency and Productivity Studies 
 
Efficiency and productivity studies use parametric and non-parametric methods to 
measure productivity and efficiency. Parametric methods of efficiency analysis rely on 
specified functional forms of production or cost functions and utilise econometric 
techniques. Typical parametric methods include regression analysis and stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). Non-parametric methods use mathematical programming 
techniques and do not require specification of production or cost functions. Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a commonly used non-parametric method that 
evaluates performance relative to the frontier. Frontier methodologies do not assume 
that all economic agents are technically efficient and measures efficiency as the distance 
to the frontier by constructing a cost or production function. Therefore, each individual 
agent is benchmarked against the best practice. Such studies reduce the need for data 
and especially when the data is challenging to collect. A number of studies have 
analysed the effect of electricity reforms on productive efficiency in developing and 
developed countries. 
 
Plane (1999) evaluated the impact of privatisation of Côte d’Ivorie Electricity Company 
(CIE) on efficiency using the SFA technique to measure efficiency change. The results 
obtained could not reject the hypothesis of a significant performance improvement in 
post-privatisation period while the technical efficiency measures have behaved 
irregularly since privatisation. Estache et al. (2008) first attempted at documenting 
efficiency levels in Africa's electricity firms based on a sample of 12 operators 
providing services in the 12 country members of the Southern Africa Power Pool. The 
study relied on the DEA decomposition technique to estimate the changes in total factor 
productivity (TFP). The results showed comparable levels of efficiency and 
performance levels in the region while finding no clear correlation of efficiency with the 
adoption of reforms.      
 
A number of studies have also focussed on efficiency and productivity analysis of 
electricity reforms in the transition countries. Berg et al. (2005) analysed 24 electric 
utilities in Ukraine in determining the extent to which privately owned firms respond to 
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incentives in ways that are different from publicly owned firms in the context of a new 
regulatory authority and distribution utility privatisations. The results from the empirical 
analysis suggested that a privately-owned firm responds to policies and incentives 
associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network losses. Cullman and 
von Hirschhausen (2008a) tested the hypothesis that economic transition toward a 
market economy increases the efficiency of firms by studying 32 Polish distribution 
companies using the DEA and SFA techniques. The results illustrated that technical 
efficiency of the companies increased during the transition process while allocative 
efficiency deteriorated. Another study by Cullman and von Hirschhausen (2008b) 
provided a cross-country efficiency analysis of electricity distribution companies in the 
East European transition countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary using non-parametric efficiency measurement involving DEA. The results 
showed the Polish distribution companies to be inefficiently small while the Czech 
Republic featured the highest efficiency. Slovakia and Hungary occupied the middle 
range. This implies that privatisation had a positive effect on technical efficiency in all 
four countries.   
 
A limited number of studies have been carried out to assess the efficiency and 
productivity of electricity reforms in developing Asian countries. Jain et al. (2010) 
evaluated the performance and efficiency of Indian electricity generation companies 
using both SFA and DEA approaches to analyse the effect of restructuring in the Indian 
electric power sector. The result supported the government policy of unbundling the 
Indian power sector. Wattana and Sharma (2011) examined whether electricity industry 
reforms improved the technical performance of the Thai electricity industry using DEA 
for the period 1980-2006. The study revealed that the increase in productivity of the 
Thai electricity industry over the period 1980-2006 was mainly driven by technological 
improvements and that industry reform had insignificant impact on productivity. 
Bautista et al. (2011) examined the efficiency and productivity of 120 electric 
cooperatives in Philippines using DEA for the period 2001-2006. The results showed 
that productivity in the sector had not improved significantly despite the reforms 
instituted in 2001. Nakano and Managi (2008) measured productivity in Japan's steam 
power-generation sector and examined the effect of reforms on the productivity over the 
period 1978–2003 using the DEA approach. The empirical analysis showed that 
regulatory reforms have contributed to productivity growth in the steam power-
generation sector in Japan.    
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Similarly, Pardina and Rossi (2000) studied technical change in a sample of electricity 
distribution companies in South America involving 36 distribution companies from ten 
South American countries using the SFA technique. The results failed to reject the 
hypothesis of no change in inefficiency effects over the period 1994-1997 while there 
was only partial evidence of correlation between reforms and performance. Ramos-Real 
et al. (2009) estimated the changes in productivity of the Brazilian electricity 
distribution sector using DEA on a panel of 18 firms from 1998 to 2005. The results 
generally proved that the reform processes as well as the incentives generated in the 
reform process do not seem to have led the firms to behave in a more efficient manner. 
Perez–Reyes and Tovar (2009) assessed whether reforms have improved efficiency by 
analysing the evolution of productivity of 14 electricity distribution companies in Peru. 
The analysis suggested that improvements in efficiency and productivity of electricity 
distribution in Peru have occurred with the adoption of liberalised reforms in the 
Peruvian electricity sector.  
 
In the context of developed countries, von Hirschhausen et al. (2009) applied non-
parametric and parametric tests to assess the efficiency of 307 electricity distribution 
companies in Germany. The results suggested that only very small utilities have a 
significant cost advantage while East German utilities featured a higher average 
efficiency than their West German counterparts. Delmas and Tokat (2003) examined the 
short-term impact of supply deregulation on the productive efficiency of electricity 
utilities in the United States using DEA. The results supported the hypotheses that a 
greater level of deregulation leads to a lower level of technical efficiency in the short-
term while there is a U-shaped relationship between the level of vertical integration and 
efficiency. Vaninsky (2006) estimated the efficiency of electric power generation in the 
United States for the period starting 1991 through 2004 using DEA. The results showed 
relative stability in efficiency from 1994 through 2000 at levels of 99–100% after which 
the efficiency declined. Hattori et al. (2005) examined the relative performance of 
electricity distribution systems between 1985 and 1989 in the UK and Japan using DEA 
and SFA methods. The results showed that productivity gain in the UK electricity 
distribution has been larger than in the Japanese sector while productivity growth 
accelerated in the UK under tightened revenue caps.  
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2.3. Macro Studies 
 
A number of studies have attracted the use of general equilibrium models in assessing 
the quantitative impacts of electricity reforms on the economy. The computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models use actual economic data to estimate how an economy might 
react to changes in policy, technology or other external factors. The advantage of the 
reform studies based on CGE modelling is that these studies attempt to model the 
interaction effects of sector reform with non-reforming sectors and calculate the 
aggregate welfare effect directly.  
 
Whiteman (1999) evaluated the macroeconomic impact of microeconomic reform of the 
Australian electricity industry using a CGE model. The study estimated a 0.22% 
increase in the GDP in the long run as a result of the electricity reform. The benefits of 
the reform were reflected in terms of a rise in real wages rather than an increase in 
employment. A study by Copenhagen Economics (2005) estimated that liberalised 
reforms such as market opening in network industries including the electricity sector 
raised the GDP of the EU-15 by 2%. This study was a report prepared for the European 
Commission using CGE modelling.  
 
In the Chinese context, He et al. (2010) estimated the impact of electricity price 
adjustment policy on the Chinese macro-economy based on a CGE model. The results 
concluded that an electricity price increase had an adverse influence on GDP, and the 
consumer price index (CPI) implying that electricity price increases have a 
contractionary effect on economic development. Kerkela (2004) estimated the costs of 
subsidised energy system in Russia and then analysed the government policy of 
boosting the gas and electricity prices to bring them into line with market-based pricing 
using a multi-region general equilibrium model. The results showed that energy 
subsidies extracted over 6% of GDP while increases of 6% in electricity and 10% in the 
price of regulated gas would improve economic efficiency by reducing subsidies 
distortions and distinctly shifting output from domestic markets to exports. Galinis and 
Leeuwen (2000) analysed the policy consequences of continuing with the future use of 
electricity generated from nuclear sources in Lithuania using a CGE model. The result 
showed that a low nuclear potential in Lithuania would result in low economic growth 
and development. 
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Similarly, a notable study by Chisara et al. (1999) estimated the macroeconomic and 
distributional effects of utilities privatisation and regulation in Argentina using a CGE 
model. The results showed that both privatisation and effective regulation led to 
significant macroeconomic benefits. However, gains from privatisation accrued mainly 
to high-income classes, while gains from the effective regulation of newly privatized 
utilities accrued mainly to low-income classes. The CGE estimates of overall 
employment effects suggested that privatisation was not a major contributor to the 
dramatic rise in unemployment in Argentina between 1993 and 1995. Boccanfuso et al. 
(2009a) used a CGE model to explore the distributional effects of price reform in the 
electricity sector of Senegal. The analysis demonstrated that poor and rural households 
were not the main beneficiaries of the expanded network while the results of the CGE 
model showed that direct price effects were weaker than general equilibrium effects on 
poverty and inequality. Another study by Boccanfuso et al. (2009b) explored the 
distributional and poverty-related effects of price reform in the electricity sector of 
Mali, a poor country in West Africa, using a CGE model. The results showed that direct 
price increases had a minimal effect on poverty and inequality, whereas the general 
equilibrium effects of such increases were quite strong and negative. 
 
2.4. Case Studies                    
 
Qualitative aspects such as regulation and conflict resolution and reform dynamics such 
as the implementation process are crucial factors in assessing the efficacy of electricity 
sector reforms and processes (Jamasb et al., 2004). However, these factors are 
inherently difficult to capture through statistical methods. Case studies can examine the 
issues that do not easily lend themselves to rigorous quantitative analysis or could not 
be analysed due to lack of comprehensive data. Hence, analysis based on case studies 
can also overcome the issues associated with model specification and accuracy of 
variables in representing the relevant aspect of reform. Case studies involving single or 
multiple countries have been a popular technique to study the process and outcomes of 
electricity sector reforms in many developing and developed countries. 
 
The assessment of reform performance across the reforming countries is based on the 
selection of performance indicators used for the comparative assessment of utilities as 
well as in gauging the impacts of sector reform on performance. Few notable studies 
have developed the indicators for power utility performance in developing and 
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transition countries that are used in comparative assessment of reforms and in 
benchmarking studies. Jamasb et al. (2004) provided a framework for benchmarking 
and analysing the performance of utilities undergoing reforms in developing countries. 
The study proposed a set of core performance indicators encompassing the economic, 
social, technological and environmental aspects of power sector reform. A World Bank 
(2007) study identified the core indicators for benchmarking analysis of electricity 
distribution sector in the Latin American and Caribbean region. This study categorised 
the performance variables in terms of technical and operational, quality, access and 
financial. Another study in World Bank (2009) created the electricity sector database for 
Sub-Saharan African countries undergoing power sector reform. The study categorises 
the performance indicators as measures of technical efficiency, electricity coverage, 
electricity usage, supply quality, electricity pricing and financial efficiency. Since 1994, 
the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has developed the 
transition indicators to assess the progress of reforms in all sectors of the economy 
including the power sector. The progress of reforms in the power sector is assessed 
under nine categories including ownership, independent regulation, vertical unbundling 
and cost-reflective tariffs. 
 
Fisher et al. (2003) addressed the effect of privatisation of the Chilean electricity sector 
without vertical or horizontal unbundling on efficiency of firms and social welfare. The 
study found that privatisation led to rising investments in generation and transmission, 
falling unit costs, declining energy losses and increasing labour productivity. Pollitt 
(2004) assessed the progress of the Chilean electricity reform that began in 1982 using a 
case study approach. The overall experience showed that the success of private 
ownership and operation of the electricity industry in Chile provided a successful 
reform lesson to other developing countries. Similarly, privatisation of the electricity 
sector with full-scale vertical and horizontal restructuring led to increasing investments 
in generation, declining distribution losses and a reduction in the spot price of electricity 
in Argentina (Rudnick and Solezzi, 2001). Pollitt (2008b) also highlighted that 
liberalised electricity reforms in Argentina were very successful prior to the collapse of 
the Argentine peso in early 2002. However, the economic achievements of the sector 
have been severely constrained by the Argentine government's poor energy policy since 
the crisis. In Colombia, privatisation of the unbundled electricity sector and the 
introduction of bid-based pool market improved the quality of supply in the Colombian 
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electricity market by reducing the average interruption time (Pombo and Taborda, 
2006). 
 
In India, unbundling and privatisation of some state electricity boards in 1991 
contributed to declining distribution losses for Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board 
and Delhi Vidyut Board (Bhatia and Gulati, 2004). However, Bhattacharya (2007), 
using an institutional economics framework, showed that the South Asian developing 
countries including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have not 
been able to make any noteworthy example of successful reform in the region since 
reforms started in 1990s. Slow progress of reform in these countries has affected the 
viability of the sector due to inadequate investment and poor operational performance. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, reforms have involved the introduction of IPPs with some 
unbundling and limited progress in establishing independent regulatory mechanisms. 
This has resulted in addition of about 4 gigawatts (GW) of capacity since early 1990s 
with IPPs generally showing better technical performance than regions with state-
owned incumbent utilities as observed in Kenya (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). 
 
Similarly, Victor and Heller (2007) concluded that the actual application and success of 
the standard textbook model has been highly erratic while the experience of power 
sector reform in developing countries seems to have gone wrong after evaluating the 
reform experiences of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. Williams and 
Ghanadan (2006) concluded that the non-OECD reform experiences suggest 
disappointing results due to the absence of effective regulation and socio-political 
legitimacy based on reform case studies of Bolivia, Ghana, India, Poland and Thailand. 
The reform process in the electricity sector of many transition countries not associated 
with the EU have also been heterogeneous and marked by political reluctance resulting 
in slow and stalled implementation of reforms (Kessides, 2012). There is wide variation 
in progress with the implementation of the model even in the EU while compliance with 
directives does not necessarily imply a thorough-going electricity reform (Pollitt, 2009). 
For example, Germany started the electricity market liberalisation process in 1998 
without an independent regulator which was only created in 2005. The theoretical 
analysis by Pollitt (2009) also concluded that the transition countries can gain above 
costs of reforms from judicious combination of reforms in the electricity sector. 
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In the United States of America (USA), energy reforms affecting the electricity sector 
have been the most disappointing even though major progress has been made in 
removing the costly price and entry regulation affecting almost every energy sector 
directly or indirectly over the last nearly four decades (Joskow, 2009). Likewise, the 
UK reform experience has revealed considerable complexities and difficulties in making 
market driven reforms work to meet the climate change and security of supply targets 
(Pollitt, 2012). Nonetheless, reforms have progressed in Australia, Canada, the United 
States and parts of Latin America. Kessides (2012) concluded that the standard reform 
model with competition, unbundling and effective regulation can lead to large gains in 
performance when implemented properly. 
 
The theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that reforms seem to have improved 
productive and operational efficiency in many developed and transition countries 
although allocative efficiency has deteriorated in the early reform process. However, it 
is not clear whether the gain in productive efficiency resulted from technological 
improvements or from the adoption of reforms. In many developing countries, reforms 
seem to be largely ineffective in inducing efficiency improvements with minimal or no 
effect on poverty and income inequality. Hence, the performance of reforms suggests 
that the success of market-based reforms is neither uniform nor guaranteed across the 
reforming countries. However, theoretical and empirical studies on the performance of 
market-based reforms on economies with small electricity systems are limited. Hence, 
clear conclusions on the performance of reforms in small electricity systems cannot be 
extracted. Likewise, the empirical evidence on the performance of electricity reforms in 
the context of wider macro-economic reforms is also missing in the literature. This 
thesis aims to fill in these gaps using both cross-country econometric studies and case 
studies to assess the effectiveness of reforms in the electricity sector of the reforming 
countries. 
 
Chapter 3 uses a case-study approach to evaluate the performance of reforms in the 
Nepalese electricity sector. Nepal is a developing country in South Asia and has a small 
electricity system. This is the first study to thoroughly assess the performance of various 
electricity reforms in Nepal. Chapter 4 uses panel-data econometrics to evaluate the 
performance of electricity reforms in the transition countries. The size of the electricity 
sector among the transition countries vary from being small to large. This is the first 
study to quantify the performance effects of electricity reforms in the context of overall 
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macroeconomic reforms in the transition countries. Chapter 5 uses time-series 
econometrics to analyse the performance of electricity reform policy aimed at 
deepening competition in the Irish wholesale market through increased 
interconnections. The wholesale market in Ireland can be considered a small system as 
compared to other wholesale electricity markets in Europe. This is the first study to 
quantify the effects of interconnections on market integration involving the Irish 
wholesale electricity market in line with the EU policy of increasing electricity market 
integration in Europe.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
         
 25 
Chapter 3: Reforming Small Electricity Systems under Political               
Instability: The Case of Nepal 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Electricity sector reforms have remained a priority across many developing and 
developed economies since the late 1980s. Many advanced economies and developing 
countries introduced some market-based reform steps in their electricity sector by the 
end of 1990s. Countries in the South Asia, including Nepal, also initiated some reform 
of their power sector as the popularity of market-oriented electricity reforms grew 
around the world. However, the motives, ideology, and initial contexts of reform 
differed across these countries although the reform aspirations were relatively similar. 
In developed economies, improving economic and financial efficiency were the guiding 
principles of power sector reform. Reforms in less-developed countries were inevitable 
due to the burdens of price subsidies, low service quality, low bill collection rates, high 
network energy losses and poor service coverage experienced under the monolithic 
state-owned and controlled systems (Joskow, 1998; Newberry, 2002b; Kessides, 2004; 
Jamasb, 2006).   
 
The initial context of reforms across the developed and developing reforming countries 
also varied in terms of institutional arrangements and frameworks, political ambience, 
market structures and electricity sector size and resource endowment. The electricity 
sectors of many developing countries, including Nepal, can be regarded as ‘small 
systems’. Small power systems are defined as having less than 1000 megawatts (MW) 
of installed capacity in a developing country context (Besant-Jones, 2006). As of 2004, 
60 developing countries had peak system loads that were below 150 MW; another 30 
countries between 150 and 500 MW, and possibly another 20 countries are between 501 
and 1000 MW (Bacon, 1999). However, increasing population and load implies that 
many small power systems will not remain small and instead grow over time from their 
current size. As such, the peak load in Nepal is also projected to increase to 2206 MW 
by 2020 and to 3679 MW by 2030 (NEA, 2010).  
 
Meeting the rapid growth in electricity demand remains a major challenge facing the 
Nepalese electricity sector. The vertically-integrated Nepalese electricity sector has 
managed to develop only around 0.72 GW out of potential 40 GW of generation 
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capacity including those of the IPPs since the establishment of Nepal Electricity 
Authority (NEA) in 1985. Various factors have contributed to the slow development of 
hydropower in Nepal despite being endowed with large water resources (Joshi and 
Khadka, 2009). The sector evolved in the on-going governmental and political 
instability in the country while having experienced a major ‘civil war’ that spanned for 
eleven years. The ‘civil war’ or ‘Maoist insurgency’ lasted from February 1996 until 
November, 2006 and involved 14,000 losing their lives while making 150,000 
homeless. The political leadership has changed around 15 times in the last decade with 
Nepal being the world’s most recent republic nation in 2008. NEA, operating under a 
single-buyer model (SBM), is also not immune to political intervention and corruption. 
Political instability has severely affected the predominantly state owned and controlled 
Nepalese electricity sector resulting in discontinued policies, uncertainty, and weak and 
often stalled implementation of sector reforms and policies. Thus, the current 
organisation and structure of the electricity sector can be regarded as uncertain and 
unsustainable considering growing political instability and rising electricity demand 
after more than two decades of the electricity reform process.  
 
The purpose of this study is to assess the performance of the Nepalese power sector 
since the adoption of various reforms and policies after NEA was established. The 
contributions of this study are two-fold. Firstly, this study provides important electricity 
reform lessons for several monolithic state-owned and controlled ‘small electricity 
systems’ in Asia and Africa reeling under growing political instability and increasing 
electricity demand. Secondly, the study aims to fill an existing gap in literature 
regarding a comprehensive study of the power sector reform process and outcomes in 
the Nepalese electricity sector. 
 
The study discusses international experience with electricity reforms in South Asian 
countries where reforms began often under external insistence but did not produce any 
example of successful reform in the region (Bhattacharya, 2007). In contrary, successful 
electricity reforms in several Latin American countries (LACs) such as Chile, Argentina 
and Brazil are also discussed. These LACs successfully reformed from having a small 
power sector towards a large one in the last two decades since adopting the market-
based reforms. Chile, in particular, provides an intriguing case because it introduced 
market-based reforms in the electricity sector with a small system, weak rule of law and 
weak democracy (Jamasb et al., 2004). These conditions can be regarded as obstacles to 
 27 
liberal electricity reforms with private participation. However, the relative success of 
electricity reforms in Chile imply that the Chilean reform experience can be a useful 
guide on long-term performance of reform in developing countries. Thus, the lessons 
learnt from the successful international experience with reforms in countries like Chile 
provide a useful guidance to ‘small systems’ like Nepal whose electricity sector will 
have to grow under increasing population and economic growth. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the economic 
arguments related to introducing market-driven reforms in small power systems. Section 
3.3 briefly discusses the policy framework and institutional structure of the Nepalese 
electricity sector. The policy framework describes the contents of the major electricity 
reform initiatives in Nepal after 1990. In Section 3.4, the major economic, operational 
and environmental consequences of power sector reforms from 1990 till 2008 are 
evaluated. Section 3.5 discusses the role of political instability in affecting the process 
and outcomes of electricity reforms. Section 3.6 discusses the multi-stage reform 
options addressing the concerns of high political volatility and growing electricity 
demand. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter and offers some policy recommendations. 
 
3.2. Reforming Small Electricity Systems 
 
One of the hallmarks of the electricity reforms in Chile and Argentina was the vertical 
and horizontal separation of the electricity sector coupled with large scale privatisation 
based on the textbook reform model (Pollitt, 2008a). The aim of vertical unbundling is 
to separate the potentially competitive generation and retail supply from the natural 
monopoly activities of transmission and distribution networks (Meyer, 2011). In 
principle, vertical separation facilitates introduction of competition in wholesale and 
retail markets and  leads to cost-reflective pricing, prevents cross-subsidy, reduces 
downstream foreclosures, improves cost and overall transparency in network and 
competitive business and removes the incentive for third-party and non-price 
discrimination  (Rey and Stiglitz, 1988; Brunekreeft, 2008). 
 
However, small systems are characterised by small size and low load density of the 
market which suggests that the benefits of vertical separation are difficult to realize in 
small markets. The small size of the market limits the effectiveness of competition in 
wholesale market as only a limited number of generating companies can be supported 
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leading to oligopolistic market situations and can be susceptible to market power 
(Domah, 2002). This implies that the benefits of full sector restructuring and reforms 
may be small in relation to the costs considering the limited scope for competition and 
scarce managerial expertise in developing countries with small electricity systems. 
Thus, the benefits of competition arising from vertical separation of the networks as 
well as economies of scale can be limited in small power systems like Nepal.   
 
In addition, important technological aspects of electricity supply favour vertical 
integration between different supply stages resulting in vertical scope economies. The 
benefits of vertical integration can be significant in terms of coordination economies, 
market risk economies including hold-up risks and specialisation economies (Kwoka, 
2002; Meyer, 2012). Further, bundling small companies under a monopsony regime via 
a SBM can allow vertically integrated small system to benefit from economies of scale. 
Hence, competition arising from vertical separation may not be feasible and, if feasible, 
may not be desirable and effective in small systems. However, unbundling can be more 
cost-effective in these systems if other restructurings are taking place or the initial 
ownership structures are not costly to change (Pollitt, 2008b). 
 
Thus, the choice between vertical integration and unbundling is between the economies 
of coordination and scope on the one hand with possible increases in transactions costs 
and the potential efficiency gains from competition and increased efficiency across 
small systems on the other (Klass and Salinger, 1995). From an economic welfare 
perspective, the productive and allocative efficiency gains from effective competition in 
conjunction with the distributional equity concerns needs to be carefully weighed 
against the benefits of economies of vertical integration in small systems. The 
transaction costs of full unbundling of small systems may exceed the subsequent 
efficiency gains. As the system grows over time, the efficiency gains and the 
effectiveness of competition from vertical separation can surpass the transactions costs. 
Hence, the relative merits of vertical separation can vary across different systems and 
should be judged cautiously in every case (Pittman, 2003).   
 
Lessons from Chile and Argentina portray that careful regulation is essential under both 
vertically integrated and unbundled electricity industry structure. Unbundling may 
imply fewer activities to be regulated but it also makes the system more sensitive to 
regulatory practice. However, the implementation of an effective regulatory process is 
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difficult and costly because of information asymmetries (Joskow, 1991). The incentive 
regulation of electricity networks under fast growing demand can also be a complicated 
and difficult task for the regulator. The absence of mature, well developed networks and 
regulatory agencies combined with high investment requirements in networks can limit 
the potential gains from unbundling the small electricity systems. Hence, the cost of 
regulation in vertically integrated small systems can be significant compared to the 
benefits (Kessides, 2004). 
 
 However, many developing countries, including Nepal, reforming their small electricity 
sectors lack the necessary experience and skilled human resources which can limit the 
scope and potential effectiveness of the electricity regulatory agencies (Domah et al. 
2002; Pollitt and Stern, 2010). This is a major problem as the need to achieve minimum 
efficient scale for a regulatory agency may imply a large number of highly skilled staff 
relative to size of the electricity sector in small developing countries. A resistant 
political and administrative culture under an unstable political environment also implies 
that effective regulation under fragile institutional arrangements is difficult to achieve in 
naturally monopolistic small systems. The small electricity systems in Nepal and other 
South Asian countries suffer from inefficiency and institutionalized corruption and 
persistent rent seeking behaviour together with poor economic governance of the power 
sector (Smith, 2004). The regulatory agency is not independent from political 
intervention. Thus, appropriate governance structures and institutional arrangements are 
important factors to ensure independent regulation necessary to implement market 
driven electricity reforms in small electricity system like Nepal. 
 
3.3. Policy Framework and Institutional Structure 
  
The theoretical guiding principle for reforms in the Nepalese electricity sector is to 
enhance social welfare by efficient management of the available scarce resources (NEA, 
2010). A large un-utilised capacity combined with increasing demand for electricity 
justifies the economic logic of exploiting the benefits of competition and economies of 
scale through electricity reforms in Nepal. Thus, a sequence of market-driven electricity 
reform initiatives was mooted after the formation of Nepal Electricity Board and Small 
Hydro Development Board in 1975. A classification system of hydro projects was 
established in 1975 followed by the creation of Nepal Electricity Act in 1984. In 1985, 
NEA was formed by merging the Electricity Department, Electricity Boards and Nepal 
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Electricity Corporation in accordance with the provisions of NEA Act of 1984 (Thakur, 
2002). The establishment of NEA eventually paved the way towards creating a legal 
framework and corporatisation of the power sector through the formulation of the 
hydropower development policy of 1992 and was enforced by the Water Resources Act 
and the Electricity Act with amendments made to the NEA Act of 1984 as discussed 
below (ADB, 1999). 
 
i) The objective of the Hydropower Development Policy of 1992 was to promote and 
facilitate hydropower development allowing for state, joint sector (public and private) 
and private sector development of hydroelectricity projects through licensees. The 
policy emphasised intensifying national electrification through small hydro plants and 
mass capacity installation with the necessity to extend the distribution system to rural 
areas. The importance of foreign and private investment in the hydropower sector was 
recognised by allowing foreign investors to finance up to 100% capital investments. The 
implementation of the act meant the need for an appropriate legal framework supported 
by more acts (NEA, 2010). 
 
 The Water Resources Act of 1992 provides appropriate legal arrangements for 
utilisation, conservation, management and development of both underground and 
surface water resources in Nepal. 
 The objective of the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act 1992 was to 
promote and facilitate economy-wide foreign investment and technology transfer by 
making optimum use of natural and human resources in the transition towards 
industrialisation. 
  The Electricity Act 1992 was primarily promulgated to promote private participation in 
hydro power development. It provides for exemption of licences for any individual or 
corporate body undertaking generation, transmission and distribution up to 1000 
kilowatt (KW) capacity. Obtaining a licence was made obligatory for any capacity 
above 1 megawatt (MW) in the electricity industry but geographic monopoly could be 
retained in the licensee distribution service area with third-party entry possible under 
conditions of unsatisfactory performance of the licensee. The Electricity and Tariff 
Fixation Commission (ETFC) was established and NEA was made a licensee. The 
ETFC consisted of six persons and included a chairman  chosen by the government 
from the non-governmental sector, a representative of the government from the Ministry 
of Energy (MOE), an economist prescribed by the government from the non-
 31 
governmental sector, a representative among the licensee of electricity generation, 
transmission or distribution and a representative each from the industry and consumer 
groups. NEA was required to act as a single-buyer via bulk-buying of power from 
generators at a purchase price sufficient to cover total investments in approximately 25 
years after accounting for depreciation costs. The licensee also allowed the export of 
electricity subject to the payment of the export duty. 
 The need to establish fair and competitive industrial arrangements meant the 
formulation of the Industrial Enterprises Act 1992 with a view to create a congenial, 
straight-forward and encouraging industrial investment environment. 
 
ii) The Hydropower Policy of 1992 was revised in 2001 as the Water Resource 
Development Policy. The major objectives of the Water Resource Development Policy 
are to develop hydropower resources at economically efficient costs, to harmonise 
electrification with economic activities and to develop hydropower for export. The 
policy prioritises hydropower capacity expansion by attracting more domestic and 
foreign investments. The policy also led to the creation of certain institutional 
arrangements in particular by inducting the ETFC to the regulatory body. These 
enterprise levels restructuring at NEA  implies that the Nepalese electricity industry 
currently runs under five core business groups for generation, electricity transmission 
and system operation, distribution, electrification and engineering services. 
 
 iii) The Community Electricity Distribution Bye Laws were introduced in 2003 with the 
objectives of promoting public participation in reducing non-technical power losses 
such as electricity theft and institutionalising distribution and encouraging community 
management in the extension of distribution lines through the distribution institution. 
The community electrification concept was introduced and regulation was passed for 
rural electrification. The community was also made responsible for distribution and 
sales of electric energy alongside NEA. 
 
iv) The Subsidy Development Mechanism was introduced in 2006 with the aim to ensure 
a fair disbursement of subsidy in a cost effective and easy access manner. Similarly, the 
rural energy policy (REP) was established in 2006 with the overall goal to contribute to 
rural poverty reduction and environmental conservation by ensuring access to clean and 
reliable energy in rural areas. The policy emphasised the promotion of renewable 
energy technologies and decentralised power production models for intensifying rural 
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electrification in Nepal. The REP also provided a framework for the establishment of 
the rural electrification board (REB) in Nepal.   
  
Table 3.1 shows the timeline of major reform introduced in the Nepalese electricity 
sector.  
 
1992 2001 2003 2006 
Hydropower Development 
Policy 
1) Water Resources Act 
2) Foreign Investment and 
Technology Transfer Act 
3)  Electricity Act 
4) Industrial Enterprises Act 
Water Resources 
Development 
Policy 
Community 
Electricity 
Distribution Bye 
Laws 
Subsidy 
Development 
Mechanism 
Table 3.1: Timing of major electricity reforms in Nepal 
Source: Adapted from NEA (2010) 
 
Hence, it can be inferred that the objectives of various electricity reform measures in 
Nepal are: 
 to attract foreign and domestic private investment,  
 to promote efficiency, fairness and economic principles in managing the sector and 
thereby reducing the dependence on state support,  
 to rationalise and institutionalise sector activities through appropriate measures for the 
overall development of the sector, and  
 to strengthen quality of supply at an affordable cost to consumers while allowing 
utilities to sufficiently recover their costs. 
 
However, the electricity sector in Nepal is governed and influenced by a multitude of 
institutions as illustrated under Figure 3.1. The Department of Electricity Development 
(DOED) under MOE is responsible for implementing overall government policies 
related to the electricity sector by ensuring transparency of the regulatory framework 
while promoting and facilitating private sector participation in the power sector. NEA is 
responsible for generating, transmitting and distributing adequate, reliable and 
affordable electricity by planning, constructing, operating and maintaining all 
generation, transmission and distribution facilities in both interconnected and isolated 
system areas. The management of NEA is entrusted to a Board of Directors which 
represents all major stakeholders of the power sector. Likewise, the Water and Energy 
Commission Secretariat (WECS) formulates and assists in developing policies and 
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strategies in the water resources and energy sector while also acting as a documentation 
centre for all regional water resources and energy related issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Institutional structure of the Nepalese power sector 
 
The Ministry of Environment (MOEN) is responsible for the development of policy 
environment conducive to sustainable development through sustainable use of natural 
resources, promotion of sustainable practices and technologies and management of 
climate change induced risks. MOEN also looks after the development and promotion 
of micro-hydro technology in Nepal. The Alternative Energy Promotion Centre (AEPC) 
was established in 1996 to promote rural electrification using renewable technologies 
under MOEN. The formulation of the Subsidy Development Mechanism in 2006 has 
heightened the role of AEPC towards rural electrification and energy efficiency while 
the Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC) under the Ministry of Commerce and Supplies 
(MOCS) deals in all activities related to the imports of petroleum products in the 
Nepalese economy. 
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The Independent Power Producers Association of Nepal (IPPAN) was established in 
2001 and is a non-profit, non-government and autonomous organisation. The role of 
IPPAN is to encourage the private sector to get involved in the development of 
hydropower in Nepal while also acting as a link between the private sector and 
government organizations. Thus, IPPAN is a lobbying organisation representing the 
private sector involved in hydropower development in Nepal. Similarly, international 
donor organisations have played an influential role in the development of Nepalese 
power sector as the sector has been receiving substantial technical and financial 
assistance since 1983  (UNDP, 1983). India, China, UK, USA, Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland and Canada have been the major bilateral donors. The multilateral donors 
have included organisations like the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank 
and the United Nations Group. The financial assistance from multilateral donors mostly 
involves loans as opposed to grants and comes with certain strings attached such as 
direct policy lending. For example, the formation of the Hydropower Development 
Policy in 1992 coincided with the Power Sector Efficiency Project grant by the World 
Bank.  
 
Hence, power sector investments in Nepal are largely donor driven with significant 
influence of the donor organisations towards policy making in the power sector. The 
state or the ruling government dominates the institutional environment and institutional 
arrangements in the power sector while there is little representation of other 
stakeholders such as the consumer and industrial groups. 
 
3.4. Performance of the Nepalese Electricity Sector 
 
This section analyses the performance of the Nepalese power sector by studying the 
economic, operational and environmental aspects of electricity sector bearing important 
social welfare impacts. The reform outcomes discussed below will provide a basis to 
gauge the success of the power sector reform program over more than 20 years of 
reform. 
 
a) Prices: Electricity prices in Nepal have been historically too low to cover costs and 
prices have not changed since the last decade. Power prices are not based on economic 
principles and are influenced by vested interests and political motives. Electricity is 
supplied to customers at highly subsidised rates creating distortions in demand. For 
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example, the charge per KWh of electricity supplied to a community wholesale 
consumer in 2010 was 3.5 Nepalese Rupees (NRs) while a small industry paid NRs. 
6.60 per KWh of electricity consumed. Thus, cross-subsidization prevails in the 
Nepalese electricity sector. Figure 3.2 shows that the residential sector comprising 
95.5% of the total electricity consumers accounted for 42% of overall revenue 
collection of NEA while the industrial sector consisting only 1.7% of total electricity 
consumers contributed 35% towards NEA’s total revenue in 2008/09 (NEA, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Contribution of consumer groups to total revenue 
Source: Adapted from NEA (2009) 
 
The NEA has a revenue rate of NRs 6.71 per KWh of electricity against the cost price of 
NRs. 9.05 per KWh (including transmission and distribution charges) of electricity. The 
under-pricing of electricity after accounting for a miscellaneous NRs. 0.43 of income 
per KWh of electricity imply that NEA suffered a loss of NRs. 1.91 per KWh of 
electricity in 2009 (NEA, 2009). The price-cost gap has exacerbated the poor financial 
health of NEA with an overwhelming loss of NRs. 4681 million in 2009 (NEA, 2009). 
NEA also maintains a discriminatory power purchase agreements (PPA) policy among 
domestic and Indian companies. The Nepalese IPP’s are paid NRs. 6.5 per KWh of 
electricity while the Indian IPP’s are paid NRs. 10.72 per KWh as an incentive to attract 
more foreign investment in the power sector.  
 
b) Investment in generation: Underinvestment in generation is a major problem facing 
the Nepalese electricity sector even though investments have risen at a slow pace since 
1983. The Nepalese electricity sector had 138 MW of installed generating capacity at 
the end of 1982 of which 11 MW was privately owned while the rest was government 
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developed hydro with a modest amount of thermal (UNDP, 1983). However, lack of 
investment in the generation segment implies that Nepal has only been able to currently 
utilise about 1.7% of its technically and economically viable hydro-electric potential 
capacity. A fundamental reason for under-investment is low power tariffs which are not 
sufficient to support the system-cost and capacity expansion.  
 
Figure 3.3 shows that hydroelectricity (owned by both NEA and IPP) is the dominant 
source of electricity generation in Nepal. The investments in hydro capacity accelerated 
post 2001 after the establishment of IPPAN and slowed down after 2003 primarily due 
to widespread national insecurity as the Maoist war intensified. The termination of war 
after November, 2006 led to increased investments in generation which emphasises the 
importance of political stability in the electricity sector. The capacity shortage in 
generation was apparent when projected demand for electricity surpassed 970 MW 
given an installed capacity of about 700 MW creating a severe power shortage in 2009. 
The peak demand is expected to reach 1700 MW by 2015 with additional capacity 
expansion of 170 MW by 2012 to be achieved (NEA, 2010). The projects to be 
completed include Chameliaya Hydroelectric project (30 MW), Khulekhani-III hydro 
project (14 MW), Trishuli 3-A project (60 MW), Rahughat hydro project (30 MW) and 
Upper Modi (40 MW). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Total installed capacity by technology type (in GW) 
Source: Adapted from EIA (2010) 
 
The domination of hydropower also implies that renewable energy is the main source of 
power production in Nepal with thermal sources (especially diesel generation) 
contributing marginally. Nepal also solely imports 1.2 million tonnes of petroleum 
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products from India as the country is devoid of any refining capacity (NOC, 2010). The 
demand for petroleum products is also expected to increase by 20% on an annual basis. 
Higher prices of petroleum products coupled with vulnerability in petroleum supplies 
have reduced the scope of adding capacity based on diesel sources. Coal imports have 
gone up due to liberal imports policy through license waivers on imports (Pokharel, 
2007). However, this policy has had limited effect on thermal capacity additions as no 
significant new thermal capacity addition was added after 2000. A high reliance on 
hydropower and imported fuels indicates that the Nepalese electricity industry exhibits 
high security of supply risks. 
 
c) Technical Network Energy Losses: The quality of power supply has been historically 
poor in Nepal and the inefficiency shows no signs of improvement. The power sector 
has been plagued by high technical and non-technical losses over the years. In 1979/80, 
overall technical electricity losses accounted for 31% of total power generation and 
increased to 35.7% in 1983/84 (Sharma, 1988). However, the technical losses during the 
last decade stood around 20% on average as observed in Figure 3.4. The losses reached 
a record level of 24% in 1997 which marked the initial phases of Maoist insurgency and 
have decreased since then.  
 
     
Figure 3.4: Electricity Distribution losses 1990-2008 
Source: Adapted from EIA (2010) 
 
The high level of technical losses in distribution can be attributed to old grids that are in 
need of investment for maintenance and upgrade. The high technical losses also imply 
that system reliability is low with frequent unplanned power outages. Grid expansion 
has also been slow in Nepal while lack of transmission and distribution facilities is a 
major bottleneck for generation capacity expansion in the country. The politically 
determined low prices have barred the sector from generating adequate revenue to 
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finance additional network expansion. The country currently has 1,980 km of 
transmission lines and among the major transmission lines under construction are the 85 
kilometer (km) Marshyangdi-Kathmandu 220 kilovolt (KV), Khimti-Dhalkebar 220 KV 
line (75 km) and Tamakoshi-Kathmandu 220 KV line (80 km). Insufficient transmission 
capacity led to 28 system collapses throughout 2010 due to congestion (NEA, 2010). 
There are currently 34 Distribution Centres and 37 Branch Offices of NEA spread over 
49 out of 75 districts in Nepal.  
 
d) Non-technical losses: Non-technical electricity loss in the form of theft is a grave 
issue in many developing countries including Nepal. Non-technical electricity losses 
arising from power theft is common across poor residential areas in South Asia where 
consumers do not have the ability and willingness to pay for electricity connection and 
energy usage. For instance, the army in Pakistan found 10,093 instances of power theft 
and recovered 2.4 billion Pakistani Rupees in fines and penalties in 1998 (Rizvi, 2000). 
It was estimated that electricity theft in Bangladesh was 14% out of 35% of total 
transmission and distribution (T&D) losses in 2003 (Smith, 2004). Lost earnings from 
power theft result in lack of profits and a need to expand generating capacity to offset 
the impact of power losses under investments crunch. The bourgeoning financial loss of 
NEA discussed above can be attributed to the high levels of electricity theft in the 
country resulting in lost earnings to some extent. 
 
e) Rural Electrification: Rural electrification is one of the major energy policy goals in 
Nepal as in other South Asian countries. However, the electrification rate remains low 
in Nepal. Electrification rate is defined as ‘the number of people with an electricity 
connection in their home as a percentage of total population’ (IEA, 2012). Table 3.2 
shows the electrification rates in 6 SAARC countries in 2009. Sri Lanka has been 
relatively successful in catering electricity to the rural sector which has translated into 
an overall high score in Human Development Index (HDI). HDI measures the strength 
of human capital in a country based on a comprehensive set of different categories. 
Electricity access and consumption is crucial towards human development in less-
developing countries (Pasternak, 2000). Thus, the low levels of electrification in Nepal 
also imply a low level of human development in the country.  
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Country 
Electrification rate (%) Population 
without 
electricity 
(millions) 
Energy 
Development 
Index (EDI) 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) National Urban Rural 
Afghanistan 15.6 22 12 23.8 na 0.349 
Bangladesh 41 76 28 95.7 0.169 0.469 
India 66.5 93.1 52.5 403.7 0.272 0.519 
Nepal 43.6 89.7 34 16.5 0.107 0.107 
Pakistan 62.4 78 46 68.4 0.281 0.281 
Sri Lanka 76.6 85.8 75 4.7 0.277 0.658 
Table 3.2: Electrification status in 2009 
Source: Adapted from International Energy Agency (IEA, 2012) 
 
The rate of electrification increased from around 30% in 2005 to 43.6% in 2008 (IEA, 
2012). However, electricity access is largely centralised among the urban population 
across South Asia including Nepal. Factors such as finance, governance, industrial 
organisation and policies can account for varying pace of electrification across much of 
the under-developed countries (Eberhard, 2004). The absence of proper electricity 
distribution infrastructures has delayed the process of rural electrification in the country. 
The difficult geographical terrain and lack of incentives such as low power prices has 
meant that the private sector is not willing to undertake the costly grid expansion in the 
country. In 2005, 78% of energy consumption was met through fuel woods while the 
residential sector was responsible for 90% of overall energy consumption in the country 
(Bhandari and Stadler, 2011). Thus, fuel woods are the dominant form of traditional and 
non-commercial energy source in Nepal.   
 
A major reason for low Energy Development Index (EDI) of Nepal could be because 
energy consumption from fuel woods is not included in such calculation. EDI allows 
understanding the role played by energy in human development. The components of 
EDI are per capita commercial energy consumption, per capita residential sector 
electricity consumption, share of modern fuels in total residential sector and share of 
population without access to electricity (IEA, 2012). Absence of rural electrification 
leads to an increasing pressure on forests (the natural source of carbon storage) for fuel 
woods. Nepal (2012a) argues that decentralised renewable energy technologies can 
provide suitable opportunities to electrify rural areas in less developed economies like 
Nepal as these technologies are capable of making better use of the locally available 
resources. However, the development of renewable energy sources can be difficult to 
achieve in the absence of proper financial, institutional and entrepreneurial support. 
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f) Energy Trade: Reliable energy supply is necessary for stimulating economic growth 
in Nepal (Dhungel, 2008). Hence, electricity trade is a vital component of Nepalese 
economic growth plans. The dominant share of hydro power in generation and a poor 
energy capacity mix means that the sector is prone to electricity supply shortage during 
drought seasons. The geographical location also precludes the possibilities of 
interconnection with other power grids for a land-locked mountainous country like 
Nepal where connection to the Chinese grid is not possible due to difficult geographical 
terrains.  
 
Nepal is engaged in a bilateral power trade with India mostly involving imports as the 
country is unable to utilise its hydroelectricity generation potential. India is the 
monopoly supplier (and a monopsony buyer) of Nepalese electricity. Thus, NEA is 
obliged to import electricity from India at a significantly higher price than paid to the 
domestic producers to satiate the increasing domestic electricity demand. The Nepal-
India power trade is limited to an interconnector capacity of 100-150 MW with Nepal 
on the net importing side. The increasing reliance on imported electricity from India has 
heightened the security of supply risks from import dependency. However, the potential 
economic benefits from electricity trade to Nepal can be significant in the future as the 
energy intensive India with a fast growing economy has decided to import a minimum 
of 10,000 MW by 2020 from South Asian countries. This will require additional 
investments in expanding interconnector capacity between the Indian and Nepalese 
power markets.  
 
g) Energy Intensity: Energy intensity is defined as the ‘energy use per unit of GDP’ and 
is a macro-level measure of the national energy efficiency. The energy use per unit of 
GDP is increasing in Nepal after 1990. The increase in energy consumption is due to an 
expansion in the residential and industrial customer base. Figure 3.5 (a and b) shows the 
curves for energy intensity, GDP and population growth rate. The fluctuating curve in 
figure 3.5 (b) is the mean stationary GDP growth rate and the steadily declining curve is 
the population growth rate. The figures reveal that increasing trend in energy intensity is 
spurred by an increase in overall GDP growth rate although the population growth rate 
has slowed down over the years.    
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Figure 3.5(a): Energy intensity (in Btu per year 2005 USD) 
Source: EIA (2010) 
 
 
Figure 3.5(b): GDP and population growth (in percentage)  
Source: EIA (2010) 
 
The fall in GDP growth rate is also marked by a fall in energy intensity for respective 
years emphasising the critical role of energy consumption in economic growth. In recent 
times, GDP growth and energy intensity are not symmetrical due to insufficient energy 
available in the country. On the other hand, the absence of any appropriate demand-side 
management (DSM) policies means that available energy is not used efficiently.  
 
3.5. Role of Political Instability in Reform Performance 
 
The empirical evidence of power sector performance starkly defies the logic of power 
sector reforms in Nepal. The performance of the vertically-integrated Nepalese power 
sector resembles the conventional problems of a monopolistic public utility suffering 
from chronic underinvestment and insufficient capitalisation, politically determined low 
and distorted tariffs coupled with poor operational and financial performance as 
reflected in various studies (Munasinghe, 1992; Schram, 1993; Jamasb et al., 2005). The 
findings confirm that distorted electricity tariffs, low access rate, frequent supply 
interruptions, underinvestment, and inefficiency in operation are the trademarks of the 
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Nepalese electricity sector along with other South Asian countries such as India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001). Thus, the 
current performance of the sector has belied the theory behind market-based reform of 
the Nepalese electricity sector.  
 
Political instability is one of the major reasons affecting the performance of electricity 
sector reforms and policies in Nepal. Several South Asian countries including Nepal 
experienced political instability which directly affected the traditional state-owned 
utilities under political control during the 1990s. Political instability disrupted the 
gradual implementation of the power sector policies and the reform objectives are still 
far from being achieved (NEA, 2010). Persistent political instability, infighting and 
power struggles, corruption, inadequate social and economic benefits and weak 
governance in Nepal contributed to a loss of confidence in government and the political 
system  since the restoration of democracy in 1991 (ADB, 2004). As such, urgent issues 
such as poverty, utilities reform and rule of law took a backseat and remain 
unaddressed. The unstable political context halted the flow of domestic and foreign 
investment in the electricity sector. Likewise, international agencies such as the World 
Bank and ADB also did not commit any resources to the ‘aid’ dependent Nepalese 
electricity sector in the period of insurgency.   
 
Political instability and changing priorities of successive governments have resulted in 
‘almost-ready’ decisions being repeatedly rehashed in the Nepalese power sector 
(Krishnan, 2007). An example of the effect of policy discontinuity and changes in 
political leadership was exposed when the newly formed government in March, 2011 
declared that ETFC will be dissolved. Political instability has opened up new 
opportunities for unfair rent seeking and corruption leading to rampant licensing and 
approving unfeasible projects, signing of loss making power purchase agreements with 
the private sector and undertaking socially unfair activities at the cost of state utility for 
electoral and political purposes. Persistent political instability can also place practical 
constraints on timeframes for undertaking reforms as any reform that extends beyond 
the lifespan of the government becomes politically infeasible and  slows down or stalls 
the reform progress as a whole (Bhattacharya, 2007). For instance, the 2004 election in 
Sri Lanka elected new members of Parliament who opposed the restructuring and 
privatisation of the power sector and thereby halted reforms. Likewise, the state of 
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Haryana in India missed some crucial reform milestones after a change of government 
in 1999 with similar trends observed in Bangladesh and Nepal.   
 
Political 
Objectives 
Political Environment 
Type Stable Unstable 
Temporary Quick short-term fixing 
Rent seeking, opportunism 
and milk-skimming 
Long-term 
Major sustainable reforms 
possible to undertake 
Any reforms highly unlikely 
to be successful 
Table 3.3: Reform matrix 
Source: Adapted from Bhattacharya (2006) 
 
Hence, the most distinctive aspect of reforms in South Asian countries like India and 
Nepal is the struggle to achieve a framework that protects the sector from political 
instability and political influence (Sen and Jamasb, 2012). Political stability is essential 
because reforms imply changes in institutional environment and institutional 
arrangements while these changes can only sustain the stability of the rule-makers. The 
government is the influential rule-maker in the Nepalese context. Table 3.3 shows long-
term political objectives such as major electricity reforms in a state owned and 
controlled system are likely to be pursued and successful under a stable political 
environment.   
 
Political instability can also translate into short-term opportunism and corruption by 
special interests and at the expense of long-term objective of the sector leading to poor 
and unsustainable sector performance. Complicated and lengthy reforms are not likely 
to be initiated or to work under political instability. On the other hand, political 
reluctance to implement reforms can slow the progress of reforms as observed among 
some transition countries of Eastern Europe even though these countries are politically 
stable (Nepal and Jamasb, 2013). However, political instability is likely to continue in 
Nepal implying that the electricity sector will have to develop under unfavourable 
institutional environment and arrangements to achieve the long-term national economic 
objectives. 
 
The current performance of the Nepalese electricity reforms can present a major setback 
for an economy in the lurch towards an export-led economic growth. The annual energy 
 44 
demand is also expected to increase from 3859 GWh to 9563 GWh from 2009 to 2020 
while the country continues to experience political uncertainty (NEA, 2010). Thus,   
reforming the power sector by considering the increasing political volatility and 
escalating energy demand is crucial for a country such as Nepal experiencing wide-
reaching economic and political changes. 
 
3.6. Reform Options for Small Electricity Systems 
 
The state-owned and politicised power sector reform in developing countries with small 
systems has been a difficult, complicated and an unsuccessful process (Williams and 
Ghanadan, 2006). Chile and Argentina pursued the deepest and most radical reforms as 
their electricity sector grew while electricity reforms in Brazil were more cautious and 
gradual with almost a textbook approach (Dutta and Menzes, 2005).  Mexico, on the 
other hand largely maintains vertical integration in the power sector while allowing 
private generators to participate in new capacity additions as in the Nepalese context 
(Rossellon and Halpern, 2001). Lessons from Brazilian electricity reforms suggest that 
creating a competitive market in the short-run can be difficult in a concentrated market 
when almost 90% of the electricity is hydropower as in Nepal (Schaeffer and Salem 
Szklo, 2001). This is because hydropower technology implies production conditions 
characterised by large economies of scale and therefore a regime close to that of a 
natural monopoly due to high minimum efficient scale of power generation (Gabriele, 
2004).   
 
The dependence on hydropower also means vulnerable supply and frequent blackouts 
during drought years. Hence, the reform options such as adjusting electricity prices and 
subsidies, independent regulation, restructuring, private sector involvement and reforms 
sequencing are equally important in the Nepalese context. The section below discusses 
some reform options for Nepal based on the experiences of electricity sector reforms of 
several countries that successfully transited to a larger system from a ‘small system’ 
accounting for political instability and increasing electricity demand. Moreover, these 
options can be of general relevance to other small power systems around the world 
experiencing rapid growth in demand and political instability.  
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3.6.1. Adjusting electricity prices and subsidies 
 
In competitive electricity markets, prices convey correct market signals and carry 
appropriate informational efficiency as they reflect the actual cost of providing service 
as well as the long-run marginal cost of new capacity irrespective of the political 
environment. Economic theory also suggests that cost-reflective pricing is desirable as it 
leads to net social welfare gains although assessing the distributional impacts of tariff 
adjustment is a complicated task (Chang, 1997). However, the electricity prices in 
Nepal are below cost in order to maintain social peace as the government regulates the 
price. The inability of the sector to finance the system on its own due to 
underinvestment and growing losses of NEA indicate that adjusting electricity prices 
towards supply costs is necessary in a small system aiming to grow. A two part tariff 
design where a fixed payment is added to the system marginal income (such as capacity 
payments) can ensure the sustainability of the system as widely practised in most LACs.  
Cost reflective prices can also eliminate the system’s deficit financed by the whole 
population and free up resources which can be used to improve access in poor and rural 
areas via electrification (Jamasb, 2006). 
 
However, a tariff increase in Nepal also means debasing the economic welfare of an 
already poor population and hence is politically sensitive. Experience from Peru 
suggests that carefully designed targeted subsidies that address the undesirable social 
impacts while limiting the impact of price distortions can reduce the overall impact of 
price increases (Revolo, 2009). The reform experience in Chile also shows that a 
competitive allocation of government direct capital subsidy to private electricity 
distribution companies to cover some portion of the investment costs can be very 
successful in intensifying rural electrification. Hence, the state, private investors and all 
users contribute to funding rural electrification (Jadresic, 2000). Rural electrification 
rate in Chile is over 90% (Millan, 2007). However, competitive allocation of capital 
subsidies towards rural electrification in the Nepalese context requires the vertical 
separation and privatisation of the distribution sector. The experience with rural 
electrification in Thailand suggests that access to financial resources and capital 
subsidies were  crucial  in increasing the rural electrification rate from 7% in  early 
1970s to 97% by 2000 (Shrestha et al., 2004). A recent reform experience in Iran 
suggest that removing heavy subsidies on energy by introducing a direct cash 
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compensation mechanism would lead to an efficient allocation of resources while 
improving social equity and income distribution (Guillaume et al., 2011).   
 
However, utility subsidies have  been poorly targeted in South Asia and have failed to 
reach the poor as shown by the Indian experience where only a quarter of one billion 
dollar subsidies for water services reached the poor households (Foster et al., 2000). 
Moreover, the use of targeted capital subsidies practice in Chile, Peru and Iran suggest 
that it is possible to strike a balance between economic efficiency and social equity in 
the Nepalese context by creating suitable institutional environment and arrangements 
surrounding the electricity sector. The electricity reform experience in Chile, Peru and 
Thailand also indicates that electricity access in developing countries can be improved 
by subsidising the capital costs associated with distribution network expansion in rural 
areas and recovering the operational costs from the sale of electricity at cost-reflective 
prices.    
 
3.6.2. Independent and effective regulation 
 
The widely used criteria in assessing the independence of a regulatory agency are the 
nature and terms of regulatory appointment, source of funding of the regulatory body 
and the extent of participation of the regulators in designing regulatory content such as 
tariff methodology (Stern 1997, 1998). This implies that the introduction of independent 
regulation in 1994 with the establishment of ETFC cannot be considered to be 
independent in Nepal. This is because of the political nature and terms of regulatory 
appointment, public source of funding of the regulatory body and low participation of 
the politically unaffiliated regulators in designing regulatory content such as tariff 
methodology (Stern, 1997). Hence, governance improvements and strengthening 
regulatory arrangements are necessary for small systems like Nepal to effectively 
implement electricity sector reforms and control corruption. Lessons from the Asian 
financial crisis underscored the need for a properly designed and managed regulatory 
system with an independent regulatory agency when economic regulation of prices is 
based on a contract regulation via PPAs between the IPPs and the incumbent (Stern, 
2000). Furthermore, lessons from utilities privatisation in Latin America suggests the 
need to have a proper regulatory agency in place prior to moving ahead with any 
contractual arrangements (Gausch et al., 2006).  
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A single-buyer model such as NEA requires stringent regulatory requirements for its 
efficient operation and investment as power sector problems can be serious for state-
owned single buyer companies operating in countries with imperfect markets and 
governance with wide-scale corruption (Stern, 2000). There is no explicit regulation on 
anything else besides the generation prices in the Nepalese electricity sector while there 
are no regulatory procedures for handling major macroeconomic shocks. The dominant 
position of the Ministry of Energy with its twin role as owner and decision maker in all 
spheres of the power sector implies that electricity sector regulation is not independent 
from vested political interests and thus making the whole regulatory process ineffective 
in Nepal. As a result, decision making suffers from political influence and instability 
often lengthening and delaying the decision making process (Krishnan, 2007). An 
effective regulatory commission as the guardian of public interests should balance and 
protect the interests and welfare of all stakeholders by creating a level playing field for 
all stakeholders in undertaking major investment decisions. However, the limited 
capacity of the regulatory agency and the state remains a challenge in managing and 
balancing multiple forms of engagement with diverse stakeholders in Nepal (Dubash 
and Morgan, 2012).    
 
An independent regulatory body requires adequate staff with a range of specialist skills 
comprising economists, lawyers, accountants, financial analysts and engineers to make 
regulation effective. This also implies that the institutional continuity of the regulatory 
system will depend on the regulatory staffs and not on the ruling span of the political 
party. Hence, there is a need to eliminate the constraints on skilled human resources of 
new regulatory bodies and agencies with appropriate training of staff to improve 
incompetence and reduce inefficiency in the regulatory process in developing countries 
like Nepal. The lessons from Chile and Argentina show that government ministers 
should not be involved in approving or implementing regulatory decisions while such 
task should be properly delegated to an independent regulatory agency like CNE for 
Chile and ENRE for Argentina (Pollitt, 2008a). However, developing economies like 
Nepal are challenged by inadequate technical capacity, institutional illegitimacy and 
democratic illegitimacy to make independent regulation feasible (Dubash and Rao, 
2008). 
 
Nonetheless, the expansion of the system in the long run necessitates sophisticated 
regulatory arrangements of the monopolistic transmission and distribution networks in 
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the form of incentive regulation. It is also prudent to have a cautious and planned 
restructuring of the sector before introducing regulation as effective regulation is a 
complex and difficult task facing any energy regulator. Inadequate and imperfect 
restructuring increases the need for intervention and regulation when regulation on its 
own is incomplete and challenging to pursue in developing countries.  
 
3.6.3. Restructuring the electricity sector 
 
NEA is a vertically integrated utility responsible for the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity in the country. Functional unbundling is introduced as a 
mechanism to facilitate internal unbundling dividing NEA into three main activities: 
generation; transmission and substation; and distribution and consumer services. While 
functional unbundling exists on paper, it is necessary to have an accounting separation 
of the potentially competitive segments and the monopoly segments. Accounting 
separation can improve transparency and accountability of operation in the sector to 
attract foreign investors as well as prevent domestic corruption.  
 
Slow and non-transparent decision making process is one of the key areas of concern in 
the sector (Krishnan, 2007). However, an outright separation of the network in 
ownership terms in the interim period is not desirable considering the absence of 
effective regulatory frameworks and small size and density of the market. Delegating 
decision making authority to the appropriate lowert levels of the government can 
facilitate timely action by minimising unnecessary bureaucratic delays in a state owned 
vertically integrated entity like NEA reeling under political instability. 
 
Although the generation segment is open to private investors, barriers to entry still exist 
in terms of discriminatory network access to the independent power producers. NEA as 
a single buyer tends to favour its own generation which distorts competition and 
discourages new entry in generation. Non-integrated private firms are unable to compete 
for consumers in the market. Eliminating entry barriers in terms of non-discriminatory 
network access can spur private generation to meet growing electricity demand. Though 
NEA can remain vertically integrated in the short-run; clear rules for access to networks 
and appropriate charges should be set in the form of regulated third-party access (rTPA) 
against negotiated third-party-access (nTPA) to avoid disputes, uncertainty, and 
corruption (Brunekreeft, 2002; 2004). Further, an independent system operator (ISO) 
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can be created in the long-run to take charge of the dispatch and grid operation under 
clearly defined rules for access to the grid. 
 
Lessons from Chile suggest that there is a need to separate generation from both 
transmission and distribution to avoid hold up problems for other generators in large 
electricity systems (Pollitt, 2004). Argentina learnt lessons from Chile and pursued 
vertical separation and created a competitive market allowing customers to switch 
suppliers while no hold-up problems exist in generation (Millan, 2007). Thus, 
unbundling of NEA remains an option after many years’ of being vertically integrated 
as the system expands over time. This can be done by commercialising NEA’s 
generation, transmission, distribution and support segments followed by privatisation of 
each of these entities in the presence of an effective regulatory body. 
 
3.6.4. Need to involve the private sector 
 
Nepal has failed to achieve notable progress in development of its hydropower 
resources than anticipated although domestic and foreign private participation accounts 
for 26% of the generation market (NEA, 2010). Economic theory suggests that privately 
owned entities are more efficient than state owned entities due to their profit motives 
(Baumol, 1996). Private ownership coupled with competition and effective regulation of 
the transmission and distribution networks can result in cost efficiency, reduced 
technical and non-technical losses, competitive prices and enhanced revenue collection 
(Newbery, 2002a). Privatisation of existing assets will also raise revenue for the cash-
strapped government with large foreign debts. However, the empirical evidence on the 
merits of privatisation in the context of electricity reforms are inconclusive (Mota, 
2004; Jamasb et al., 2005). In addition, the limited experience of Nepal with the 
privatisation process suggest that timing of privatisation is crucial to avoid any conflicts 
between different electricity sector goals as experienced in the electricity reform context 
of Cameroon (Pineau, 2002). 
 
At present, private participation in the Nepalese power sector is only possible as an 
independent power producer which gathered pace after the establishment of IPPAN. 
However, the inability of NEA to strike a favourable PPA with the IPPs due to political 
resistance to increase end user tariffs in 2011 imply that 1700 MW of hydroelectricity 
construction projects is being stalled (IPPAN, 2011). Thus, it is necessary that NEA 
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buys power from the private sector at full cost with a fair financial return while raising 
the end user electricity tariffs to meet the escalating electricity demand in the country.  
In the short run, private participation through IPPS needs to be bolstered with 
appropriate incentives for the private sector to participate in electricity generation.  
Given that both foreign and domestic investors are risk-averse, only a high risk 
premium can coax the private sector to undertake major investment decisions in the 
electricity sector operating under political instability. Political instability adds a risk 
premium to foreign and domestic mode of finance. A high risk premium will also 
necessitate an increase in the low existing end consumers' tariff across the small 
systems. Hence, the government should absorb any increase in tariffs through well-
targeted subsidies across poor households to prevent social unrest and ensure equity. 
 
Electricity reform lessons from Nicaragua suggest that assessing appropriate risks and 
designing suitable risk premium forms an integral reform component to lure private 
sector investments in the energy sector (Mostert, 2007). However, the transition towards 
larger power systems in the long run can allow the privatisation of the individual 
segments. The hydroelectricity dominated Norwegian electricity sector reform 
experience illustrates that privatisation is not a pre-requisite and can wait until the 
structure, regulation and ownership of the distribution is clear (Jamasb, 2006).  
 
However, the experience of Chile and Argentina suggests that large scale privatisation, 
if implemented under a robust institutional framework, can be beneficial in terms of 
enhancing sectoral efficiency. Privatisation in LACs proceeded quite fast and 
contributed to about 40% of the total value of energy privatisations in the world during 
the 1990s (Gabriele, 2004). The strong legal protection and observance of private 
property rights with appropriate regulatory framework as in Chile can deliver benefits in 
a politically unstable country with small or medium electricity system (Estache et al., 
2000). Meanwhile, the Chilean experience also suggests that total privatisations in the 
electric sector should be carried out according to the country’s framework of economic 
and social development based on market principles and subsidiarity of the state 
(Morande and Raineri, 1997). 
 
Economic theory also supports that privatisation will result in a lower level of 
corruption in the sector as the control of the government over the rents offered by the 
direct operation of public services gets reduced after privatisation (Shapiro and Willing, 
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1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The complete or partial transfer of ownership from 
the government to the private sector in the presence of an independent regulatory body 
also implies that the bureaucratic influence in power sector decision makings will be 
minimised with increasing private ownership. This will ensure an unhindered 
management and operation of the electricity sector irrespective of the changes in 
political leadership. Hence, a viable option to mitigate the adverse effects of increasing 
political volatility in the Nepalese power sector would be to completely or partially 
privatise the sector.  
 
3.6.5. Sequencing of reform measures 
 
There seems to be some consensus with regard to the sequence of main reform steps as 
a part of a good reform design although the sequence of reform steps should be 
consistent with the needs and specific characteristics of the sector such as resource 
availability and institutional endowments. According to the generic reform model 
suggested by Bacon (1999), the key elements of reforms sequence are: i) effective 
regulation and an independent regulatory body with proper electricity law, ii) 
restructuring which involves separating and regulating distribution networks followed 
by the separation and regulation of transmission networks and finally creating a 
wholesale market by horizontally splitting the segment, and iii) privatising generation, 
transmission and distribution segments. Most LACs including Chile and Argentina have 
generally followed the model suggested above although privatisation followed suit 
before the establishment of the regulator in Brazil. 
 
The Nepalese power sector requires an effective independent regulatory body from the 
outset while unbundling can be deferred to a later date depending on the future size of 
the system. The presence of sound regulation can facilitate private participation in by 
protecting the sector from political volatility and also increasing electricity production 
to meet demand by employing private capital. The reform experience of the transition 
economies comprising countries of Southern and Central Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union also suggest the presence of mass corruption due to ill-guided large scale 
privatisation in the absence of an effective regulatory body (EBRD, 2001). 
Consequently, establishing a strong electricity regulatory commission is more urgent 
than unbundling NEA in the present context.  
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3.6.6. Critical summary of reform options 
 
These market-based reforms are possible reform options that the Nepalese electricity 
sector can choose to pursue and thereby are not a strict mandate for reforms. 
Implementing full reform package based on the standard reform model is currently not 
desirable in the Nepalese context due to inadequate institutional capacity surrounding 
the electricity sector. The small size of the sector also does not support the complete 
adoption of the market-oriented reform package in the short-term. However, certain 
reforms options are more urgent than others considering the political instability and 
growing electricity demand facing the sector. 
 
Past power sector reform options and policies failed to produce the desired outcomes in 
Nepal as these were mostly pursued under external pressures from donor organisations. 
For example, developing countries were advised to adopt the institutional innovation of 
regulatory agencies in infrastructure sectors that proved successful in the advanced 
economies which had adequate institutional endowment. However, many developing 
countries have been unable to replicate the results observed in developed countries due 
to insufficient embedding of regulatory agencies within local political and institutional 
context (Dubash and Morgan, 2012). The Indian state of Orissa provides a distinct 
example of market-based reform failure in the Indian electricity sector. Orissa achieved 
all the milestones of the reform program including the privatisation of the thermal 
power stations and all distribution companies. However, the power sector woes of 
Orissa did not end while the financial viability of the sector got jeopardised after 
reforms (Haldia, 2001). 
 
Corruption also remains a major problem in electricity reform in developing countries 
including Nepal. Thus, privatising the electricity sector as the system gets bigger 
coupled with creating an independent regulation can partially solve the corruption issues 
in the Nepalese electricity sector. Estache at al. (2009) empirically documented that 
privatisation and introduction of independent regulation have partial effects on the 
consequences of corruption for access, affordability and quality of service in developing 
countries. Privatisation also reduces the direct involvement of the state in the power 
sector implying that the sector performance is less affected by political instability. The 
successful reform experience in Chile and Argentina also suggests the reduced role of 
the state as market-based reforms were pursued.  
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However, it is essential for developing countries like Nepal to appreciate that reforms 
can only be successful if they are implemented properly. In Nepal, a low political 
commitment to reform coupled with weak implementation of necessary measures due to 
political instability created a widening gap between theory and practice on the 
performance of electricity sector reforms. Hence, the reforms must be simple to 
implement and may not be full-fledged while minimising any potential conflict of 
objectives among them. 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the consequence of more than 20 years of 
reforms in the relatively small Nepalese power sector. Nepal initiated some reforms in 
the electricity sector since the early 1990s along with other developing countries. 
However, the reforms coincided with political instability and civil unrest which affected 
the reform efforts. Political instability also affected the reform process and outcomes in 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Hence, the reform outcomes suggest 
minimal performance improvements after reforms implying that the sector remains 
unsustainable in meeting the growing electricity demand. The analysis suggests that the 
electricity sector in Nepal is ‘resource rich but policy poor’. Hence, reforms may be 
needed as the vertically integrated sector has failed to deliver as anticipated during the 
past 28 years. 
 
As such, electricity reforms across small systems like Nepal can be multi-staged. This is 
because small systems will grow with increasing population and economic growth in 
the long-run. In the short and medium term, focus needs to be towards tariff and subsidy 
restructuring and creating an effective independent regulatory body to lead the sector 
towards recovery and self-sustainability. The importance of establishing an independent 
regulatory body was largely ignored by policymakers in the Nepalese context. While an 
independent regulator is necessary to implement the electricity reforms; strong 
governance and proper institutional arrangements can control corruption, theft and 
install resistivity toward political shocks in the sector. IPPs entry should also be 
facilitated and encouraged by minimising unnecessary market and non-market barriers 
while providing appropriate entrepreneurial incentives. As the system grows  in the long 
run, complete vertical separation of the networks and privatisation of them is an option 
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while creating a wholesale market by horizontally splitting the generation segment. 
Moreover, accounting separation of the different activities is encouraged in the short 
term in order to promote transparency and accountability.  
 
It is vital that electricity reforms in small systems like Nepal should primarily be based 
upon a thorough assessment of economic costs and benefits as an effective way to 
manage the scarce economic resources properly. It is desirable that need-based reforms 
relying on individual country’s ability and resources receive foremost priority. A 
cautious and gradual reform process based on a piece-meal approach with constant self-
adaptation through error corrections as in the Brazilian context is more suitable for 
many hydro-rich small systems. Moreover, it is also necessary for developing countries 
to understand that electricity sector reforms falls within the broader domain of the 
economic reform and is linked with other sectoral reforms in the economy as a whole. 
 
Lessons from Chile suggest that the role of the state should be limited and be based on 
the principle of subsidiary prioritising economic logic before vested interests and 
personal gain. This implies the necessity to redefine and revisit this role in light of 
market-oriented electricity reforms so as to insulate the sector from political instability 
and interference. However, the role of state will continue to be crucial and important 
across small electricity systems like Nepal. 
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Chapter 4: Reforming the Power Sector in Transition:  Do Institutions 
Matter?   
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The early 1990s brought about fundamental economic and political changes among the 
popularly termed ‘transition economies’ (TECs hereafter) comprising twenty-nine 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The end 
of central planning paved the way for economy wide market-oriented reforms in the 
TECs as a part of pervasive political and economic transformation. The pace and order 
of these reforms varied markedly across the TECs primarily reflecting the constraints on 
these governments’ ability and resources. Some countries such as Lithuania, Russia and 
Slovak Republic opted for instant large scale privatisation without appropriate legal 
framework as a ‘shock therapy’ which often resulted in significant economic and social 
costs. Elsewhere, civil wars and ethnic conflicts disrupted and delayed the gradual 
progress in countries like Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tajikistan. The 
incentive to join the European Union and benefit from regional integration provided 
impetus to sectoral reforms in countries across Central and Eastern Europe in the early 
2000s. Meanwhile, the isolated Asian economies in the CIS region are still reeling 
under the legacy of central planning with low political commitment to sectoral reform 
since independence.  
 
The systemic change of the early 1990’s coincided with the rising popularity of power 
sector reforms around the world. The power sector was an undisputed choice across the 
TECs to rapidly undergo marketization in the context of overall macroeconomic 
reforms for three major reasons: a) the energy-intensive economies were highly 
subsidised through low power prices prior to collapse, b) the direct and indirect 
contribution of the power sector towards the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
was significant, and c) the sector involved strategic aspects of national energy supply. 
The inclination towards low resource dependency and energy security coupled with 
mass politicisation and natural monopoly characteristics of the sector also meant that 
the role of the power sector was important in determining the speed and magnitude of 
economic growth for countries experiencing drastic systemic changes. Thus, the role of 
power sector was seen as being crucial in economic growth policies of the TECs. 
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After two decades of market-based reforms across the power sectors of TECs; the 
outcomes can be considered as being mixed, stalled and uncertain (Williams and 
Ghanadan, 2006). Partly, the present state of the power sector in these countries is a 
reflection of the fact that the collapse of central planning was not by choice but rather a 
consequence of non-functioning political and economic system of yesteryear. Belarus 
and the Caspian countries like Turkmenistan have exhibited great reluctance towards 
power reforms and have not started the initial process of liberalisation, small scale 
privatisation and the creation of an environment supportive of private investment. 
Largely, it also reflects the failure of sure-fire policies of economic advisors to cater to 
the local conditions in the process of quick transition to a market economy (Stiglitz, 
1999). Several new European Union (EU) member states such as Hungary and Bulgaria, 
though nearing the advanced phase of power sector reforms, still experience chronic 
power shortages, high distribution losses, lack of investment and vulnerability of energy 
supply (EBRD, 2007).  
 
Thus, it is debatable whether the reforming countries have significantly benefited from 
power sector reforms. Likewise, it is worth questioning whether energy-rich countries 
such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have benefited 
from power sector reforms since 1990 relative to non-energy-rich transition economies 
even after a gradual real increase in energy prices (Tarr, 1994; Gray, 1995; Pomfret, 
2009). 
 
It is tacitly accepted by policymakers that power sector reform in the transition 
economies has proven to be a difficult and complicated on-going process (Jamasb et al., 
2004). The current sectoral performance portrays that formulated policies did not 
effectively reflect the functioning of a market economy coupled with the 
misunderstandings of the reform process itself that largely failed to take country-
specific conditions into account. However, any concrete econometric studies assessing 
the performance of electricity reforms in transition economies are missing in the reform 
literature. This motivates the conduct of an empirical assessment of power sector 
reforms on the power sector outcomes in the context of overall market-driven economic 
reforms across the transition countries.  
 
This chapter, therefore, aims to quantitatively assess the less explored link between 
power sector reforms and wider institutional reforms in the economy across different 
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groups of transition countries. We analyse the link via the impact of reforms on the 
economic, operational and environmental aspects while accounting for the interactions 
between power sector reforms and economy-wide institutions. The contributions of this 
chapter are two-fold. Firstly, the lessons learnt from two decades of reform experiments 
in TECs can provide valuable indicative insights to the power sector reforms of other 
developing and less developed countries in Asia and Africa where economic transition 
is on-going. Secondly, this chapter contributes to the relatively scarce literature on the 
quantitative analysis of power sector reform across the TECs. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explores the literature encompassing 
the relationship among different institutional reforms in the economy and power sector 
reforms. Section 4.3 explains the drivers of power sector reform in TECs. Section 4.4 
describes the common economic, technical and environmental aspects across the 
transition countries at the start of reform. Section 4.5 describes the data and econometric 
methodology. Section 4.6 discusses the results while Section 4.7 concludes and offers 
some policy recommendations. 
 
4.2. Review of the Literature 
 
Although economic theory considers both competition and privatisation as the core 
aspects of a market economy; the outcomes cannot be guaranteed to be Pareto efficient 
in the absence of proper institutional infrastructure (Rodrik et al., 2004). North (1971) 
has criticized the standard neoclassical theory as it disregards the role of institutions and 
time. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) as described by North (1971) and 
Williamson (1996), considers the importance of institutions and time in the light of 
market-oriented reforms under two major strands: a) institutional environment (rules of 
the game which can be explicit, formal or implicit, informal) and b) institutional 
arrangements which by contrast, are specific guidelines - the so called ‘governance 
structures’. 
 
However, the early phase of the systemic change in transition economies rested on the 
false notion that market-oriented policies would automatically install the institutions of 
a market-based economy during the transition process. This led to a decade of 
neglecting the institutional differences across countries in implementing power sector 
reforms while similar approaches to reform led to different outcomes in TECs 
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depending upon the levels of formal and informal institutions in each country (von 
Hirschhausen and Waelde, 2006). Stiglitz (1999) argued that the enforcement 
mechanism of reforms were weak as the state’s legal and judicial capacities were 
limited during the transition process brewing inefficient rent seeking and corruption 
with shock therapy reforms such as large scale privatisation. Hence, the success of 
market-oriented electricity reforms can tremendously depend on the development of a 
market-based institutional framework to support the reforms (Hogan, 2001).  
 
Empirical econometric studies by Heybey and Murrell (1997) have concluded that the 
success of sectoral reforms in transition economies depends much more on the overall 
institutional framework than on short-term policies. Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) 
found evidence of country policy and institutions being positively correlated with 
reform while country risk being negatively related with reform. Ruffin (2003) using 
institutional explanatory variables and electricity reform scores found an ambiguous and 
insignificant relationship between judicial independence and competition. Cornillie and 
Frankhauser (2004) showed that reform in energy prices and progress in enterprise 
restructuring are the two most important drivers for more efficient energy use in 
transition countries. However, a recent study by Nepal (2012b) showed that 
privatisation has contributed in improving energy efficiency in transition countries even 
though other market-based economic reforms remain ineffective possibly due to the 
absence of proper institutions to support market-based reforms.  
 
The role of sector level institutions as key elements to properly understand a market-
based economy was overlooked in TECs. Arrow (1972),  Hirschmann (1992), Putnam 
(1993), Fukuyama (1995), Stiglitz (1999) and others have argued that the success of 
market-oriented economy cannot be understood in terms of narrow economic incentives 
such as prices but norms, institutions, social capital and trust play critical roles. Pollitt 
(2009) in relation to the South Eastern Europe (SEE) electricity markets concluded that 
electricity reform should be a part of wider institutional reforms and successful 
outcomes cannot be achieved unless there is sufficient economy-wide institutional 
reform to reinforce power reforms. Kennedy (2003) underscored the importance of a 
proper institutional context for regulation analysing whether or not a regulator is 
politically independent for power reforms to produce the desired outcomes based on the 
study by Levy and Spiller (1996). However, the criteria vary when assessing whether a 
regulator can be considered independent or not. The widely used criteria are the nature 
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and terms of regulatory appointment, source of funding of the regulatory body and the 
extent of participation of the regulators in designing regulatory content such as tariff 
methodology (Stern 1997; 1998). 
 
Following Easterly and Levine (2003), two relevant views on the relationship between 
overall institutional development and power sector reforms are reflected in this chapter. 
The first view holds that electricity sector reform performs through long-lasting 
institutions in the absence of which policy becomes ineffective. Economies where 
reforms are most effectively implemented do so by adapting to the required political and 
legal changes through suitable institutional development. This implies that the role of 
technology is endogenous to the institutions as reforms implemented determine the 
necessary arrangement for adoption of better technology. The second view maintains 
that institutional reforms should be context specific in terms of know-how and political 
conditions to produce any significant impacts. 
 
4.3. The Motivation for Power Sector Reform in TECs 
 
Though reform was much needed and indeed inevitable in the power sector of TECs; 
factors external to the sector played a major role to catalyse the reform process. For 
example, Hungary pursued power reform in order to reduce the fiscal deficit through 
large scale privatisation while for the Czech Republic and Russia; reforming the power 
sector was part of an overall ownership change. The most important factor was the 
limited public resources to continue financing the sector with short-run excess capacity 
(Williams and Ghanadan, 2006; Bacon and Besant Jones, 2001, Joskow 1998). While 
economic efficiency, competition and choice were the main drivers of electricity reform 
in the developed economies such as OECD; these aspects were secondary in electricity 
reform in the TECs. The oil shocks of the 1970s led to soaring foreign debt, budget 
deficits and high inflation forcing the governments in the TECs to implement economic 
adjustment programs to mitigate the macroeconomic and fiscal crisis. The power sector 
and other state-led utilities were favoured candidates to undergo restructuring as these 
sectors had the greatest potential for deficit reduction and revenue generation through 
corporatisation and privatisation. Hence, power reforms for cost recovery and private 
investment followed suit as an alternative source to finance the sector and raise 
government revenue (Jhirad, 1990). 
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International development institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) also played a role in initiating power sector 
reforms as the economic stabilisation loans came with conditions attached to reform the 
power sector in the TECs (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001). Furthermore, as of early 
2000 the prospect of EU accession had a significant influence on the extent of power 
reforms in many Central Eastern Europe and Baltic States (CEB) and South Eastern 
Europe (SEE) as these countries needed to meet the minimum standards of the EU to 
gain a membership (EBRD, 2001). Following Jamasb et al. (2005), the motives behind 
power sector reforms in the TECs are summarised in Table 4.1 in terms of ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors. While ‘push’ factors include the unfavourable macroeconomic conditions; 
‘pull’ factors captures the incentives and obligations associated with power sector 
reforms. 
 
Push Factors Pull Factors 
1) Macroeconomic events: 
1970 oil crisis,  Post-Soviet 
economy-wide market-based 
transition (1989), Asian 
Financial crisis (1997-1998),  
economy-wide liberalisation 
and reform programs as 
initiated by the fiscal crisis 
 
2) Limited national fiscal 
ability: high public debt, utility 
borrowing as a major 
proportion of national debt 
 
3) Investments constraints of 
the power sector: no ability to 
self-finance, system upgrading 
and modernization required, 
high projected electricity 
demand 
1) Capital raising options: privatisation of state assets, 
greenfield private investment 
 
2) Lending for institutional reform: macroeconomic 
stabilization lending conditional upon power sector 
restructuring, asset privatisation (IMF), liberalisation and 
reform for new power sector loans (World Bank in 1993) 
 
3) Spill-over effects from international experiences : 
learning from pioneering reforms of power sectors in 
Chile, England and Wales and Norway in the 1980s and 
early 1990s 
 
4) EU accession: opportunities to benefit from regional 
integration by reforming the power sector in accordance 
with the EU Directives 
 
5) OECD Deregulation: new energy multinationals 
created as a result of OECD energy sector deregulation, 
provided investment opportunities for Europe and USA 
Table 4.1: Drivers of power sector reforms in TECs 
 
The early phase of reform policies were predominantly based on the theoretical analysis 
and policy recommendations of economic advisors influenced by electricity sector 
deregulation experiences in Europe and USA. A standard menu of reform for the TECs 
and non-OECD countries was prescribed by the World Bank through the reform 
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‘scorecard’ (World Bank, 1999). The major elements of the menu followed a gradual 
progression from forming energy laws to sector corporatisation and commercialisation 
with an independent energy regulator in place that eventually led to sector restructuring 
and privatisation (Jamasb, 2006). The creation of competitive wholesale markets was 
the last step to fully complete the reform process. While establishing a spot market or 
pool was one of the most innovative reforms of privatisation in the power sector of the 
TECs; whether it led to cost-reflective bidding remains inconclusive (Newbery, 1994). 
 
However, the ‘scorecard’ as well as the earlier power sector reform programme is 
criticized on the grounds that the local contexts were thoroughly ignored (Bacon and 
Besant-Jones, 2001). The advisors from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), EBRD and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), who 
initially came over to help these countries did not understand the extent to which 
institutions mattered in electricity reforms. The experience followed by a standard menu 
of reform based on OECD models as part of the structural adjustment programmes has 
proved unsuccessful as electricity reform in developing countries is different from 
OECD reform in terms of reform drivers, initial context and institutional aspects (Nepal 
and Jamasb, 2013). On the other hand, the lack of reform experience among developing 
countries meant that electricity reforms in Norway and the UK served as starting points 
while policy formulation was also based on trial and error as in the Indian context (Sen 
and Jamasb, 2012). Chile was the only non-OECD country that implemented a 
relatively successful electricity reform process already in the early 1980s. The focus of 
the standard menu of reforms was primarily financial with societal concerns such as 
access, service quality, socially efficient pricing and environment being ignored 
(Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). Further, policymakers ignored that electricity reform 
in the TECs is not an undertaking that is confined to the sector but one that is closely 
interlinked with broader legal and institutional contexts throughout the economy.  
 
Hence, this chapter takes a quantitative approach in exploring the high-level links 
between power sector reforms and other institutional reforms in the economy. We 
expect that effective power sector reforms should engender significant impacts on the 
economic, technical and environmental aspects of power sector across the TECs during 
20 years of reforms experience.  
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4.4. Initial Context of Reforms 
 
The power sectors of transition economies in the Former Soviet Union and Central and 
Eastern Europe had some common economic, technical and environmental features at 
the beginning of the reform period. The initial economic, technical and environmental 
context of reforms is discussed below: 
 
4.4.1. Declining GDP 
 
The transition countries experienced falling GDP in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 
1979 and 1980s. The contractions in real GDP during the early reform phase in Central 
Europe were comparable to the 20% fall in the US during the Great Depression while 
for other CEB and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) economies such as 
Russia and FSU the fall was even higher (Stern and Davis, 1997). Hence, boosting 
national GDP was one of the objectives of the economic reforms in TECs. Reforming 
the power sector was considered appropriate by the transition countries as a major way 
to recover from the fiscal crisis. The fall in GDP coincided with major fall in energy 
consumption significantly lowering industrial output and vice-versa. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Per capita GDP from 1990-2008 (in constant 2000 US dollars) 
 
Figure 4.1 above traces the per capita GDP of the CEB, SEE and CIS countries from 
1990-2008. All country groups experienced a recovery after the Asian financial crisis 
although the CEB region experienced the greatest decline. The reason could be that the 
CEB region includes 7 out of 9 countries in the EU with a strong industrial base and got 
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affected by declining energy consumption. All countries experienced a significant fall in 
per capita GDP during the early phase of transition. 
 
4.4.2. Excess capacity 
 
Although the region had ample capacity; the breakup of the Soviet Union also broke the 
integrated energy supply system allowing the oil and gas prices to rise as par to the 
international levels. The hike in energy prices produced an energy price shock in the oil 
importing countries. Energy supply from other FSU producers such as Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan also experienced frequent disruptions with the Russian monopoly over 
export routes through Ukraine, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. As of 1989, 
numerous nuclear reactors in Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia and 
Ukraine had an installed capacity of 300 gigawatts (Gray, 1995). Several unsafe nuclear 
plants were shut down such as the closure of, Chernobyl in Ukraine in 2001. With 
demand for electricity rising in particular and supply security being increasingly 
threatened, the early experience of excess capacity has come to an end (EBRD, 2008). 
Figure 4.2 shows that the gross generating installed capacity in the CIS region was 
increasing after 2000 while the figures are fairly stable in the SEE region since 1991. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Capacity mix in 2007 across TECs (in million kilowatts) 
 
Increasing environmental obligations such as EU renewable energy targets have 
prompted the transition countries associated with the EU to expand their renewable 
energy base. The phasing out of unsafe nuclear plants and the motives to reduce 
emissions from dirty coal has induced investment in renewable generation capacity in 
the transition regions. The transition towards a less carbon intensive economy combined 
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with the need to meet the increasing electricity demand has prompted countries to invest 
in renewable capacity expansion among the transition countries. 
 
The importance of the power sector to the economy and excess capacity was reflected in 
higher electricity production before reform started after which electricity production 
declined due to the economic slowdown. The fall in national GDP across the TECs after 
reform led to lower electricity demand and also lowered the electricity production. The 
Asian financial crisis seems to have negatively affected the CIS region the most in 
terms of power production. A decisive factor is the declining industrial demand for 
electricity among the energy-intensive industries during this period (Stern and Davis, 
1997). Figure 4.3 shows that the power production declined for the CIS region during 
the early phase of transition process increased after 2000. However, the SEE region has 
the largest renewable electricity production though thermal production dominates all 
regions. The CEB region produced the least amount of electricity from nuclear sources 
consisting only 9% in 2007 (EIA, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Electricity production across TECs from 1993-2008 
 
4.4.3. Low and distorted electricity prices 
 
Most prices in the centrally planned economies were set administratively, with little 
regard for cost and demand considerations (IMF, 1997). Prices were on the whole 
subject to strict controls while measured inflation was most of the time low and 
repressed. The energy prices in the transition economies were also de-aligned from 
economic cost with tax revenue being used to subsidise consumer groups such as 
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households. The price structure was distorted and based on cross-subsidisation as low 
household prices were achieved by charging relatively higher prices for industrial users. 
However, the practice of lower prices of electricity to households seems to have been 
maintained during the transition period as illustrated by Table 4.2 especially in the CIS 
countries with twin problems of low bill collection and high commercial losses. The 
low power prices have been a major obstacle in terms of financially supporting the 
system. 
 
Countries 
Residential price 
(USc/kwh) 
Industrial price 
(USc/kwh) 
Bill collection 
(%) 
Commercial losses 
(%) 
Albania 2.9 7.2 84.5 11.2 
Armenia 4.4 2.9 87 30 
Estonia 4.9 4.1 97.1 1.1 
Hungary 6.8 5.7 90 na 
Romania 5.2 4.8 62 2 
Bulgaria 3.7 3.9 85 10 
BIH 5.6 6.1 95 11.5 
Georgia 4.2 3.3 32 27.5 
Tajikistan 0.2 1.1 na 14 
Uzbekistan 0.7 0.7 25 na 
Turkmenistan 0.5 0.5 30 na 
Table 4.2: Prices, cash collections and commercial losses in selected TECs 
Source: Adapted from Kennedy (2001) 
 
The lack of adequate revenue generation from electricity sales is also reflected by the 
high electricity losses among the transition countries. The losses remain the lowest on 
average in the CEB region and the highest in the SEE region (EIA, 2010). For example, 
Albania belonging to the SEE region had the losses reaching 69% of output produced in 
2006. The high level of losses could indicate the poor state of the transmission and 
distribution networks in need of maintenance and upgrading. On the other hand, the 
high technical losses also demonstrate the lack of investment in the network 
infrastructures to upgrade and maintain them. 
 
4.4.4. High energy intensity 
 
The energy consumed per unit of GDP in the transition economies was historically 
estimated at four to eight times to that of OECD countries and the United States (Gray, 
1995). The high energy intensity of the past can be attributed to the presence of many 
energy intensive industries and the inefficiency of energy use spurred by lower power 
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prices. Furthermore, the distorted energy prices and soft budget constraints for industry 
also led to high energy use in the TECs. The CIS countries being the most energy 
intensive have reduced their energy intensity by about one-third since 1994 (EBRD, 
2008). However, these countries still use three times more energy as compared to 
Western Europe to produce a unit of GDP in terms of purchasing power parities (PPP). 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are highly energy intensive among the CIS 
countries. Hence, there is a significant potential in the TECs to be more energy efficient 
and converge at similar levels with the OECD countries in terms of per capita 
consumption of electricity (Markandya et al., 2006). 
 
4.4.5. High carbon emissions intensity 
 
 Many CEE and FSU countries relied heavily on low-quality and high polluting coal 
and lignite in the past. While reliance on coal and lignite was an alternative to not being 
dependent on Russian oil and gas; it also meant high levels of carbon and sulphur 
emissions. For example, coal comprised 90% of all fuel used for power generation in 
Poland and 60% in the former Slovakian Republic in 1995 (Gray, 1995). The transition 
countries met 6% of its total energy consumption from renewable sources in 1999 (EIA, 
2010). While the CEB and SEE countries consumed 7.5 million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(mtoe) of renewable energy; the amount was 57.5 mtoe for CIS countries. 
 
Of the world’s 20 most carbon intensive economies, 13 countries belong to the TECs 
(CDIAC, 2005). Kazakhstan and Russia are among the top 15 carbon polluters. Among 
the countries included in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCC), Kazakhstan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Armenia are listed as the three 
most carbon intensive economies. 
 
However, the impact of power sector reforms in the context of overall macroeconomic 
reforms remain to be examined in relation to these economic, technical and 
environmental aspects after more than two decades of reforms. This chapter attempts to 
do so. 
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4.5. Data and Econometric Methodology 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the link between power sector reforms and 
wider institutional reforms in the economy since the start of the transition process across 
27 TECs. This chapter uses the ‘Transition Indicators’ developed by the EBRD which 
measures the overall progress in transition countries through a set of indicators. The 
transition indicator scores reflect the judgment of the EBRD’s Office of the Chief 
Economist about country-specific progress in transition (EBRD, 2001). The reform 
scores reflect the assessments of EBRD country economists. The measurement scale for 
these indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid 
centrally planned economy while 4+ represents the standards of an industrialised market 
economy. This chapter uses the transition indicator scores as a proxy to measure the role 
of institutions in the transition countries. Table 4.3 explains that a score of 4+ in  power 
sector reforms imply that electricity tariffs are fully cost-reflective and provide adequate 
incentives for efficiency improvements, the presence of large-scale private sector 
involvement in the unbundled and well-regulated sector and fully liberalised sector with 
well-functioning arrangements for network access and full competition in generation 
(EBRD, 2001; EBRD, 2008). It also shows that the each reform steps builds upon the 
preceding reforms.  
 
The following five institutional indicators from the available set of nine EBRD 
indicators are constructed: 
 
 Economic Governance Reform Index (EGRI):  composite index based on un-
weighted average of large scale privatisation and corporate governance and 
enterprise restructuring indices. 
 Overall Market Liberalisation Index (OMLI): composite index based on un-
weighted average of price liberalisation, competition policy, and trade and foreign 
exchange indices. 
 Other Infrastructure Reform Index (OIRI): composite index based on un-weighted 
average of reform scores in roads, water and waste water and telecommunication 
indices. 
 Financial Sector Reform Index (FRI): composite index based on un-weighted 
average of banking reform and interest rate liberalisation and securities markets and 
non-bank financial institutions indices. 
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 Power Sector Reform Index (PRI) 
 
1 
Power sector operates as government department, few commercial freedoms or pressures, 
average prices well below costs, extensive cross-subsidies, and monolithic structure and 
with no separation of different parts of the business. 
2 
Power company distanced from government but political interference exists, attempts to 
harden budget constraints but effective tariffs are low, weak management incentives for 
efficient performance, little institutional reform and minimal private sector involvement (if 
any). 
3 
Law passed providing for full-scale restructuring of industry, including vertical unbundling 
through account separation and set-up of regulator, some tariff reform and improvements 
in revenue collection and some private sector involvement. 
4 
Separation of generation, transmission and distribution, independent regulator set up, rules 
for cost-reflective tariff-setting formulated and implemented, substantial private sector 
involvement in distribution and/or generation and some degree of liberalisation. 
4+ 
Tariffs cost-reflective and provide adequate incentives for efficiency improvements, large-
scale private sector involvement in the unbundled and well-regulated sector, fully 
liberalized sector with well-functioning arrangements for network access and full 
competition in generation. 
Table 4.3.: Components of power sector reform index  
Source: Adapted from EBRD (2001) 
 
Further, in order to analyse the relationship between the institutional frameworks on 
macroeconomic and power sector outcomes (economic, operational and environmental), 
the following three performance indicators were used as described below: 
 
 Economic impacts: includes per capita GDP (PGDP) and per capita installed 
capacity or  the available supply capacity (PINSTC) 
 Operational impacts: includes operational aspects namely per capita transmission 
and distribution losses (PTDL) and per capita electricity production (PEPDN)  
 Environmental impacts: carbon emissions intensity (CEI) and per capita renewable 
installed capacity (PRINSTC)  
 
However, both household and industrial electricity prices are not included in the 
analysis due to the lack of reliable and comprehensive data for all transition economies. 
Table 4.4 shows the status of the countries included in the sample. The transition 
countries studied in our sample can be divided into three distinct groups namely CEB, 
SEE and CIS based on European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
classification. 15 out of the 27 countries included in our sample are associated with the 
EU. Some transition countries included in our sample have already obtained a 
membership at the EU while some are in the process of being an EU member and have 
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the potential for joining EU. Turkey and Montenegro are excluded from our sample due 
to data unavailability on the predictor and criterion variables respectively. In addition, 
Montenegro became an independent state from 3 June 2006. 
 
Central Eastern 
Europe and Baltic 
States (CEB) 
South Eastern Europe 
(SEE) 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 
Others 
Croatia**, 
Estonia*, 
Hungary*, Latvia*, 
Lithuania, Poland*, 
Slovak Republic* 
and Slovenia* 
Albania***, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina***, 
Bulgaria*, FYR 
Macedonia** , Serbia, 
Romania* and 
Montenegro*** 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan 
Turkey** 
and 
Mongolia 
*EU members, ** EU candidates and *** Potential EU candidates 
Table 4.4: Countries included in the study 
Source: Adapted from EBRD (2001) 
 
The dataset, thus, is an unbalanced panel comprising 27 cross-sections (N) with short 
time series (T) of 19 years observed from period 1990-2008. The year 1990 was the 
start of the transition process among the TECs. The cross-sections represent different 
countries with their own economic, political and cultural system and history allowing 
the possibility for individual country-specific characteristics to influence the behaviour 
of each country. It is likely that unobserved heterogeneity such as culture, legal origin, 
geographical location and historical origin which are fixed over time is likely to be 
correlated with the wider economic reforms. Hence, panel data econometrics based on 
fixed effects (FE) is used to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Table 4.5 
summarizes and lists the dependent and independent variables used in the models. 
 
However, the relationship between the institutional framework and power sector 
outcomes is a complex one as the creation of a suitable institutional environment does 
not instantaneously lead to improved outcomes. The behaviour of dependent variables 
can depend upon the past values of itself along with a set of independent and control 
variables (Bruno, 2005). Thus a dynamic specification of the panel model can be 
specified as yit = Ωyit-1 + Xitβ + αi + uit where ‘Ω’is the coefficient of the lagged value of 
the dependent variable while ‘Xitβ’ represents the matrix of explanatory variables and 
coefficients. Hence, a dynamic FE model is applied in this study. 
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Type Variables Description Units Source 
Independent 
Variables 
PRI power reform index 
scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
OIRI 
other infrastructure reform 
index 
scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
FRI financial reform index 
scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
EGRI 
economic governance 
reform index 
scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
OMLI 
overall market 
liberalisation index 
scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
Control 
variable 
LNPECS 
per capita electricity 
consumption 
kilowatt hour 
(KWh) 
CIA World 
Factbook 
Conversion 
variable 
POPULATION 
includes all residents 
regardless  of legal status 
or citizenship 
total number WDI 
 
Dependent 
variables 
LNPGDP 
per capita GDP or per 
capita income 
constant 2000 
US dollars 
WDI) 
CEI carbon emissions intensity 
metric tons of 
CO2 per 
thousand year 
EIA 
LNPINSTC 
per capita installed 
capacity 
KWh per person EIA 
LNPRINSTC 
per capita renewable 
installed capacity 
KW per person EIA 
LNPEPDN 
per capita electricity 
production 
KWh per person EIA 
LNPTDLS 
per capita transmission 
and distribution losses 
KWh WDI 
Table 4.5: List and description of variables 
 
It is well established in the econometric literature that a dynamic least square dummy 
variables (LSDV) model with a lagged dependent variable engenders biased estimates 
when ‘T’ is small (Roodman, 2006). Thus, an alternative to dynamic LSDV panel 
estimates would be to use other consistent Instrumental Variable (IV) such as 
Anderson-Hsiao (AH) and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators such 
as Arellano-Bond (AB) and Blundell-Bond estimators (BB). The AH estimator 
precludes the fixed effects by transforming the data into first differences  and uses the 
second lags of the dependent variable (either differenced or in levels) as an instrument 
for the one-time differenced lagged dependent variable (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). 
The AB estimator is a GMM estimator for the first differenced model relying on a 
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greater number of internal instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The BB estimator 
assumes that the first differences of the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with 
fixed effects and augments the AB estimator by allowing for more instruments and 
improving efficiency (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
 
However, the relative performance evaluation of bias-corrected LSDV estimate 
(LSDVC) by Bruno (2005) in comparison to LSDV, AH, AB and BB estimator for 
unbalanced panels with small ‘N’ concludes that the STATA computed LSDVC version 
outperforms all other estimators in terms of root mean square error (RMSE) and bias. 
Thus, the LSDVC model by Bruno (2005) for unbalanced panels is used to examine the 
dynamic relationship for all estimators used to initialize the bias corrections (AH, AB 
and BB). The LSDVC estimator can be applied under two fundamental assumptions: a) 
it has a strictly exogenous selection rule and b) the error term ‘uit’ is classified as ‘an 
unobserved white noise disturbance’. The use of indexes based on individual 
components score as regressors and considering electricity demand as given largely 
confirms to the exogenous selection rule. The standard test statistics along with the 
Arellano-Bond test for first and second order autocorrelation is reported. Under the null 
of no autocorrelation, the presence of second order autocorrelation would imply that the 
estimates are inconsistent. In addition, the estimates of the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions reported by the Blundell Bond estimator should test 
significantly different from zero to reject the null that overidentifying restrictions are 
valid. Using ‘xtlsdvc’command in STATA, the estimator first produces uncorrected 
LSDV estimates which then approximates the sample bias of the estimator using 
Kiviet’s higher order asymptotic expansion techniques (Bruno, 2005; Kiviet, 1995). 
 
All dependent and independent variables except indexes have been logarithmic 
transformed. Following Sen and Jamasb (2012) and Zhang et al. (2008); the first model 
(Model I) to be estimated in examining the relationship between reforms and outcomes 
is: 
Yit =ΩYit-1 + PRIitβ1 + OIRIitβ2 + EGRIitβ3 + FRIitβ4 + OMLIitβ5 + 
                 LNPECSitβ6 + αi + uit                                (1) 
 
However, the motives to reform the power sector in the TECs were primarily external. 
Hence, reforms in external sector upon interaction with the power sector could have 
affected the macroeconomic and power sector outcomes. This study accounts for the 
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interaction among the reform variables by constructing the interaction terms. The 
interaction terms have been derived by multiplying the indexes under consideration. 
Thus, model II introduces an interaction term between the power sector reforms with 
wider economic institutional reforms as specified below: 
 
Yit = ΩYit-1 + PRIitβ1 + OIRIitβ2 + EGRIitβ3 + FRIitβ4 + OMLIitβ5 + LNPECSitβ6 + 
OIRIit*PRIitβ7 + EGRIit*PRIitβ8 + PRIit*FRIitβ9 + PRIit*OMLIitβ10 + αi + uit (2) 
 
Both models use per capita electricity consumption as a control variable. Table 4.6 
below reports the descriptive statistics of variables used in our study. It can be inferred 
that liberalising the economy as a whole (opening up trade, establishing proper 
competition policies and price liberalisation in the economy) has been high on the 
reform agenda across all transition countries. However, overall price liberalisation in the 
economy has not been necessarily applied to the power sector as all groups of countries 
considered are still a distance away from achieving cost-reflective pricing of electricity. 
Thus, the power sectors in the TECs have been reformed the least in relation to the 
standards of an industrialised market economy. However, disaggregating the diverse set 
of countries into different groups based on their common characteristics would allow 
studying the relative institutional reform progress more precisely than solely relying on 
the overall average.   
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum No. of Observations 
LNPRINSTC -2.211 2.061 -8.526 0 490 
LNPREPDN 5.407 2.315 -5.195 8.013 472 
LNPGDP 7.360 0.992 4.805 9.532 509 
LNPINSTC -0.141 0.474 -2.282 0.809 490 
LNPEPDN -5.801 0.513 -7.108 -4.502 513 
LNPTDLS -7.782 0.431 -8.977 -6.663 513 
PRI 1.994 0.814 1 3.67 513 
OIRI 2.013 0.796 1 3.92 513 
EGRI 2.236 0.855 1 3.84 513 
OMLI 2.949 0.888 1 4.22 513 
FRI 2.065 0.810 1 4 513 
LNPECS 7.866 0.515 5.979 8.873 513 
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics for the variables 
 
Figure 4.4 confirms that economic liberalisation was highly pursued across the 
transition countries. The figure also depicts some degree of institutional convergence 
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among PRI, OIRI, EGRI and FRI variables across all CEB, SEE and CIS member 
states. The CEB countries which include 7 out of 9 EU members seem to have 
experienced a stagnation of institutional reforms including power sector reforms though 
the financial sector reforms is following an upward trend. However, the SEE countries 
exhibit an upward reform trend in other institutional reforms except for the power 
sector. On the other hand, the CIS countries show a mixed picture. The steep upward 
trend in PRI among CIS countries reveals that these countries have some catching up to 
do in relation to their counterparts in reforming their power sectors. The overall market 
liberalisation process seems to have flattened out after 2004 while reforms in economic 
governance, other infrastructures and financial sector are gaining pace. 
 
A detailed analysis of EU members gives a clearer outlook on the progress of power 
sector reforms. Electricity reforms seem to have sped up after financial crisis till EU 
accession in 2004 (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) 
before a brief moment of respite. The reform process again gained pace until 2005 with 
Bulgaria and Romania in the process of joining EU. However, power sector reform 
appears to have stagnated among the EU members after 2005 while other institutional 
reforms show a slow upward trend. Likewise, the power sector reform gained pace in 
the potential EU candidates (Albania, BIH, Montenegro, Serbia, Croatia, FYR 
Macedonia) after 2000 but with stagnation post 2005. Other institutional reforms in the 
EU candidate countries show an upward trend. Hence the motivation for joining EU 
indeed has acted as incentives to accelerate power sector reforms across these countries. 
 
A further analysis of the oil and gas rich transition countries such as Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan shows that power sector reform gained pace after 
2000 with a reversal around 2004 and stagnation after 2005. While reforms in other 
infrastructures are speeding up, reforms in overall market liberalisation, economic 
governance and financial sector reform have stalled.  
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 Figure 4.4: Graphical analysis of economy-wide reform progress 
Note: The vertical axis represents the EBRD transition scores ranging from 1 to 4+. 
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4.6. Results and Discussions 
 
This section presents and discusses the results based on Model I and Model II estimated 
using the ‘LSDVC’ technique. The findings are organised under the economic, 
operational and environmental impacts of reforms. Model I explains the ‘on its own’ 
impact of reforms over-time. Model II explains the outcomes of reforms  accounting for 
interrelations between the power sector reforms and other institutional reforms. The 
bootstrapped standard errors are reported in brackets. A third order bias correction was 
performed while the number of bootstrapping repetitions was confined to 50 depending 
on the number of observations. For all econometric estimations, the AB tests of 
autocorrelation and BB test of over identifying restrictions were performed to assess the 
model choice though the results are not reported in this chapter. OLS and FE 
estimations were carried out and the results were compared to determine the nature of 
bias for each hypothesis. In all cases, bias estimates were observed as OLS and FE do 
not take endogeneity among regressors into account.    
 
4.6.1 The economic impacts of reform 
 
Per capita GDP and per capita installed capacity were used as outcome variables in 
order to assess the economic impacts of inter-sector reforms in the TECs. Changes in 
per capita GDP imply changes in economic growth while per capita installed capacity or 
available supply capacity is a proxy for power sector endowment and indicates the size 
of the system. An increase in the per capita installed capacity is particularly associated 
with new capital being attracted to the power sector due to factors such as privatisation 
and Greenfield projects. 
 
i) Impacts of reforms on per capita GDP: The results in Table 4.7 show that the lagged 
value of GDP is significant implying that last year’s GDP had an effect on previous 
years’ GDP across the transition countries. Power sector reform on its own, does not 
bring about a change in per capita GDP. However, the power reforms appear to 
significantly affect the GDP when accounting for interactions between power reforms 
and other institutional reforms. Interestingly, electricity reforms when considered along 
with overall market liberalisation reforms had a significant negative effect on per capita 
GDP. This could be explained on the grounds that while competition is an essential part 
of market-based electricity reforms, competition policy in the economy as whole in 
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TECs has progressed above those required by the power sector. The average progress in 
reforms for ‘OMLI’ and ‘PRI’ is table 4.6 also supports this view. This renders great 
responsibilities on competition authorities to implement reforms in the power sector as 
inter-sector competition reforms are not synchronized (Pollitt, 2009). In contrast, some 
transition countries have introduced full unbundling in the power sector while the 
competition policy in the economy as a whole remains ineffective in these countries 
producing counter-conducive results to power sector reforms.  
 
Variables 
Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
L.LNPGDP 
0.896*** 
(0.038) 
0.893*** 
(0.002) 
.935*** 
(0.030) 
0.967*** 
(0.041) 
0.975*** 
(0.043) 
0.942*** 
(0.031) 
PRI 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.125*** 
(0.021) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.060*** 
(0.020) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.099*** 
(0.027) 
OIRI 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.049** 
(0.021) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.044** 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.057* 
(0.031) 
EGRI 
0.068*** 
(0.007) 
0.051* 
(0.027) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
0.016* 
(0.008) 
0.019 
(0.031) 
OMLI 
0.063*** 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.019) 
.015** 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.008) 
0.024 
(0.021) 
FRI 
0.009 
(0.298) 
0.020 
(0.031) 
0.007 
(0.274) 
0.019 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.016 
(0.031) 
LNPECS 
0.171*** 
(0.011) 
0.073*** 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
0.035** 
(0.004) 
0.042** 
(0.025) 
PRI*OIRI 
 
-0.025 
(0.010) 
 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
PRI*EGRI 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
PRI*OMLI 
-.051*** 
(0.117) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
PRI*FRI 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
 
-0.042 
(0.124) 
Table 4.7: Impact of reforms on per capita GDP 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively 
 
Reforms in other infrastructures (telecommunication, water and roads), economic 
governance (large scale privatisation and enterprise restructuring), and overall market 
liberalisation (opening up trade, liberalising prices under certain competition policy) all 
produced a significant impact on per capita GDP. Thus, we can infer that regional 
integration and increasing cross-border trading of goods and services (including the 
energy trade) boosted national GDP. However, it is not clear which particular aspects of 
institutional reforms were important in influencing the GDP and which countries gained 
 77 
or lost. Nonetheless, countries that had the macroeconomic motives to reform their 
power sector benefited when power sector reforms took place in conjunction with 
institutional reforms as suggested by the results. 
 
Per capita electricity consumption also has a significant effect on per capita GDP in the 
transition countries confirming that these countries are energy-intensive. The traces of 
decade’s long experience of the economy based on cheap and state subsidised energy in 
the transition countries seems to be still present as confirmed by the overall results. 
 
ii) Impacts of reforms on per capita installed capacity: Per capita installed generation  
capacity remained fairly inelastic to power sector reforms and per capita electricity 
consumption in the transition countries as observed in Table 4.8. The one-lagged 
coefficient is significant indicating that last year’s capacity is an important indicator for 
the current year’s capacity. All other institutional coefficients except for EGRI (with 
and without  interaction terms) are insignificant in explaining changes in per capita 
installed capacity. However, the economic governance index (large scale privatisation 
and corporate governance with enterprise restructuring) is negatively significant to per 
capita installed capacity. In most cases, privatisation occurred without an appropriate 
framework for privatisation itself such as suitable legal structure, a proper regulatory 
and competition framework. The results, to some extent, indicate the use of power 
sector privatisation as a ‘shock therapy’ and with the sole motive of raising revenue. It 
may be possible to include the lagged EGRI variable in the model to assert this claim 
and remains a topic for further analysis. 
 
While such privatisation (or the transfer of ownership) indeed raised proceeds for the 
government, the receipts from privatisation were not necessarily channelled towards 
adding more generation capacity due to factors such as corruption (Kaufmann and 
Siegelbaum, 1997). The lack of suitable institution might also have facilitated 
corruption in the economy. Stiglitz (1999) explains the so-called ‘the velvet gloves of 
privatisation’ where privatisation occurred backdoors with ill-motives resulting in mass 
corruption. Thus, mass privatisation of the power sector with a motive to add generation 
capacity has defied the logics in the transition countries as per our results in Table 4.8. 
However, good corporate governance and enterprise restructuring also led to the 
shutting down of few old and inefficient plants such as Chernobyl in 2001. 
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Variables 
Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
L.LNPINSTC 
0.918*** 
(0.154) 
0.911*** 
(0.148) 
0.924*** 
(0.030) 
0.916*** 
(0.033) 
1.176*** 
(0.016) 
1.16*** 
(0.018) 
PRI 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.028 
(0.074) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.037) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.018 
(0.053) 
OIRI 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.030 
(0.060) 
0.007 
(0.016) 
0.035 
(0.042) 
-0.001 
(0.023) 
0.083. 
(0.044) 
EGRI 
-0.032 
(0.020) 
-0.091* 
(0.054) 
-.034** 
(0.013) 
-.085** 
(0.037) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
-0.086 
(0.047) 
OMLI 
0.009 
(0.021) 
0.045 
(0.057) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.039 
(0.034) 
0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.044) 
FRI 
0.015 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.076) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.047) 
0.022 
(0.290) 
-0.024 
(0.067) 
LNPECS 
0.018 
(0.037) 
0.073 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
-0.018 
(0.019) 
-0.018 
(0.020) 
PRI*OIRI 
 
-0.017 
(0.027) 
 
-0.019 
(0.029) 
 
-0.047 
(0.022) 
PRI*EGRI 
-0.036 
(0.029) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
PRI*OMLI 
-.021 
(0.031) 
-0.016 
(0.018) 
 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
PRI*FRI 
-0.002 
(0.041) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
 
0.022 
(0.029) 
Table 4.8: Impact of reforms on per capita installed capacity 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively 
 
4.6.2 The operational impacts of reforms 
 
Per capita transmission and distribution network energy losses and per capita overall 
electricity production were considered as performance outcomes to assess the 
operational and technical impacts of power sector and other economic institutional 
reforms. These measures are also helpful in assessing the technical efficiency of 
electricity generation and transmission. 
 
i) Impact of reforms on per capita transmission and distribution (T&D) losses: The 
results in Table 4.9 shows that power sector reform ‘on its own’ does not have a 
significant effect on reducing the per capita T&D losses but inclusion of interaction 
terms in the model would do so. The lagged value is also significant implying prior 
years’ losses have significant bearings on current year’s losses. Overall market 
liberalisation has significantly increased the T&D losses in the transition countries. The 
argument can be supported on the grounds that cross-border power trade has 
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significantly increased in these countries after market liberalisation. For instance, the 
SEE region electricity imports increased from 1837 GWh to 5549 GWh between 1995 
and 2002 (Hooper and Medvedev, 2009).  
 
The existence of old and long inefficient grids across the transition countries can 
increase the power losses in proportion with the volume of imported electricity traded. 
However, overall market reform when complemented with power sector reform has 
reduced the T&D losses across the TECs. One way to counter the power losses would 
be to harmonise power sector reforms with overall market reforms (price liberalisation, 
open trading and competition policy) which also led to efficiency improvements in the 
regulated networks as shown by the results below.  
 
Variables 
Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
L.LNPTDLS 
0.781*** 
(0.065) 
0.783*** 
(0.066) 
0.818*** 
(0.039) 
0.809*** 
(0.042) 
0.928*** 
(0.031) 
0.911** 
(0.036) 
PRI 
-0.023 
(0.045) 
-0.180 
(0.135) 
-0.018 
(0.026) 
-0.159* 
(0.089) 
-0.028 
(0.027) 
-0.191** 
(0.089) 
OIRI 
-0.020 
(0.059) 
-0.053 
(0.122) 
-0.020 
(0.032) 
-0.059 
(0.076) 
-0.009 
(0.027) 
-0.033 
(0.078) 
EGRI 
-0.004 
(0.053) 
-0.046 
(0.124) 
-0.005 
(0.032) 
-0.048 
(0.082) 
-0.005 
(0.034) 
-0.075 
(0.084) 
OMLI 
0.065 
(0.046) 
0.202** 
(0.097) 
0.060** 
(0.027) 
0.195*** 
(0.066) 
0.058** 
(0.028) 
0.207*** 
(0.067) 
FRI 
-0.024 
(0.030) 
-0.031 
(0.161) 
-0.026 
(0.030) 
-0.043 
(0.109) 
-0.032 
(0.031) 
-0.025 
(0.107) 
LNPECS 
-0.043 
(0.074) 
0.053 
(0.068) 
-0.0489 
(0.040) 
0.053 
(0.043) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
0.051 
(0.040) 
PRI*OIRI 
 
0.025 
(0.059) 
 
0.026 
(0.038) 
 
0.023 
(0.039) 
PRI*EGRI 
0.029 
(0.061) 
0.029 
(0.039) 
 
0.048 
(0.041) 
PRI*OMLI 
-0.106* 
(0.090) 
-0.105** 
(0.040) 
 
-0.118*** 
(0.041) 
PRI*FRI 
0.006 
(0.081) 
0.009 
(0.053) 
 
-0.024 
(0.036) 
Table 4.9: Impact of reforms on per capita transmission and distribution losses 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively 
 
ii) Impact of reforms on per capita electricity production: Expansive electricity 
production was a key economic policy of the TECs. This can be inferred from Lenin’s 
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statement that ‘communism equals Soviet Union and the electrification of the whole 
nation’. Table 4.10 reports the results on the impacts of reforms on per capita electricity 
production after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Power sector reform significantly 
affects per capita electricity production only after controlling for interaction across 
different institutional variables. The past years’ electricity production is significant in 
determining the current year’s per capita production across the TECs. Overall market 
liberalisation seems to have brought about a significant effect in per capita electricity 
production. Increasing regional power trade with the creation of power exchanges in 
these countries coupled with increasing cross border trade of oil and gas as a fuel to 
generate electricity from energy-rich transition countries could explain the overall 
increase in power trade volumes. Large scale privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
in relation to power sector reforms also produced significant results in overall electricity 
production possibly due to new entries in the market as shown in Table 4.10.  
 
Variables 
Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
L.LNPEPDN 
0.518*** 
(0.061) 
0.519*** 
(0.050) 
0.578*** 
(0.030) 
0.809*** 
(0.042) 
0.810*** 
(0.026) 
0.848*** 
(0.029) 
PRI 
-0.031 
(0.082) 
0.120 
(0.909) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
0.133* 
(0.050) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
0.159** 
(0.089) 
OIRI 
0.019 
(0.101) 
0.089 
(0.760) 
0.019 
(0.020) 
0.086 
(0.044) 
0.011 
(0.025) 
0.150 
(0.058) 
EGRI 
-0.008 
(0.100) 
-0.073 
(0.811) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.078 
(0.047) 
-0.017 
(0.025) 
-0.116 
(0.063) 
OMLI 
-0.007 
(0.085) 
0.062 
(0.645) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
0.074** 
(0.037) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
0.084* 
(0.050) 
FRI 
0.026 
(0.030) 
0.010 
(1.09) 
0.024 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.061) 
0.019 
(0.021) 
0.019 
(0.077) 
PRI*OIRI 
 
-0.031 
(0.368) 
 
-0.029 
(0.021) 
 
-0.067 
(0.029) 
PRI*EGRI 
0.038 
(0.396) 
0.042* 
(0.022) 
 
0.057* 
(0.030) 
PRI*OMLI 
-0.055 
(0.392) 
-0.063 
(0.022) 
 
-0.049 
(0.041) 
PRI*FRI 
0.013 
(0.524 
0.011 
(0.030) 
 
0.008 
(0.036) 
Table 4.10: Impact of reforms on per capita electricity production  
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively 
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4.6.3 The environmental impacts of reform 
 
Carbon emissions intensity (CEI) and per capita renewable installed capacity were 
considered as the outcome variables to assess the environmental impact of power sector 
and broader economic reforms since 1990. This measure can serve as a proxy for 
environmental sustainability to some extent. 
 
i) Impact of reforms on carbon emissions intensity: The empirical results on carbon 
emission intensity in Table 4.11 show that all institutional variables except for reforms 
in other infrastructure sectors have no significant bearing on carbon emissions intensity. 
Per capita electricity consumption in the transition countries has been driving emissions 
intensity as thermal sources constitute a large share of electricity generation in as shown 
by our results. Likewise, the previous level of carbon intensity also has a role to play in 
determining the level of carbon intensity with the lagged coefficient being significant. 
 
Variables 
Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
L.LNCEI 
0.892*** 
(0.040) 
0.832*** 
(0.038) 
0.890*** 
(0.030) 
0.866*** 
(0.018) 
0.852*** 
(0.026) 
0.897*** 
(0.027) 
PRI 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
-0.425 
(0.393) 
0.042 
(0.078) 
-0.186 
(0.069) 
0.059 
(0.081) 
-0.197 
(0.027) 
OIRI 
-0.051 
(0.094) 
-0.564* 
(0.029) 
-0.115 
(0.030) 
-0.059** 
(0.070) 
-0.128 
(0.027) 
-0.553** 
(0.066) 
EGRI 
0.193 
(0.014) 
0.180 
(0.034) 
0.132 
(0.090) 
0.0157 
(0.052) 
0.142 
(0.094) 
0.148 
(0.062) 
OMLI 
-0.025 
(0.013) 
-0.134 
(0.079) 
0.014 
(0.078) 
0.080 
(0.219) 
0.033 
(0.081) 
0.059 
(0.224) 
FRI 
-0.154 
(0.140) 
0.124 
(0.338) 
-0.151 
(0.119) 
-0.056 
(0.269) 
-0.161 
(0.122) 
-0.020 
(0.273) 
LNPECS 
0.327* 
(0.080) 
0.323* 
(0.088) 
0.028*** 
(0.034) 
0.338** 
(0.032) 
0.369*** 
(0.041) 
0.353** 
(0.043) 
PRI*OIRI 
 
0.205 
(0.047) 
 
0.210 
(0.021) 
 
0.192 
(0.025) 
PRI*EGRI 
0.007 
(0.060) 
-0.007 
(0.034) 
 
0.001 
(0.037) 
PRI*OMLI 
0.136 
(0.060) 
-0.001 
(0.030) 
 
0.022 
(0.035) 
PRI*FRI 
-0.179 
(0.060) 
-0.083 
(0.029) 
 
-0.101 
(0.043) 
Table 4.11: Impact of reforms on carbon emissions intensity 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively 
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ii) Impact of reforms on per capita renewable installed capacity: Table 4.12 shows that 
the lagged value of per capita renewable installed capacity and financial reforms are 
significant for per capita renewable capacity. Other variables including power sector 
reforms are insignificant in bringing about changes in per capita installed renewable 
capacity. The regression results also show that financial sector reforms on their own are 
important for additional renewable capacity. 
 
The adoption of renewable technology is costly with high sunk costs. Hence, access to 
credit and availability of finance plays a crucial role. Banking reforms with interest rate 
liberalisation and the development of several non-bank financial institutions (such as 
cooperatives) might have facilitated borrowing and much needed access to funds 
thereby promoting investments in renewable capacity. An important lesson to be learnt 
from this result is that the long run transition towards a low carbon economy with the 
widespread adoption of renewable also depends on the overall financial sector reforms 
in the transition economies. 
 
Variables 
Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
L.LNRPINSTC 
1.145*** 
(0.024) 
1.018*** 
(0.043) 
1.076*** 
(0.016) 
1.078*** 
(0.018) 
1.079*** 
(0.011) 
1.078*** 
(0.012) 
PRI 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
-0.121 
(0.093) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
-0.055 
(0.069) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
-0.062 
(0.059) 
OIRI 
0.010 
(0.033) 
-0.013 
(0.087) 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
-0.059 
(0.070) 
-0.001 
(0.027) 
-0.063 
(0.063) 
EGRI 
-0.017 
(0.023) 
-0.067 
(0.079) 
-0.027 
(0.022) 
-0.042 
(0.065) 
-0.026 
(0.021) 
-0.047 
(0.060) 
OMLI 
0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.029 
(0.067) 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
0.004 
(0.059) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
-0.004 
(0.054) 
FRI 
0.034* 
(0.030) 
0.087 
(0.101) 
0.057* 
(0.030) 
0.076 
(0.082) 
0.055** 
(0.026) 
0.093 
(0.075) 
LNPECS 
-0.044 
(0.044) 
-0.023 
(0.048) 
-0.028 
(0.034) 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.022 
(0.031) 
0.022 
(0.030) 
PRI*OIRI 
 
-0.001 
(0.038) 
 
0.022 
(0.032) 
 
0.026 
(0.029) 
PRI*EGRI 
-0.018 
(0.043) 
0.008 
(0.034) 
 
0.012 
(0.031) 
PRI*OMLI 
0.033 
(0.031) 
0.004 
(0.032) 
 
0.007 
(0.029) 
PRI*FRI 
-0.015 
(0.049) 
-0.015 
(0.406) 
 
-0.024 
(0.036) 
Table 4.12: Impact of reforms on renewable per capita installed capacity 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively 
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4.6.4. Summary of results  
 
The results from the econometric analysis reveal that power sector reform ‘on its own’ 
did not directly influence the economic, operational and environmental outcomes. There 
are two likely reasons to explain such outcomes. Firstly, although reforms advanced 
linearly in theory; the implementation in practice remained too weak to influence any 
outcomes significantly. For example, the results indicate that power sector reform on its 
own has not been significantly linked with change in national income and thereby 
contradicting the expectations of the policymakers. The legacy of central planning may 
have translated into slow willingness and commitment towards implementing reform. 
The first post-communist governments in some SEE (Belarus) and many CIS countries 
(Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) were led by the same political elites under communism 
delaying the progress in transition to preserve the status-quo. Elsewhere in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia and Tajikistan; overall reforms including  reforms  in the 
power sector have been slow as these countries had to do some ‘catching up’ due to 
civil war and ethnic-conflicts. Regional integration via EU membership successfully 
accelerated power reforms as the countries with common geography, history and culture 
created appropriate institutions that allowed international integration to complement 
domestic economic reforms. 
 
Secondly, the complexities and intricacies of power sector reform and dependence on 
wider economic reform were not properly appreciated or were largely ignored. For 
example, the results from Table 4.13 below suggest that per capita transmission and 
distribution losses decrease when power sector reforms are interacted with overall 
market liberalisation. Likewise, the results suggest that adding new renewable 
generation capacity is only successful when supported by broader financial sector 
reforms and reforms in other infrastructures but not with reforms in the power sector. 
Such results portray the complexities involving power sector reforms and the need to 
consider wider institutional aspects surrounding these reforms. Thus, the results show 
that the relationship between power sector reforms and their outcomes in practice is not 
straightforward as believed in the past by policymakers. On the other hand, the current 
arrangements of power markets in transition countries with intermediate structures 
between full vertical integration and full unbundling suggests that the relationship is not 
linear or at least there has not been a linear path to reform in practice (World Bank, 
2011). 
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Economic 
performance 
Per capita GDP 
Positively affected by 
 reforms in other infrastructure 
sectors, 
 economic governance and overall 
market liberalisation 
Per capita installed 
capacity 
Negatively affected by economic 
governance 
 
Operational 
performance 
Per capita transmission 
and distribution  losses 
Positively affected by overall market 
liberalisation 
Negatively affected by power sector reforms 
and overall market liberalisation 
Per capita electricity 
production 
Positively affected by overall market 
liberalisation 
Environmental 
performance 
Carbon emissions 
intensity 
Negatively affected by reforms in other 
infrastructures 
Per capita renewable 
installed capacity 
Positively affected by financial sector 
reform 
Table 4.13: Summary of major results 
 
As argued by Stiglitz (1999); it is necessary for policymakers to understand that neither 
every reform measure is important and nor all reforms should be done at once for 
reforms to be successful. For example, the results in general show a negative significant 
relationship between economic governance index and per capita generation capacity 
even though good governance and enterprise restructuring did shut down few plants. 
This is mainly due to misguided large scale privatisation under weak governance 
structure which created and preserved vested interests such as in the Russian power 
sector. Hence, ‘gradualism’ with proper sequencing of reform measures can perform 
better than hastily applied ‘shock therapy reforms’.  
 
Two major messages are clear from the results for successful electricity sector reforms 
in the transition countries: a) the need to harmonize reforms in ‘theory’ or paper with 
reforms in ‘practice’ and b) the need to synchronize electricity sector reforms with other 
related institutional reforms in the economy. This is because electricity sector reforms 
fall within the domain of overall economic reforms and is closely interlinked with other 
sectors of the economy as suggested by the main results in Table 4.13. Thus, in line 
with Easterly and Levine (2003), the results support the view that power sector reforms 
where successful and effective are able to do so by adopting broader institutional 
reforms  to support the electricity sector reforms.  
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However, this analysis may have a number of limitations that are worth mentioning like 
any other research examining the determinants and impact of reforms. The issue of 
endogeneity can be raised in this study like all other studies on electricity and economic 
reforms (Erdogdu, 2011a). Nonetheless, the econometric methodology used in this 
study controls for endogeneity problems to a large extent. Similarly, this model may not 
adequately capture and reflect all the qualitative dimensions and steps involved in the 
electricity reform process. This is because not all aspects of reforms are readily 
quantifiable in physical and monetary units (Jamasb et al., 2005). The lack of a 
complete dataset also prevented this study from incorporating other aspects such as 
technological innovations and changes in energy regulatory regimes to study their 
impacts on power sector outcomes in the model. It may also be argued that the dataset 
used in this study did not actually reflect the true reform progress in the transition 
countries as the reform scores are based on the subjective judgement of EBRD's group 
of economists. However, the assessment of the scores is based on an updated 
classification system implying that reform scores may  capture  actual progress in 
transition over-time. The analysis also does not quantify the effects of EU membership 
or candidate status on the performance variables against those transition countries not 
associated with the EU because of multicollinearity issues involved when using a 
dummy variable in a small dataset. However, it may be possible to explicitly study the 
effects of EU membership with a big dataset in the future.  
 
4.7. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the link between power sector reforms and their 
outcomes accounting for wider economic reforms in countries that experienced 
transformation from centrally planned economic systems towards marketization without 
effective market signals to market design, tradition, and institutions. The transformation 
of the power sector was one of the prominent components of this economic 
transformation because of the economic characteristics of the sector which involved 
large fixed costs operated by regulated monopolies with alleged significant links with 
national income and output. Thus, this chapter focused on the relatively ignored role of 
broader economic institutions that market oriented electricity reform policies tend to 
rely upon to work.  
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The results support the view that electricity sector reform is a complicated process 
primarily due to its dependency upon broader institutional framework in the economy. 
The link between power sector reforms and other institutional reform have not been as 
lucid and direct as policymakers anticipated. Thus, failure to understand the institutional 
aspects of electricity sector reform combined with adopting emulated reforms under 
differing institutional capacity delayed effectiveness of the process. On this note, it is 
unclear whether the benchmark set for the transition countries to achieve the standards 
of that of an industrialised economy such as UK and Norway has been a valid one.  
 
The transition countries seem to have sped up their power sector reforms post 2000 
though with stagnation since 2005. While much has been said in the past regarding the 
pacing and sequencing of power sector reforms; the message from this study is that only 
those countries that have been able to harmonise reforms across sectors such as 
harmonizing power reforms with other institutional reforms or are in the process of 
doing so have gained significantly in terms of power sector and broader macroeconomic 
reform outcomes. Furthermore, such argument equally applies to many other sectoral 
reform programmes as well in developing and transition countries. 
 
The errors in the early 1990s across the transition countries sends a message to other 
developing nations that electricity sector reforms do not perform based on one-
dimensional sector-level reforms. The need to formulate realistic reform models based 
on individual capacity, resources and needs rather than theory driven reforms is what 
the developing world can learn from the reform experiment in the TECs. The main 
lesson to be learnt by the developing countries where sectoral reforms and institution 
building is moving together is that electricity sector reform squarely falls within the 
domain of wider economic reforms. Thus, power sector reform need not wait until all of 
proper supporting institutions are in place. However, a more serious problem in power 
sector reforms in developing countries is that there is often great resistance to them as 
compared to developed countries, and even when reforms are implemented, the political 
processes and institutions in developing countries often adapt themselves to counter the 
effect of reforms in different ways. Hence, the overall health of real-time economic 
institutions and the rigidity of the institutional framework matters a lot for power sector 
reforms to succeed as a whole in developing countries.  
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Chapter 5: Interconnections and Market Integration in the Irish Single 
Electricity Market  
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The creation of a common and integrated market for electricity is a major goal of the 
European Commission (EC).  The EU 1996 Directive on ‘Directive for a common 
Electricity Market’ laid down the foundation for liberalisation and integration of 
electricity markets in the European Union (EU). The Commission’s Directive 
2003/54/EC required the member states to open their markets and guarantee non-
discriminatory network access to third-parties while the EU Directive 2009/72/EC 
placed wider emphasis on cross border-interconnections and the need to mitigate 
barriers to cross-border trade. As a result, electricity markets across Europe experienced 
liberalisation, privatisation and price deregulation so as to meet the energy policy goals 
and targets of sustainability, affordability and security of supply.  The development of 
organised wholesale spot markets and power exchanges, increased cross-border 
electricity trade and more interconnections, remain the major hallmarks and objectives 
of these liberalised but largely national markets aspiring to be integrated (Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2005).   
 
In line with the EU policy towards greater market integration, the Northern Ireland 
Authority for Utility Regulation (NAIRU) and Ireland’s Commission for Energy 
Regulation (CER) began to jointly regulate the all-island Single Electricity Market 
(SEM) on November 1, 2007. The goal of the Irish All-Island Market (AIM) is to 
increase investment in new generating plants and availability of existing generators in 
both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. However, the isolation of the island's 
economy from continental Europe has resulted in just one high voltage direct current 
(HDVC) interconnector link via  the Moyle interconnector connecting SEM with Great 
Britain (GB) amounting to almost 4.7% (about 500 MW) of total SEM generation 
capacity. The lack of greater interconnection is a major concern in a highly concentrated 
market as SEM as this can lead to strategic behaviour by the incumbents, creates 
opportunities for market power abuse and exercise, and unilateral profiting from limited 
competition in the market. In addition, the potential benefits of an integrated market are 
not achieved as price convergence can be difficult in the absence of adequate 
interconnections among the markets.  
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 The main advantages of larger integrated markets are enhanced security of supply and 
reduction in reserve capacity needed to maintain a given level of system performance 
(Valeri Malaguzzi, 2009; de Nooij, 2011). An interconnected system is economically 
justifiable because it incurs lower operating costs by permitting excess supply in one 
node to be utilised in other nodes where the marginal cost would be higher if there were 
no interconnections (Charun and Morande, 1997). Thus, the potential for capital cost 
reduction exists by incurring lower investments as it may no longer be necessary to 
maintain reserve generating capacity in every node in case of system failures (Turvey, 
2006). The total economic surplus is also maximised as the most expensive energy is 
displaced. Integrated markets, in general, can lead to higher social welfare than if the 
markets were to remain separate (Neuhoff and Newbery, 2005; Hobbs et al., 2005; 
Ehrenmann and Neuhoff, 2009). Interconnections between two very similar markets are 
also desirable for profit-seeking investors as significant revenues can be generated even 
without consistent price differences between the connected markets (Parail, 2010). 
Thus, interconnections can create incentives for optimising the size and timing of new 
investments by linking with a more efficient system (Brunekreeft and Newberry, 2006). 
 
Economic studies on the theoretical and numerical models of strategic behaviour further 
indicate that it is more costly and hence less attractive to exploit market power in 
interconnected markets (Amundsen et al., 1998; van Damme, 2004). Interconnection 
allows generating companies abroad to compete with dominant domestic generators, 
mitigating market power (Newbery, 2002b). Interconnecting fossil dominated electricity 
systems such as SEM with hydro based systems could reduce price volatility and 
mitigate subsequent market uncertainties (Matsukawa and Mulder, 2009). A stable 
wholesale price, in turn, provides stability to the wholesale market which can further 
help in providing investment incentives and market signals to the market participants 
(Green, 2008). Hence, SEM may benefit through increased interconnections with other 
EU electricity markets in terms of enhanced competition, improved security of supply 
and lower electricity prices. The increase in competition from interconnections implies 
that market integration between SEM and other interconnected markets can improve 
due to wholesale price convergence in the interconnected markets. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to primarily assess the current degree of market 
integration between SEM against other large, mature and well-established electricity 
wholesale markets in Europe including Great Britain (GB) and determine the required 
 89 
level of interconnection needed in SEM to meet the EU policy of increasing integration 
of electricity markets. In the process, the chapter also estimates the gross benefits for 
SEM arising from international wholesale electricity price differences and thereby 
should not be perceived as a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of interconnection in SEM as 
the analysis does not explore the cost-side of interconnections and is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. The analysis believes that competition inherently is the main driver of 
lower electricity prices in Europe as implicitly underscored in the EU Directives 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). Hence, interconnections may be an effective way to increase 
competition and market integration via price convergence in smaller wholesale markets 
with limited numbers of participants such as SEM. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides an insight 
into the Irish wholesale electricity market. Section 5.3 briefly discusses the relevant 
literature that analyses wholesale electricity market integration in Europe. Section 5.4 
describes the features of the power exchanges considered in this study. Section 5.5 
discusses the properties of the data.  Section 5.6 presents the econometric methodology 
used in this study. The results are presented in Section 5.7 and discussed with policy 
recommendations in Section 5.8. Section 5.9 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2. The Irish Single Electricity Market  
 
The Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM) is a relatively small wholesale electricity 
market in the European context encompassing approximately 2.5 million electricity 
customers including 1.8 million in the Republic of Ireland and 0.7 million in Northern 
Ireland. The installed dispatchable all-island capacity is estimated to be 9356 MW in 
2012 while the all-island annual electricity consumption reached around 36.36 TWh in 
2011 (EirGrid, 2011). Annual electricity consumption in Northern Ireland alone is 
around 9 TWh with the peak demand reaching 1669 MW in 2007 while electricity 
consumption is dominated by household demand (UREGNI, 2009).  
 
The all-island market is operated by SEMO (the Single Electricity Market Operator), a 
joint-venture between the two transmission operators in Ireland (EirGrid) and Northern 
Ireland (SONI) respectively. SEM is a centralised gross mandatory pool for any 
generator with an export capacity of more than 10 MW. All electricity is traded through 
a market clearing mechanism based on the generators bidding their Short Run Marginal 
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Cost (SRMC) and receiving the System Marginal Price (SMP). The SMP comprises of 
two components: shadow price and uplift. The ‘shadow’ price constitutes the most of 
SMP as it includes the cost of fuel and the price of carbon. The ‘uplift’ component has 
some additional costs tied to the reliable running of the market such as the generator’s 
start-up costs and no-load costs that are indifferent to output levels. In addition, power 
producers separately receive capacity payments based on available generation capacity 
and constraint payments for differences between the market schedule and the system 
dispatch to cover the long-run capital costs. Suppliers purchase electricity from the pool 
by paying the SMP for each trading period along with capacity payments and system 
charges.  
 
Economic theory suggests that SRMC pricing is desirable to achieve Pareto efficient 
outcomes and allocative efficiency by optimally allocating the scarce economic 
resources at a given time (Hotelling, 1939). However, the risk of social welfare losses or 
deadweight losses is high in SEM due to the dominance of the wholesale market by two 
large incumbents, namely Electricity Supply Board (ESB) and Viridian with the 
potential ability to exercise market power. ESB accounted for a market share of about 
80% in 2004 while the Irish state owned 95% of ESB with remaining 5% owned by the 
employees of the company (Malaguzzi Valeri, 2009). Wholesale market concentration 
is high as the installed capacity share of the three largest generators in the Republic of 
Ireland amounted to 95% of installed capacity at the end of 2004 indicating market 
power concerns and lack of competition. Theory also suggests that market power abuse 
can lead to productive inefficiency implying that electricity will be under-produced and 
will no longer be produced at the least possible average cost (Boiteaux, 1965). 
Furthermore, a vertically integrated market structure between transmission and 
generation can create incentives and opportunity for exclusionary behaviour making the 
electricity market more susceptible towards market power abuse (Joskow, 2003). 
Market power abuse arising from vertical integration can be a major concern for SEM in 
the events of vertical re-integration (Viridian, 2011).  
 
SEM has a negative pricing regime in place. Negative prices occur in times of high 
power in feed and in particular from intermittent energy sources such as wind which 
leads to a lower intersection of the merit-order curve with the demand function leading 
to lower wholesale power prices (Nicolosi, 2010). Hence, a negative spot price reveals 
the underlying opportunity costs including the avoided start-up and shut-down costs, 
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and gives higher value to consumer flexibility and provides an additional price signal 
for the storage of intermittent energy sources such as wind (Geneose et al., 2010). It is 
further believed that increased trade in renewables in the wholesale market will greatly 
improve the EU electricity market integration (Joseffson, 2009). This is particularly 
interesting for SEM as Northern Ireland aims to source 40% of its generation from 
renewable energy by 2020.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Scheduled generation fuel mix for SEM in 2009 
Source: UREGNI (2009) 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the scheduled generation mix in SEM for the first three quarters of 
2009 spanning from January until September. The diversity in energy mix is dominated 
by gas fired generation constituting 69% followed by coal and wind at 9% and 7% 
respectively.  The reliance on imported gas and coal mostly from the UK raises security 
of supply risks in SEM due to high import dependence. This also has an important 
implication in the SEM wholesale price formation as gas price has been a key driver of 
the Irish SMP since 2007. The contribution from interconnectors to the generation mix 
is also set to increase with the planned commercial operation of the East-West 
interconnector with a capacity of 500 MW joining the island with Wales from 2012. It 
is expected that renewable energy sources (mostly wind) will replace most of the fossil-
based generation in SEM in the future. 
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5.3. Review of Relevant Literature 
 
Several studies have empirically examined European electricity market integration by 
studying the development of wholesale electricity price convergence across different 
European wholesale markets for varying time periods using different econometric 
techniques. Bower (2002) compared day-ahead 2001 prices from the Nordic countries, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and the UK applying correlation and cointegration 
analysis. The study found some evidence of an already integrated market especially 
among the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany in 2001. Boisseleau (2004) 
used regression and correlation techniques on the same dataset to determine the level of 
market integration and subsequently analyses the findings of Bower (2002). The results 
indicated a low level of market integration among the European electricity markets.  
 
Armstrong and Galli (2005) examined the day-ahead price differentials between Spain, 
Germany, France and the Netherlands from 2002 to 2004 testing for price convergence. 
Their findings suggest convergence of European electricity prices during this period. 
However, Armstrong and Galli ignored the cross-border capacity allocation 
mechanisms. Turvey (2006) studied the use of interconnectors and pricing of limited 
transmission capacities using correlation analysis based on the limitations of the study 
by Armstrong and Galli (2006). The results based on the Anglo-French interconnector 
indicate a low correlation of flows and price differentials. A recent study by Zachmann 
(2008) analyses the integration of European electricity prices by studying the 
development of wholesale prices from 2002 to 2006 and includes congestion charges to 
account for congestion and congestion management. The findings show that although 
bilateral price convergence occurred during 2002-2006, no single European electricity 
market exists so far. The study suggests that congestion charges cannot fully explain the 
low level of observed market integration using the Kalman filter analysis.  
 
However, none of the above discussed studies on electricity markets have analysed the 
development of wholesale price in SEM while the occurrence of negative prices in the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX) and SEM necessitates re-visiting the methodology 
used in previous studies. Hence, this study examines the degree of market integration of 
SEM with other EU electricity markets using a dynamic approach to capture the 
subsequent effect of any structural and unobservable changes (such as political, 
economic, and regulatory) as revealed through prices over time. Full market integration 
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necessitates that the wholesale electricity prices across markets obey the Law of One 
Price (LOOP). The law of one price states that in competitive markets free of 
transportation costs, barriers to trade and infrastructure bottlenecks, identical goods sold 
in different markets must sell for the same price when their prices are expressed in the 
same currency (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Engel and 
Rogers, 2001 and Lammont and Thaler, 2003). 
 
The prices are analysed because prices aggregate and reveal all market information 
(Grossman, 1976). Prices should reflect all publicly available information and instantly 
change to reflect new public information in line with the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) assuming no transmission and distribution constraints (Fama, 1970).  According 
to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), markets can be weakly, semi-strongly or 
strongly efficient in terms of reflecting and processing market information. Weak EMH 
claims that prices on trade already reflect all past publicly available information; semi-
strong EMH claims  that prices reflect all publicly available information and that prices 
instantly change to reflect new public information while strong EMH additionally 
claims that prices instantly reflect even hidden information. Thus, markets become fully 
integrated as ‘an entire territory of which the parts are so united by the relations of 
unrestricted commerce that prices take the same level throughout with ease and 
rapidity’ as primarily defined by Cournot (Stigler, 1969). Hence, in a fully integrated 
market the prices of homogenous products from diverse suppliers should follow the 
same pattern over time.  
 
This chapter analyses the wholesale spot electricity price development of SEM with 
other large, mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe using a 
time-varying approach. A low level of market integration would indicate possibilities to 
improve the integration of markets by expanding interconnections in SEM and 
accordingly benefit from price differences in international wholesale electricity markets. 
This is the first study to examine the price development of SEM with other large, 
mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe using a state-space 
model based on the powerful recursive Kalman filter algorithm while accounting for the 
occurrence of negative wholesale prices in the spot market. 
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5.4. European Power Exchanges  
 
Bilateral wholesale electricity trading is the dominant form of wholesale trade in some 
European countries including GB. The GB power trade is dominated by over-the-
counter (OTC) trading since market liberalisation. The operation of the market within 
the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) in Great 
Britain encourages and allows for voluntary bilateral agreements between suppliers, 
traders and customers (Newbery, 2006). BETTA replaced the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA) in 2005 after Scotland joined NETA while NETA replaced the 
pool arrangement that existed before 2001. In Germany, around 1900 TWh of wholesale 
electricity was traded bilaterally in the OTC market in 2005 (Growitsch and Nepal, 
2009).  
 
However, electricity trade is no longer confined to OTC trade with the establishment of 
power exchanges in most European countries. A common market design across many 
power exchanges is the creation of a spot market in which electricity is traded for each 
hour of the day based on a day-ahead market except for SEM and GB where trade takes 
place half-hourly. The wholesale markets in other EU countries besides SEM and GB 
also consist of multiple voluntary forward and future markets. It is assumed that prices 
determined in the spot market can contain sufficient information on available generation 
capacity, supply flexibility, electricity demand levels and demand flexibility (Ulbig, 
2010). Analysing high frequency data such as day-ahead hourly and half-hourly spot 
prices can also avoid the temporal aggregation problems associated with using lower 
frequency data (such as monthly, yearly) ( Hamilton, 1994).  
 
Thus, this study examines the development of hourly and half-hourly intraday prices.  
The dataset consists of wholesale spot prices from four countries in Continental Europe 
(Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria); Northern Europe (the Scandinavian 
countries including Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden); GB and the all-island 
Irish countries. All of these spot markets except SEM started operation before 2007 
while also being large and widely interconnected as shown in Table 5.1. For example, 
only 1% of scheduled generation in SEM was obtained via the interconnector in 2008 
which eventually increased to about 5% in 2009 (UREGNI, 2009). Spot trading of 
electricity in SEM is mandatory leading to a liquid wholesale market whereas wholesale 
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spot trading of electricity in other power exchanges across Europe is voluntary and bulk 
electricity is traded bilaterally in the OTC market. 
 
 
 
Countries 
 
Established 
 
Currency 
Spot 
market 
volume 
in 2009 
(TWh) 
Total 
Consumption 
in 2009 
(TWh) 
Spot market 
share (% of 
total 
consumption) European 
Energy 
Exchange 
(EEX) 
 
Germany 
 
2002 
 
EURO 
 
203 
 
581 
 
35% 
Belgian 
Power 
Exchange 
(BELPEX) 
 
Belgium 
 
2006 
 
EURO 
 
10.1 
 
81.7 
 
12.4% 
Energy 
Exchange 
Austria 
(EXAA) 
 
Austria 
 
2002 
 
EUR0 
 
4.7 
 
62.4 
 
7.5% 
Nordpool 
Power 
Exchange 
(ELSPOT)
1
 
 
Scandinavia 
 
2002 
 
NOK 
 
285.5 
 
396.5 
 
72% 
Amsterdam
Power 
Exchange 
(APX) 
 
Netherlands 
 
1999 
 
EURO 
 
29.1 
 
122.8 
 
23.7% 
 
Power UK 
(former 
UKPX) 
Great 
Britain 
2000 
Pound 
Sterling 
10 
(approx) 
344.7 2.9% 
Single 
Electricity 
Market 
(SEM) 
Northern 
Ireland and 
Republic of 
Ireland 
 
2007 
 
Euro and 
Pound 
Sterling 
 
34.6 
 
36.2 
 
95% 
Table 5.1: Characteris ics of the power exchanges 
Source: Respective spot markets websites ((APX Endex (2011); Belpex (2011); EEX 
(2011); EXAA (2011; Nord PoolSpot (2011)) 
 
A fundamental characteristic common across the power exchanges is the regulatory 
practice of day-ahead price setting based on ‘sealed bid one-shot uniform price’ auction. 
The market operator or the auctioneer collects all supply and demand bids while market 
clearing is done once per trading day separately for each hour besides for GB and SEM 
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where market clearing takes place every half-hour and sold electricity is physically 
delivered the following day. All bidders essentially receive the same price which is the 
SMP and any bidder who lowers his quantity offer can improve his terms of trade and 
the terms of trade of all winners (Klemperer, 2005). However, market participants are 
only allowed to bid one energy price for an entire day with the exception of 
interconnection users who bid in half-hourly energy prices while unit commitment is 
day-ahead in SEM. Bidding one energy price for an entire day serves as a strong market 
power mitigation device in SEM (UREGNI, 2010). 
 
The European Energy Exchange (EEX) was founded in 2002 as a result of a merger 
between the Leipzig Power Exchange (LPX) located in Leipzig and the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX) located in Frankfurt. EEX operates trading market platforms 
for electricity, natural gas, CO2 emission allowances and coal. The spot market for 
electricity is operated by EPEX Spot which is a joint venture owned by German EEX 
AG and the French Powernext SA since 2008. Hence, the power spot and derivatives 
market between Germany and France are integrated. EPEX SPOT operates day ahead 
auctions for spot electricity trade while physical delivery of power takes place on the 
next day. EPEX Spot also operates an intraday market for Germany and France. 
 
The Belgian Power Exchange (BELPEX) is an organised wholesale electricity trading 
platform for anonymous, cleared and short term trading which provides a transparent 
reference price for the market. The Belpex spot market is comprised of a day-ahead 
market segment (Belpex DAM) and a continuous intraday market segment (Belpex 
CIM). The Belpex DAM provides standardised day-ahead hourly products for 
producers, distributors, industrial groups, traders and brokers to sell and purchase 
electricity to be delivered the day after. The Belpex DAM is coupled to the APX Power 
NL market and the EPEX Spot day-ahead markets in Germany and France. The prices 
of electricity on the Belgian DAM are determined via a double-sided blind auction.  
These prices are also known as market clearing prices. The Belpex CIM provides 
standardised hourly and multi hourly products for producers, distributors, industrial 
groups, traders and brokers to sell and purchase electricity on a continuous basis. The 
Belgian CIM segment is coupled with APX-ENDEX in the Netherlands and Nord Pool 
Spot in the Nordic region. 
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The Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA) is a Central European energy exchange and 
encompasses trading areas in Austria and Germany. EXAA started the day-ahead spot 
market trading of electricity in March, 2002 and also started trading in European CO2 
emissions allowances (EUAs) from June, 2005. EXAA is operating a day-ahead 
electricity spot market with a single daily auction point at 10:15 am. This implies that 
traders are able to place buy and sell orders for electric energy for a day-ahead until 
10:15 am when the auction is closed. Traders have the flexibility to choose to buy 
electricity in individual hours as well as in standardised blocks comprising several 
hours. The market clearing price is determined during the auction at 10:15 am when the 
bids are evaluated by a matching algorithm that selects an appropriate price for each 
hour.  
 
The Scandinavian market has the largest joint spot market for electrical energy in the 
world (Nord Pool Spot) and organizes a day-ahead spot market via Elspot. Elspot was 
registered as a separate company in 2002 after Denmark joined the pool. It is also the 
first wholesale market in the world to trade European Union Allowances (EUAs) for 
carbon dioxide emissions since 2005. The price formation in Elspot is based on day-
ahead auction where power is traded for delivery during the next day. The system price 
is calculated based on the sale and purchase orders disregarding the available 
transmission capacity between the bidding areas in the Nordic market. The system price 
is also the Nordic reference price for trading and clearing of most financial contracts in 
the wholesale market. However, the settlement of orders in Elspot market is based on 
the area prices as the market is divided into several bidding areas. A spot market share 
of 72% indicates that Elspot is highly liquid. 
 
The Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) was the first electricity market exchange in 
Continental Europe. APX became APX-ENDEX in 2009 when the European Energy 
Derivatives Exchange N.V. (ENDEX N.V.) was acquired by APX Group in 2008. The 
APX Power NL was established in 1999 and provides a spot market trading platform for 
day-ahead and continuous trading. The trading takes place day-ahead in APX. The 
market players submit their orders electronically after which supply and demand are 
compared and the market price is calculated for each hour of the following day. The 
continuous market provides the members to continuously trade the power products in 
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hourly basis as well as under standardised block of hours up to 90 minutes prior to 
delivery. 
 
Similarly, the APX Power UK (formerly named UKPX) was established in 2000 as 
Britain's first independent power exchange. The exchange provides an organised 
platform for integrated trading, clearing and notification for spot and prompt power 
contracts and a trading platform for cleared forward contracts. Market clearing price 
setting is based on a day-ahead auction where trading takes place on one day for the 
delivery of electricity the next day. The market participants submit their electronic bids 
after which supply and demand are compared and the market price is calculated for each 
hour of the following day. The trading and balancing activities at the spot market 
consists of half hourly products of electricity as well as discrete standardised blocks 
made up of the individual half hours.  
 
Design aspects SEM Other European markets 
Number of 
physical markets 
mandatory physical pool-based 
around single ex-post price 
multiple forward and spot markets 
with voluntary participation 
Features of 
generation bids 
complex commercial and technical 
bids with generators required to bid 
their short-run marginal cost (SRMC) 
bids can be non-complex and 
simple (covering one hour) or block 
bids (covering several hours) 
Market 
scheduling and 
dispatch 
central scheduling of generation by 
optimization algorithm; ex-post 
central dispatch by TSO; out-of-merit 
dispatch compensated at the bid price 
(SRMC) 
self-scheduling based on contracted 
positions; redispatch (by consent) 
by TSO through voluntary 
balancing mechanism; balancing 
actions based on bid-price. 
Gate closure 
timings 
currently day-ahead at 10 am for data 
submissions but scheduling uses out-
turn availability, demand and wind 
generation data 
intra-day gate closure is typically 
within a few hours of real time 
Wholesale price 
composition 
separate prices for energy and 
capacity; no material imbalance 
exposure 
prices reflect a single product with 
no explicit separation of energy and 
capacity payments; separate pricing 
for imbalance exposure 
Table 5.2: Market design features across the EU wholesale markets  
Source: Based on Poyry (2011) 
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EEX and SEM are the only power exchanges with negative wholesale pricing regime in 
this analysis. The EEX allowed the possibility of negative energy prices in bids since 
September, 2008 and closed with negative prices for the first time in October, 2008. The 
possibility to trade with dual currencies in SEM makes it a unique organised market in 
the world. The mandatory pool central dispatch model of the SEM is also an exception 
in comparison with other EU wholesale electricity markets (Gorecki, 2013).  Thus, 
some differences exist between SEM and other mature wholesale markets considered in 
this study in terms of market design features such as  number of physical markets, form 
of generation bids, market scheduling and dispatch, timing of gate closure and 
composition of wholesale prices as observed in Table 5.2 below. These factors are 
highly significant in terms of facilitating or hindering integration of SEM with other 
well-established wholesale markets in Europe (Poyry, 2011). However, despite minor 
differences in market structure and mechanisms, liquidity and products; the EXAA, 
EEX and APX operate in similar terms (Zachmann, 2008). 
 
5.5. Data 
  
The time frame for hourly day-ahead price data ranges from 1
 
January 2008 to 31
 
December 2011 with total number of observations surpassing 35,000 for all markets. 
The data for APX, EEX, BELPEX, and EXAA was obtained from the German company 
Energate which hosts the data and information on energy markets. The Elspot data is 
publicly available while the SEM and APX Power UK data was obtained from external 
contacts. The hourly day-ahead price data for SEM and GB was constructed by 
averaging the half-hourly prices within each hour. However, the SEM prices consist of 
energy only prices while the wholesale prices for other markets also include the 
capacity payments. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the logarithmic transformed day-ahead 
hourly wholesale prices across the power exchanges. The SEM electricity prices remain 
one of the highest in Europe. The day-ahead hourly wholesale prices at SEM were on 
average 12% higher than APX, 15% higher than APX UK, 16% higher than EEX and 
25% higher than Elspot. The heavy use of gas in electricity generation coupled with (or) 
market power could have led to relatively higher wholesale prices in SEM though this 
remains to be empirically examined. While the Elspot prices were the least volatile of 
all; the prices in SEM and GB experienced greater volatility of all markets. The 
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presence of large water reservoirs in Norway and Sweden allow for levelling out the 
variability of precipitation and in general serve as energy stores for the Nordic system 
contributing to lower price volatility in Elspot. On the other hand, uncertainties 
associated with gas prices as both markets have significant gas-fired generation coupled 
with the underlying trading uncertainty in a new, less mature but liquid Irish market, 
could have led to high price volatility in SEM and GB markets. However, the log-prices 
in SEM remained the least volatile after Elspot possibly due to the exclusion of negative 
prices resulting from excess energy supply from intermittent sources. 
 
Eur/MWh APX BELPEX EEX ELSPOT EXAA SEM APX UK 
Mean 52.18 51.48 49.70 44.46 50.11 59.33 68.17 
Median 47.71 47.00 45.98 42.850 46.07 51.77 61.11 
Maximum 500.0 500.00 494.26 300.03 248.27 695.8 1111.71 
Minimum 0.01 0.01 -500.02 0.000 0.010 -26.02 0.000 
Std. Dev. 26.22 24.52 24.45 14.90 23.40 33.84 35.58 
Skewness 1.83 1.85 0.69 1.94 1.23 3.14 4.80 
Kurtosis 16.79 16.43 22.75 19.01 6.20 24.85 58.33 
Observation 35064 35064 35064 35064 35064 35064 35064 
    Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics (in levels from 2008-2011) 
 
While wholesale electricity spot prices usually show potentially homoscedastic and 
mean stationary properties at levels; the degree of market integration cannot be 
observed and needs to be examined. Moreover, changes in time-variant observed and 
unobserved factors such as fundamental market rules and regulations, new market 
designs and other institutional changes are likely factors to change the strength of price 
relationships across markets. This implies that markets either move towards a greater 
level of integration or they tend to diverge from each other. Hence, the notion of market 
integration or separation can be analysed by testing for the convergence or divergence 
of the day-ahead hourly and half-hourly prices across the markets considered in this 
study. 
 
5.6. Econometric Methodology 
 
The institutional understanding of electricity market integration primarily involves the 
creation of a common power exchange and elimination of cross-border tariffs while the 
economic understanding of market integration implies that the prices across markets 
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should be strongly related (Bergman, 2003). Hence, the extent of market integration can 
be analysed by examining the extent of price convergence across the markets. Price 
convergence can be explained by a vector of observable and unobservable factors such 
as the convergence of factor inputs and final product prices; harmonisation of 
institutional frameworks and electricity market regulation and the convergence of 
electricity consumption patterns coupled with similarity in generation technologies, 
trading behaviour and market expectations. Cointegration analysis has been widely used 
to test for price convergence in the econometrics literature. However, an implicit 
assumption of cointegration analysis is that the structural relation among prices is fixed 
over the considered time period. Cointegration analysis ignores the dynamics of any 
possible price convergence or divergence as mentioned in several studies including 
King and Cuc (1996) and Neumann et al. (2006). Thus, the assumption of a fixed 
relationship between spot prices over time seems problematic considering the likely 
structural developments across all wholesale markets (Growitsch and Nepal, 2011). 
 
This study, therefore, uses a linear state space representation in order to examine the 
price convergence using the Kalman filter analysis which is based on a recursive 
algorithm (Kalman, 1960). A Kalman filter can analyse the data series integrated of any 
order.  Hence, the application of the technique has also not been confined to the energy 
sector of the economy. Karadeloglou (1999) applied the Kalman filter to agricultural 
prices in Bulgaria and Slovenia. Babetskii et al. (2004) reviewed the pros and cons of an 
early EU enlargement that included the Central and Eastern European countries using 
the Kalman filter. Prazmowski (2005) analysed fiscal equilibrium in the Dominican 
Republic economy using the Kalman filter. Yu et al. (2010) applied the Kalman filter to 
assess the development of equity market integration in Asia.   
 
The Kalman filter technique is based on a state-space approach. The state space 
approach incorporates the state variables or unobserved variables to be estimated along 
with the observable model. The filter allows the nature and path of price convergence 
across markets to be studied and thereby explains market integration and price 
efficiency by estimating a time-variant coefficient model. The prices across related 
markets are efficient to the extent that they already factor in or discount all available 
information. Hence, efficient prices should also reveal additional underlying 
information in the market apart from reflecting all available information and reacting 
instantaneously to new information (Fama, 1970). Using the day-ahead hourly spot 
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prices at SEM (Market A) and other large, mature and interconnected markets 
considered in this study (Market B), the following equations constituting a linear 
relationship between the two markets can be specified: 
 
PA,t = αAB + βAB,t PB,t  + εt                                                                                       (1) 
βAB, t = βAB,t-1 + Ѳt                                                         (2) 
where ),0.(...~ 2 diiNt  and ),0.(...~
2
 diiNt  are white noise processes.  
 
Equation (1) is the ‘signal’ or ‘observation’ equation while equation (2) is the ‘state’ or 
transition equation. The state equation captures the effect of unobserved variables and 
incorporates those effects to be estimated with the observed model as represented by the 
signal equation. In the above set of equations, εt and θt are normally and independently 
distributed random error terms (with zero mean and a normal variance σ2) while αAB 
captures the time-invariant factors (such as the transactions costs and capacity charges) 
between the markets A and B. The vector of unobservable coefficients at any time t is 
denoted by βAB,t which describes the price relationship between the two markets 
considered. Applying the time variant coefficient model to the price series (PA and PB) 
will enable to identify the joint development of prices. It provides information on the 
value of state variables (αAB and βAB,t) for each point in time for both price series.  
 
Therefore, the Kalman filter processes the data on both price series in two consecutive 
steps. It first estimates βAB,t by using available information till the period t-1. As a 
second step, the estimates of βAB,t are updated by incorporating prediction errors from 
the first step as information at time t is realized. In the process, the time variant 
coefficient model produces linear minimum mean error estimates of βAB,t using 
observed and available data through time t. According to Bomhoff (1992), the 
coefficients estimated by the Kalman filter generally outperform the coefficient estimate 
generated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and is hence preferred to OLS. Thus, the 
filter allows for the updating of the model estimations using newly available 
information using a specific optimization recursive algorithm (Harvey, 1987; Hamilton, 
1994). The filter approach ensures the corrections made in βAB,t beyond t (say t+k) to 
follow a time-varying moving average process of order k-1. The recursive algorithm 
subsequently updates, or error corrects, the one-step ahead estimate of the state mean 
and variance given new available information. However, the Kalman filter is the 
optimal estimate for linear system models and is limited to linear and Gaussian 
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assumptions. This necessitates that the system dynamics and measurement model must 
be linear in order to apply the Kalman filter analysis.  
 
It is also important to cautiously determine the initial variances for εt  
and Ѳt  as well as 
of the expected value of 0  to provide suitable noise reduction and signal preservation 
in the model. In general, the maximum likelihood function has several local maxima 
implying that inadequately chosen starting points can lead to undesirable results. 
Exaggerated values of 2
  would lead to the inclusion of short-term behaviour. This 
makes it difficult to differentiate random shocks from structural relationships. Likewise, 
setting the variance too low would ignore significant developments in the convergence 
process over time (Growitsch et al., 2012). Hence, the following calibration is 
performed: 
1,
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The initial value for βAB,t-1(β0) is chosen to be 1 and not zero given the uncertainty in the 
initial state estimate. In addition, setting any non-zero initial value would allow the filter 
to eventually converge. Hence, if A and B spot markets are perfectly integrated, the 
value of βAB,t  equals unity at any time t.  In contrast, if βAB,t = 0 the prices of day-ahead 
hourly electricity traded on both markets bear no relation with each other at any time t 
implying perfectly uncorrelated prices. This implies that if A and B hourly day-ahead 
markets are fully integrated or the spot prices are in full convergence, the value of {limit 
t→infinity (PA – PB)} = αAB while the final state of convergence will be {limit t→infinity βAB} 
= 1. A full market integration indicates limited (or no) opportunity to benefit from cross 
border price differences through interconnections as arbitrage opportunities become 
exhausted. In contrast, low market integration implies significant opportunities to 
benefit from differences in international electricity prices via cross border 
interconnections and improve market integration accordingly.   
 
5.7. Results  
 
It is necessary to examine the properties and nature of data series as a pre-requisite for 
any time-series econometric analysis. Testing for unit roots is a well-established 
methodology in the literature involving time-series.  Empirical studies also suggest that 
unit roots can also be used to test for pair-wise price convergence (or divergence) for 
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price series (Aubyn, 1999; Bernard and Durlauf, 1996; Zachmann, 2008). However, the 
concept of applying unit roots to test for price convergence can be criticized on the 
grounds that the stationary property of price differences can mean both convergence and 
divergence while in the presence of outliers unit root tests can lack power and 
robustness.   
 
Table 5.4 reports the results from unit root tests based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and Kwiatkowski; Phillips; Schmidt and Shin 
(KPSS) test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) even though it is not the aim of this chapter to 
examine market integration via unit roots test. ADF is based upon the null hypothesis of 
a unit root while KPSS is based upon the null hypothesis of stationarity. The results 
from both unit roots test are presented as the power of the KPSS test is high as 
compared to ADF. Double testing also improves the reliability of the results. However, 
ADF is based upon the null hypothesis of a unit root; the KPSS is based upon the null 
hypothesis of stationarity. The tests include a constant but no time trend. For ADF, the 
lag length is selected according to Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). For KPSS, 
bandwidth was chosen according to Newey-West using the Bartlett Kernel. The 
numbers provided in the table denote the t-statistics for ADF and the LM statistic for 
KPSS. 
 
Electricity hourly day-ahead prices (log) 
Power Exchanges 
ADF Test KPSS Test 
Level Level 
APX -4.786*** 0.358* 
Belpex -7.607*** 0.339 
EEX -23.032*** 0.353* 
Elspot -2.253** 0.313 
EXAA -51.875*** 0.423* 
SEM -37.463*** 0.375* 
APX UK -33.42*** 0.311* 
Table 5.4: Unit root tests 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively 
 
The results suggest that the hourly and half-hourly day-ahead price series are stationary 
at levels and at the first differences. The stationary behaviour of hourly spot prices is 
expected since electricity cannot be stored economically with demand having little or no 
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effect (inelastic demand). However, the absence of a unit root at levels also precludes 
the motivation to test for a stable long run equilibrium relation between the price series 
using the Johansen cointegration test (Johansen, 1998; 1991). The Johansen 
cointegration test assumes a constant cointegrating vector over time and do not 
effectively allow assessing the development of market integration over time. However, 
correlation analysis can be used to determine whether certain market pairs are integrated 
as the correlation coefficient provides a useful analysis on the initial level of market 
integration (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985). The correlation results from Table 5.5 show the 
static notion of market integration between SEM and other large, mature and 
interconnected wholesale markets.  
 
 APX BELPEX EEX ELSPOT EXAA SEM 
APX 1.000      
BELPEX 0.963 1.000     
EEX 0.883 0.855 1.000    
ELSPOT 0.398 0.397 0.422 1.000   
EXAA 0.923 0.893 0.927 0.435 1.000  
SEM 0.588 0.560 0.564 0.475 0.602 1.000 
Table 5.5: Correlation results (in levels) 
 
The correlation results show that the market integration of Elspot with other markets is 
the lowest. SEM prices are thinly correlated with other spot markets while price 
correlation to Elspot is the least. The lack of direct physical interconnection coupled 
with twin conditions of being a new market and differences in several institutional 
aspects such as market designs and regulatory framework can explain such low 
correlation (Poyry, 2011). However, APX and Belpex markets are highly correlated for 
reasons such as an already existing trilateral market coupling regime between France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands leading to increased international electricity trade and 
harmonisation of institutional frameworks. The trilateral market coupling between 
France, Netherlands and Belgium has been largely successful since 2006. Similarly, the 
price correlation between SEM and GB half-hourly prices was about 0.52 indicating 
differences in market structure and arrangements between the Irish and GB markets. 
The correlation results show some signs of bilateral convergence of prices among 
different market pairs such as (APX-BELPEX, EEX-EXAA, and APX-EXAA). 
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However, the notion of a single European wholesale market for electricity still appears 
far from being achieved. 
 
The relatively low price correlations of SEM with other wholesale markets indicate that 
significant potential exists to improve market integration from interconnections. 
Moreover, market integration is a dynamic process and can vary with time due to 
changes in economic, political and regulatory environment in the national and 
international energy markets. Hence, results from correlation analysis can be 
economically misleading as they do not account for changes in market integration 
process over-time. Table 5.6 illustrates the strength of price relationship between SEM 
and other large, mature, and interconnected wholesale markets in Europe that are not 
physically interconnected with SEM based on the Kalman filter using the Maximum 
Likelihood estimator (MLE) for the log prices. The log prices can better reflect the 
underlying distribution of the residuals used in the model. Log transformed prices also 
potentially mitigate the heteroscedastic properties of prices by minimising the effects of 
high volatility and the outliers. 
 
The results show the current state of market integration of SEM is less than 20% with 
most of the other studied markets while being insignificant. Hence, the results suggest 
absence of any market integration of SEM with EEX, APX, Belpex and EXAA. 
However, the results interestingly suggest a low degree of market integration (0.19 out 
of the possible value of 1) between SEM and Elspot even though these markets are not 
physically interconnected. The existence of liquid and transparent wholesale markets 
coupled with reliable day-ahead market arrangements might have facilitated the market 
integration process between SEM and Elspot. Liquid and transparent wholesale 
electricity prices facilitates the price convergence process by quickly reflecting and 
processing all  available public information contained in  prices as suggested by the 
semi-strong efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970; Cargill and Rausser, 1975). 
Liquidity also remains an important feature of a well-functioning wholesale market 
(DECC, 2011). Hence, the SEM and Elspot markets possess a common feature of 
quickly absorbing and responding to all available public information and thereby 
facilitating the market integration process as both of these markets are liquid. This 
finding supports the results by Zachmann (2008) in concluding that higher wholesale 
market liquidity can accelerate the price convergence process across related markets. 
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However, this is an indicative result and further research is required to examine the 
exact impact of wholesale market liquidity on wholesale market integration.  
 
Method: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt) 
Sample: 1/01/2008 to 12/31/2011 
Market Pairs Final State of Market Integration 
 
SEM-EEX (log) 
0.09 
(0.069) 
 
SEM-EEX (levels) 
0.29 
(0.413) 
 
SEM-APX (log) 
0.18 
(0.058) 
 
SEM-APX (levels) 
0.45 
(0.460) 
 
SEM-Belpex (log) 
0.15 
(0.058) 
 
SEM-Belpex (levels) 
0.44 
(0.432) 
 
SEM-EXAA (log) 
0.14 
(0.057) 
 
SEM-EXAA (levels) 
0.47 
(0.464) 
 
SEM-Elspot (log) 
0.19*** 
(0.061) 
 
SEM-Elspot (levels) 
0.27 
(0.512) 
Table 5.6: Market integration coefficients (in logs and levels)  
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively 
Numbers in brackets report the root mean squared errors 
 
Table 5.6 also calculates the market integration coefficient based for price levels for the 
same market pairs to better understand the role of wholesale renewable electricity trade 
in wholesale market integration. The levels prices include the negative prices as well 
which is an important element of wholesale market design in EEX and SEM. The 
results show a large improvement in the final state of market integration coefficient for 
all market pairs after the inclusion of negative prices. The availability of more market 
information through negative prices might have resulted in such an increase. However, 
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the results are not significant indicating no market integration. The results based on the 
existing dataset do not support or remain inconclusive in claiming that increasing 
renewable wholesale trade will lead to an increasingly integrated market for electricity 
in Europe.  
  
Table 5.7 presents estimate of market integration coefficients between the large, 
interconnected and mature electricity wholesale markets considered in this study in 
order to facilitate comparison and establish a benchmark case of market integration 
between SEM and other markets. The results, using the unitary method, illustrates the 
corresponding level of interconnection required in SEM to reach the integration level of 
other well established wholesale markets in Europe considering that interconnection  
amounts to only 4.7% of available generation capacity.   
 
Method: Maximum likelihood 
(Marquardt) 
Sample: 1/01/2008 to 12/31/2011 
Required level of interconnection in SEM 
(as a percentage of total generation 
capacity)  
Market Pairs 
Final State of Market 
Integration 
 
APX-Belpex 
0.77*** 
(0.008) 
APX 
19% 
BELPEX 
20.10% 
 
EEX-APX 
0.66*** 
(0.013) 
EEX 
25.9% 
APX 
16.33% 
 
EXAA-APX 
0.86*** 
(0.006) 
EXAA 
26.9% 
APX 
21.3% 
 
EXAA-EEX 
0.62*** 
(0.0110) 
EXAA 
19.42% 
EEX 
24.3% 
Table 5.7: Market integration coefficients among selected markets (log prices) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively 
Numbers in brackets report the root mean squared errors 
 
Hence, if SEM is to achieve the market integration coefficient of 0.77 that currently 
exists between APX and Belpex all other things remaining constant; 19% of the 
generation capacity should be met by interconnecting with APX or 20.1% with Belpex. 
If SEM wholesale prices converge to the levels EEX, APX, Belpex, EXAA and Elspot; 
the expected gross benefits to SEM arising from international price differences would 
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amount to about 333, 248, 272, 319 and 514 million euros respectively. The estimate of 
gross benefits was obtained by multiplying the 2009 spot market consumption of the 
total demand from Table 5.1 with the average hourly wholesale price differences 
between SEM and all other markets assuming a constant annual total demand. The 
benefits arising from international price differences to SEM can guide policymaking 
involving the cost-benefit analysis of interconnection in SEM even though physical 
interconnection with other European markets can be expensive for SEM. These 
estimates can be an important input for policymakers undertaking the social cost-benefit 
analysis of interconnecting SEM with these markets.         
 
However, it is likely that SEM will be further linked to GB as the two markets are 
already physically interconnected.  Hence, this study also estimates the current state of 
market integration between GB and SEM using the half-hourly spot prices accounting 
for the negative wholesale prices in SEM. Table 5.8 shows the market integration 
coefficients for SEM and GB which evidences the existence of an integrated market 
between SEM and GB. The current market integration of 17% indicates that an 
engineering capacity of 2941 MW is required to achieve 100% market integration 
between GB and SEM with all other things remaining constant. Full market integration 
would generate a gross benefit of about 306 million euros in SEM arising from the 
competition effects between GB and SEM markets.  
 
Method: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt) 
Sample: 1/01/2008 to 12/31/2011 
 
Market Pairs 
 
Final State of Market Integration 
 
SEM-GB (log) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
 
SEM-GB (levels) 
-0.41 
(0.460) 
Table 5.8: SEM-GB market integration coefficients (in log and levels) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively 
Numbers in brackets report the root mean squared errors 
 
The results also indicate the market integration between SEM and GB with a direct 
physical connection is less than the market integration between SEM and Elspot even 
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without a direct physical interconnection. This could be primarily because of the 
illiquidity of the GB market implying that the market is not fully able to capture all 
available market information via prices. Liquidity in the GB wholesale market has 
declined since 2001 primarily because the major vertically integrated players owning 
both generation and supply can sign confidential bilateral contracts with retailers 
outside the wholesale market (DECC, 2010). It also indicates that the Moyle 
interconnector may not be efficiently used to generate any substantial effect on market 
integration between SEM and GB. Likewise, the market integration coefficient remains 
insignificant after including the negative prices making the contribution of renewable 
energy trade to market integration inconclusive. 
  
Figure 5.2 shows the path of the market integration coefficient (βAB,t) between GB and 
SEM markets since November 1, 2008. It can be seen that the coefficient has remained 
seemingly volatile primarily due to series of market events and announcements in the 
GB and SEM markets. The introduction of Moyle access arrangements and capacity 
allocation procedures in 2008 could have produced this effect even though it requires 
examining in a detailed event study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 : 
Figure 5.2: Path of time varying coefficient (βAB,t) 
 
 
The results from CUSUM plot in Figure 5.3 show that the markets experienced several 
structural changes since the third quarter of 2008. The market integration coefficient has 
reached as high as 0.6 while also hitting as low as -0.7. The integration coefficient 
remained volatile and unstable over time and far from reaching unity which can 
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primarily be attributed to various uncertainties such as trading and volatility associated 
with high liquidity in a newly established market. However, higher price volatility can 
be an inherent feature of a liberalised energy market where prices quickly adjust to 
market volatility and shocks.    
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Figure 5.3: CUSUM plot for assessing structural changes 
 
5.8. Discussions and Policy Recommendations 
 
The low levels of market integration and relatively higher average wholesale prices in 
SEM as compared to other wholesale markets in Europe including GB indicates 
significant potential for wholesale price reductions in SEM from increased 
interconnection. The transition towards a low-carbon economy has meant that the Irish 
government has a target to achieve 40% of energy consumption from wind energy by 
2020. Expanding interconnections will enable SEM to effectively utilise the growing 
wind generation by exporting to BETTA and other markets as there are physical 
limitations to the amount of wind that can be accommodated within the SEM. Hence, 
the proposal to expand the interconnection network through the East-West 
interconnector (Ireland-Wales) apart from the existing Ireland-Northern Ireland 
interconnector (Louth-Tandragee) and the existing 500 MW Northern Ireland-Scotland 
interconnector is desirable. However, an interconnected system also bears certain 
security of supply risks as the damages in one region can easily spread along the 
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interconnected regions via the interconnector creating a ‘ripple effect’ (Hammond and 
Waldron, 2008). Interconnecting markets with a growing share of diverse and 
intermittent wind generation can pose additional security of supply challenges to the 
grid and system operators due to system imbalances and inadequate system 
harmonisation. 
 
The market integration results suggest the availability of interconnector capacity and 
efficiency of interconnection usage to be significant in affecting the level of market 
integration. Furthermore, efficient interconnection usage can contribute to high liquidity 
even in the presence of a fair amount of vertical integration among electricity 
companies as suggested by Germany and Norway. However, Gebhardt and Hoffler 
(2013) showed that it is rather the lack of competition, a case where well-informed 
traders do not engage in international electricity trade, than the presence of limited 
interconnector capacities that explains the significant difference in average international 
electricity prices across Europe. This indicates that inefficient use of interconnector 
capacity remains a major problem in the liberalised electricity markets in Europe. De 
Nooij (2011) also mentioned that a capacity worth almost 50 million euros was not 
utilised in the German-Dutch interconnector in 2004 while underutilisation and misuse 
led to a loss of 289 million euros in the UK-France interconnector from 2001 to 2005. 
Hence, it is desirable that the existing interconnector capacities between SEM and GB 
are efficiently used while GB also expands interconnection to mainland European 
electricity markets. 
 
Market coupling can be an appropriate mechanism to efficiently utilise existing 
interconnector capacity and improve market integration. Market coupling will allow 
wholesale market participants to benefit from cross-border exchanges without needing 
to explicitly acquire the corresponding transmission capacity. Transmission capacity is 
automatically used to the maximum extent possible and surplus capacities will be made 
available for reallocation. This implies that market coupling also reduces potential for 
hoarding capacity. The market coupling mechanism allows different wholesale markets 
across countries to be coupled in a manner that requires them to make minimal changes 
to their market rules while maximising the total economic surplus of all participants. 
This is because cheaper electricity generation in one market can meet demand and 
reduce prices in another market while the markets will converge entirely when there are 
no transmission constraints. Market coupling, thus, represents a major step towards a 
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more integrated European market. Hence, the proposal to couple SEM with GB and 
French markets by 2014 seems desirable in integrating the SEM market with mainland 
Europe while additional market coupling possibilities with other continental markets 
should also be explored. 
 
Reform of the UK electricity market implies that GB is set to introduce the carbon price 
floor from April, 2013 to ensure the viability of long-term contracts. Long-term 
contracts would reduce the risk and assure the market and the new entrants of a future 
revenue stream and encourage investments towards low-or zero-carbon generation. 
Hence, the introduction of a carbon floor price may lead to a tax reflecting the 
difference between the carbon floor price and the EU’s European Trading Scheme 
(ETS) price. That price cannot be readily reflected by the existing SEM rules and 
thereby presents a problem. In addition, this raises questions about whether the costs 
should be absorbed by Northern Ireland generators or if Ireland will have to introduce a 
similar carbon price. It is desirable that the Republic of Ireland also adopts the carbon 
price floor to mitigate any fiscal disadvantage with Northern Ireland. It would be 
interesting to assess the the impact of carbon price floor introduction on market 
integration between GB and SEM with a longer time-series data accounting for future 
changes in market rules and regulation. 
 
The future regulatory environment surrounding wind energy also needs to be examined 
as wind generation is set to increase in SEM and the rest of Europe. It is desirable that 
tradable permits for wind generation are established so that surplus wind electricity 
generated in Ireland could be traded to another market with a deficit leading to a more 
efficient allocation of resources. This could also be a viable option for managing the 
wind energy to be generated across the EU in the future. However, exporting wind 
electricity generated from Ireland also means that consumers in other markets are 
benefiting from wind subsidies in the SEM market and appropriate arrangements are 
needed to address the free-rider issues without disrupting the electricity generation from 
wind.  
 
5.9. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the impact of interconnections on market 
integration in the all-island Irish electricity wholesale market. SEM is a small isolated 
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market with a relatively small number of market players and thereby operating under an 
oligopolistic market structure. Oligopolistic market structures are typically not 
considered to be competitive and can lead to anti-competitive outcomes under limited 
competition. Hence, market integration of SEM with other markets can be desirable to 
prevent any anti-competitive market outcomes in SEM. A time-varying econometric 
technique based on the Kalman filter algorithm was applied to determine the degree of 
market integration between SEM and other large, mature and interconnected wholesale 
electricity markets in Europe including the GB market.   
 
The results show that market integration of SEM with other wholesale markets around 
Europe excluding Elspot and GB do not exist largely due to the absence of direct 
physical interconnection between these markets. However, the results show a low 
evidence of market integration between Elspot and SEM despite any direct physical 
interconnection between these markets. This indicates that unobservable factors such as 
market liquidity may be a crucial factor in facilitating wholesale market integration and 
requires further research. The results also suggest low market integration between SEM 
and GB despite a direct physical interconnection between these markets. This indicates 
the need to expand interconnections between SEM and GB while efficiently utilising 
the existing interconnector capacities.   
 
It is desirable that SEM reduces its reliance on expensive gas firing and increase 
generation from alternative energy sources as the average wholesale prices in SEM are 
high and volatile as compared to other markets in Europe. As such, the Republic of 
Ireland has a target of generating 40% of electricity from wind by 2020 which seems 
appropriate and forward looking. However, the Kalman filter results remain 
inconclusive in determining whether trading intermittent energy sources such as wind 
can contribute towards market integration unless other complementary conditions such 
as storage, proper regulatory and market design framework are established. 
Nonetheless, it can be expected that an increasing share of wind energy in the 
generation mix across Europe will improve the wholesale market integration as 
generation technologies converge. This will require further research.  
 
The results also showed that the gross benefits to SEM from wholesale price 
convergence with other European markets are large. This indicates that interconnecting 
markets and increased trading of electricity on a level playing field via a common 
 115 
platform such as power exchange can offset the problems of potential market power 
abuse and increase competition in the wholesale market. Increased interconnections will 
also increase the security of supply benefits and reduced price volatility apart from the 
benefits of lower prices as markets integrate. For example, price volatility in Elspot is 
lowest because of increased cross-border electricity trade with the integrated markets 
even though the region is dominated by seasonally varying hydro generation. This 
implies that integrated markets can still pursue interconnections expansion to improve 
security of supply and mitigate price volatility. 
 
However, increasing interconnections will require major investments in interconnector 
capacity and transmission networks. Thus, it is desirable that interconnections with 
other larger wholesale markets in Europe such as Elspot are considered based on careful 
cost-benefit analysis. Interconnecting markets and improving market integration will 
also require some harmonisation of economic and regulatory institutions across 
countries which can be challenging. However, if properly done, the gains can be 
significant as demonstrated by the NordPool experience. Other important factors 
include establishing appropriate regulatory frameworks and market design that 
incentivizes wholesale market participants to actively engage in cross-border electricity 
trade as well as optimally utilising the interconnector capacity and generating adequate 
investments in transmission infrastructure.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
6.1. Summary 
 
This thesis qualitatively and quantitatively assesses the evolution and impact of market-
driven reforms evolving the electricity sector of less-developed, transition and 
developed countries based on cross-country econometric and case studies. The countries 
studied include Nepal, the transition countries and the all-island Irish economies. 
Deriving relevant and feasible reform options and policy recommendations for the 
electricity sector based on the lessons learnt after considering more than two decades of 
power sector reforms in these countries is the major aim of this thesis. 
 
Electricity sector reforms in Nepal started in the early 1990s often as a result of direct 
pressures from international donor organisations. Nepal is a developing country in 
South Asia with a small electricity sector and has only pursued minimal power sector 
reforms. The state is actively involved in the operation and management of the power 
sector in Nepal. The transition countries include both developing and developed 
economies with electricity sectors of varying size and have pursued minimal to full 
adoption of the standard reform model. These countries experienced power sector 
reforms in the context of overall market-oriented macroeconomic reforms in the 
economy. The role of the state in power sector ownership and control significantly 
varies among the transition countries. Ireland and Northern Ireland have fully adopted 
the standard reform model with the joint operation of a small organised wholesale spot 
market for electricity. The successful reform experience in the UK with market-based 
models provided the early impetus for reforming the all-island electricity markets. 
Hence, the role of the state in power sector operation and management remains limited 
in the presence of independent regulatory authorities across the island. 
 
The analysis of electricity reforms among countries studied in this thesis suggests 
significant heterogeneity in the power sector outcomes even though all of these 
countries adopted the standard reform model to some extent. Reforms appear to have 
led to some improvements in efficiency gains in the electricity sector of reforming 
countries when implemented properly even though the direct benefits of reforms to end 
consumers remain less visible. The governance of the electricity sector has also 
improved in developing and developed countries where independent regulation has been 
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effective. Likewise, the prospects of competition and innovation in the sector have 
improved with the proper implementation of reforms. For example, Guatemala has a 
competitive wholesale power market with a capacity of 1875 MW while the small joint 
Irish market in the European context is expanding interconnections to reap the benefits 
from deepening competition in the wholesale market. However, it is not clear from the 
findings of this thesis that the application of the market-driven reform process has been 
a global success after nearly three decades of reforms and restructuring of the electricity 
sector. This necessitates a careful understanding of the lessons and policy implications 
of electricity reforms based on liberal market-oriented policies. 
 
6.2. Lessons and Policy Implications 
 
 Academics, policymakers and practitioners in favour of the standard reform model may 
generalise the success of reforms in pioneer reforming countries such as NordPool, UK, 
Chile and other LACs such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil in concluding that 
market-based reforms can be successful when implemented properly. These LACs 
preferred to pursue competition and privatisation of the electricity sector as opposed to 
the single buyer model with public ownership prevalent in most South Asian countries 
such as Nepal. In contrast, those critical of  the reform process can generalise the 
outcomes of the slow and unstable market-based reforms in Eastern Europe, Asia and 
Africa in concluding that the reform process has been costly, unsuccessful and 
economically wasteful.   
 
The severe market failures that occurred in the liberalised Californian electricity market 
during 2001-2002 and popularly known as the California crisis marked a turning point 
in the progress of electricity and gas market liberalisation in the US and cannot be 
forgotten. The UK reform experience has also revealed considerable complexities and 
difficulties in making market driven reforms work when the global trend towards 
electricity reform is driven by orthodox political ideologies and theoretical arguments in 
favour of market-oriented reforms for nearly two decades (Newbery, 2012). Hence, it is 
necessary to draw out relevant lessons and policy implications of reforms in terms of 
‘what needs to be done’ and ‘what needs to be avoided’ based on the reform discourse 
observed from different reforming countries at varying stages of the market-oriented 
reform process and economic development.  
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6.2.1. Reform in developing countries 
 
 Many developing countries such as Nepal face continued major challenge of meeting 
their electricity demand driven by economic growth and increasing population. The 
inelastic demand for electricity from industrial and residential consumers has resulted in 
rolling and frequent power outages under tight electricity demand and supply 
conditions. The electricity prices are not market clearing as market determined prices 
are not politically desirable even though some elements of market-based reforms are 
introduced in these countries. This implies that electricity prices will have to rise from 
uneconomic levels in developing countries. Moreover, electricity price reforms have 
always presented a complex dilemma for developing countries. Politically determined 
low electricity prices can be essential in these countries to maintain social equity and 
increase affordability among the dominant poor population although not being 
economically efficient and desirable. Thus, any attempts to radically increase the 
electricity price can be unsuccessful in the absence of a cautious balancing mechanism 
between economic efficiency and social equity. For example, it is prudent that price 
adjustments be done before privatisation rather than after privatisation for socio-
economic reasons if privatisation of the electricity companies is considered as an option 
for reform in less-developed countries. Lessons from LACs suggest that the mass public 
opposition to privatisation arose due to the failure of the liberalised reform process to 
deliver for the poor while being linked to bad governance and corruption (Roland, 
2008). 
 
Electricity sector reform and restructuring is a costly process and successful adoption of 
market-based reforms should not be taken for granted by developing countries. It may 
not be necessary for less-developed countries to pursue radical restructuring of their 
electricity markets based on the standard textbook model as many countries such as 
Norway, Brazil, China, France and US have historically succeeded and still continue to 
do so in developing their electricity sector with publicly-owned companies. Governance 
improvements are crucial in these countries to control corruption and the issues of non-
payment. Improvements in governance are also necessary in order to have independent 
regulation in place in case of reforms being adopted. Thus, corruption control together 
with skilled work force enrichment and carefully determined sustainable electricity 
prices may be more essential in some developing countries rather than the electricity 
reforms proposed by the standard model.   
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 However, it is clear that proper implementation of reforms in developing countries such 
as Argentina led to a significant increase in investments in generation and network 
expansion while Colombia gained major power efficiency in distribution and foreign 
investment. In countries like Peru and Brazil, access to electricity and labour 
productivity in distribution and supply companies improved respectively after the 
introduction of market-based reforms in their electricity sector (Millan, 2006; Anaya, 
2010). Therefore, the application and sequencing of electricity sector reforms in less-
developed and developing countries is largely country-specific depending on individual 
country needs and priorities and should not be driven by the 'keeping up with the 
Joneses' principles. The LACs reform experience also suggests significant benefits of 
increased competition from the adoption of the market-based model as market grows. 
Hence, small countries like Nepal may benefit from full adoption of the standard reform 
model by expanding interconnections with other South Asian countries and increasing 
the size of the market. An integrated South Asian regional market for electricity can be 
an option for small economies like Nepal with high electricity generation potential in 
the long- run.  
Moreover, the lack of adequate network investments will be a critical issue for 
developing countries even though the current major concerns with reforms are mostly 
associated with generation adequacy and easing capacity shortage. It is inevitable that 
the existing grid in these countries cannot accommodate all electricity generated as 
generation continues to expand to meet growing demand. Further, the gradual switch 
towards renewable energy sources will exert additional pressure on the existing grid in 
terms of integrating generation into the transmission and distribution networks unless 
re-designed and updated. For example, the Indian power crisis that occurred during July 
in 2012 affected around 700 million people and halted the functioning of several other 
critical infrastructures after a two-day blackout. The blackout experience teaches a 
valuable lesson for developing countries to also invest in power infrastructures and 
effectively manage demand in meeting the growing electricity demand spurred by 
economic growth.  
6.2.2. Reform in transition economies 
In transition countries, electricity sector reforms occurred along with reforms in other 
sectors of the economy. Hence, electricity reforms became a mixed priority due to the 
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need to focus reforms in other sectors of the economy as well. This could be a major 
reason for the observed heterogeneity of reforms implemented across the transition 
countries with mixed success stories. Those aspiring to join the EU have pursued more 
far-reaching reforms such as retail market opening and the creation of a spot market in 
their wholesale market while those in Asia such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Belarus are still struggling with early stages of reform.  Most importantly, it is not clear 
among the transition countries whether the advanced reformers have significantly 
benefited from market-driven reforms than the slow reforming or non-reforming 
countries.   
 
This is possibly because power sector reforms in transition countries were not well-
targeted as they missed the third major element of the standard model which focussed 
on creating powerful and effective new institutions such as independent regulation. The 
neo-classical belief that institutions ‘do not matter’ did not hold true in power sector 
reforms of the transition countries while all other successful reformers like UK, Chile 
and Norway had well designed economic institutions in place to buttress market-based 
reforms in the electricity sector. Hence, the reform experiment in the transition countries 
teaches an important lesson to other developing countries, that structural changes take 
time to implement and to produce desired effects. This implies that it is important to 
envisage a suitable industry structure from the start of the reform. It is essential that 
appropriate governance mechanisms be put in place so that the social and institutional 
capacities of the country are able to support the reforms being implemented in the 
power sector. A better understanding of the energy sector political economy needs to be 
developed in developing and transition countries to adequately inform the reform design 
and process. 
   
The evidence of reforms from transition countries provides a clear lesson that the 
success of electricity reforms can depend on the willingness to change, learn and adapt 
to new information and problems. Political ideology often has proved to be a stumbling 
block in power sector reforms flourishing among these countries as demonstrated by the 
group of Caspian countries. Hence, political objectives should not be prioritised at the 
expense of sound economic principles while the political-economy arrangements in 
these countries should facilitate the reform process in the electricity sector as a whole.  
Likewise, social legitimacy and public acceptance of reforms are crucial in tackling the 
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traditional problems of power theft and non-payment in most of the transition and 
developing countries.   
Social legitimacy and public acceptance of reforms can be increased if adopted reform 
programs adequately reflect the local or country-specific economic, political and social 
conditions shaping the power sector rather than solely holding to a reform ideology that 
proved successful elsewhere. Thus, it is not clear if market-centred EU electricity 
reform model which is in a trial phase across the EU-25 is the best reform model for all 
transition countries. It is essential that development policymakers not rely on formulaic 
economic or systems models for power sector reform in developing and transition 
countries.  Similarly, the small size of the electricity market in some SEE countries like 
Albania, BIH, Romania and Montenegro indicate that these countries need to expand 
interconnection to reap the benefits of increased wholesale competition from the 
adoption of the market-oriented economic reforms.  
6.2.3. Reform in developed economies 
In developed economies such as the EU, electricity reforms have reached advanced 
stages with major elements of the standard reform model being already implemented.  
Many developed economies have already established wholesale spot markets for 
electricity. To some extent, the EU electricity market reform process is unique because 
it allowed for retail competition from start in the form of market opening. However, 
differences exist among EU countries such as in France and Germany where both 
economies have 100% market opening in principle but the practice of market opening 
and consumer switching suppliers is irrelevant in France where regulated customers  
benefit from low electricity prices due to large nuclear generation and national 
subsidies. Likewise, the French electricity industry is still heavily vertically integrated 
as generation, transmission and supply have not been separated indicating a deviation 
from the standard reform model.   
Elsewhere such as in the Netherlands, the industry is vertically separated and the 
transmission network is ownership unbundled. The distribution segment is legally 
unbundled from the competitive segments. Similarly, energy sector private ownership 
has been pervasive in economies like Germany, the US and Japan throughout the post-
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World War II period while substantial public ownership has persisted within liberalised 
energy sector in economies like Norway, Sweden, New Zealand and Australia (Pollitt, 
2012). Nonetheless, the creation of a single integrated market for electricity is a major 
objective across the EU as driven by the Lisbon Agenda of 2010 and reinforced by the 
three European Directives. It is, however, essential to understand that achieving full 
market integration across the EU still requires harmonisation of the economic and 
institutional aspects governing the regionally integrated but yet separate cross-border 
markets.   
The creation of organized spot markets such as power exchanges and removal of cross-
border trade barriers has facilitated the economic integration of wholesale electricity 
markets across the EU creating separate regional trading blocs. However, day-ahead 
wholesale electricity price differences are still large among countries like Ireland and 
UK as compared to the prices in NordPool countries such as Norway and Sweden 
(Meeus and Belmans, 2008). Incompatible differences also exist in the form of market 
design and structure among the different transmission system operators (TSOs) and the 
spot market operators. Electricity reform lessons from NordPool, which runs the largest 
spot market for electricity in the world, suggest that market integration is largely 
dependent on establishing similar institutional and economic arrangements as exists 
within the Nordic countries. However, the regulatory environment and the governance 
structures vary widely across the EU markets. For example, the French electricity 
industry operates on a more hierarchical structure where the Ministry assumes a greater 
control in terms of responsibility allocation among the regulatory authorities. On the 
contrary, the Dutch electricity industry is operated under market based governance with 
greater control from the independent regulatory agency and the competition authority 
(Niesten, 2006). The incompatibility among these unobservable institutional factors 
should not be overlooked as they can significantly delay the creation of a single 
integrated market for electricity in Europe.   
Increased investment in transmission networks and transmission infrastructures 
connecting the cross-border markets coupled with an efficient allocation and usage of 
transmission capacity is essential among the EU electricity wholesale markets to 
improve market integration among them. This is particularly true for small isolated 
regions and island economies in the EU such as Ireland. The transition towards a less 
carbon intensive energy-economy, increasing digitisation of the grid, (the so- called 
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smart grids), larger adoption of renewable energy and the growing integration of electric 
vehicles also implies undertaking the capital-intensive tasks of maintaining and re-
designing the existing grid to accommodate these technological transitions in the 
networks. It is estimated that the transition towards a sustainable and smart energy 
economy will require investments of about 200 billion euros in electricity and gas 
transmission networks (Vinois, 2012).   
However, the lack of adequate investment in both transmission and distribution 
networks is a major regulatory issue of the modern day liberalised market structures in 
the EU built on the standard reform model. The on-going quest towards the creation of a 
common internal market of electricity can depend on the ability of the EU electricity 
markets to innovate the required level of investment in the networks and cross-border 
infrastructures. This remains a major challenge in the absence of an appropriate 
regulatory framework and adequate institutional harmonisation across member states. 
However, increased investments and a significant rise in grid related capital costs will 
necessitate a rise in consumer electricity bills. Rising end-user electricity bills can be a 
major concern for countries like the UK where around 4.75 million households 
experienced fuel poverty in 2010 (DECC, 2012). Hence, developed economies also face 
a major challenge and need of balancing economic efficiency and social equity as in less 
developed and developing countries. However, developed countries may find prices 
falling due to reform and have the capacity to absorb or adjust to rising prices for low 
income groups via the national tax and benefit system. This may be more difficult to 
achieve in developing countries due to political problems.  
 
More emphasis should be placed on energy efficiency combined with the use of energy 
efficient technologies and demand-side management in advanced economies like the EU 
as final consumer electricity bills rise. The role of the regulatory body to generate the 
required level of investment and mitigate the adverse impact of electricity price rises 
would be equally important. 
    
6.3. Further Research and Concluding Remarks 
This thesis analysed the process and outcomes of market driven electricity reforms in 
developing, transition and developed economies. The findings cast doubt on the net 
benefit of competition arising from implementing market driven reforms in small 
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electricity systems. Hence, evidence is needed to assert the appropriateness of full 
adoption of market driven reforms in small systems. Further research is required to 
estimate all the relevant costs and benefits of electricity reform in small systems using 
cost-benefit analysis. The use of SCBA in analysing the effectiveness of electricity 
reforms in developing countries is also limited in the literature implying a considerable 
knowledge gap. Hence, undertaking a SCBA of reforms can offer useful policy 
guidance for developing countries before implementing a comprehensive electricity 
reform.    
The thesis also portrays mixed evidence of market-based reforms in improving 
electricity access in developing and transition countries. Market driven reforms have 
significantly improved electricity access in most of the LACs while the model has been 
less successful in South Asia in improving electricity access. In contrary, centrally 
planned models have been successful in delivering higher levels of electrification in 
transition countries. Universal electrification has also been successfully achieved in 
China despite a population over 1.3 billion. Hence, further research is required to assess 
the suitable model for improving electricity access in developing countries. Similarly, 
the thesis places greater emphasis on the importance of electricity wholesale market 
liquidity on electricity market integration across Europe. Further research can be carried 
out to examine the direct impact of market liquidity on wholesale price convergence 
among EU electricity markets.  
It is evident from the thesis that electricity reform process remains a work in progress 
and an evolving process across all countries. A majority of the less-developed and 
developing countries are still on some stages of the standard reform menu. Some 
developed countries have established a well-functioning wholesale spot market for 
electricity but are suffering from chronic market power concerns coupled with the 
inability to sustain competition and lack of investment in the networks. Climate change 
and security of supply issues in the face of regulatory uncertainty have raised new 
problems and concerns in advanced economies such as the EU where reforms have 
already reached the advanced stages of the market-based reform process. For example, 
recent electricity reforms in the UK are being driven by capacity shortage concerns as is 
also present among the less-developed and developing countries. However, the contexts 
vary. While cost-reflective pricing and privatisation in the presence of sound regulation 
can mitigate the capacity concerns in developing countries; developed countries such as 
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UK will need a new market model and industry structure to increase the production and 
accommodation of renewable energy sources. This will discourage fossil-based 
generation in the transition towards a low-carbon economy and meet the EU energy 
policy goals and environmental targets.   
The thesis reveals that electricity sector reforms remain a major economic, political and 
social challenge across all reforming countries in the world. This is because electricity 
reforms require coordinated progress on all aspects of the development process, namely 
political, macro-economic, sectoral, and financial to be successful. The interplay and 
intricacies between the economic, social and political factors complicates the reform 
process. Thereby, any qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the success or failure of 
the reform process is difficult irrespective of the evaluation of reforms being a matter of 
empirical testing or theoretical debate. It may be argued that the long-term 
consequences of market-based reforms in the electricity sector will be much clearer by 
qualitatively and quantitatively studying a longer reform discourse in the future. 
However, this is not a guarantee, as how long exactly 'long-term' is remains wholly 
unanswered. Further, new economic, political and technological challenges will 
continue to evolve the electricity sector as market based reforms continue to progress 
across all countries, though at varying speed. As such, it is clear that electricity sector 
reforms are an evolving and changing process rather than a one-off event. These factors 
lead to a unanimous conclusion that electricity sector reform is and will indeed remain a 
complex process across each economy.  
The reliance on market based models and the extent to which electricity reforms have 
been pursued in each economy has reflected a general political belief in the efficacy of 
markets. However, competitive markets with independent regulatory bodies have 
exhibited significant market and regulatory failures as observed among the EU 
electricity markets. In contrary, the active involvement of the state in the electricity 
sector across developing countries has often demonstrated severe political failures in 
electricity sector management and operation as evident among some transition and most 
South Asian countries. The electricity market model in EU has also demonstrated 
considerable stress in delivering the large scale investment required for electricity 
infrastructure expansion to meet climate change targets and security of supply 
standards. This indicates the need to carefully assess whether future electricity sector 
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reform process should involve a greater role of state intervention rather than a complete 
reliance on market and market-based solutions.        
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